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Colloque Causal explanation of action (1997)
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What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain?
Pierre Jacob1

Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires (formed by learning), the contents of innate representations (depending directly on evolution by natural selection) cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.
1 :  IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'action

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit
Causal explanation – intentional behavior – content

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