What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain?

Abstract : Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires (formed by learning), the contents of innate representations (depending directly on evolution by natural selection) cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.


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Contributor : Jacob Pierre <>
Submitted on : Friday, June 21, 2002 - 2:00:48 PM
Last modification on : Friday, June 21, 2002 - 2:00:48 PM

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Pierre Jacob. What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain?. Kluwer. Colloque Causal explanation of action, 1997. <ijn_00000051>

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