Qualia Domesticated

Abstract : Consider the following argument (1) If panpsychism is true, then the hard problem of consciousness is solved (2) Physicalism is true (3) Physicalism entails panpsychism. We conclude that (4) The hard problem of consciousness is solved. This is a valid argument, and one whose conclusion has a certain appeal. What about the premisses? How exactly is panpsychism a solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness? Who can take panpsychism seriously, and how can panpsychism be entailed by physicalism? A little forcing is assumed in suggesting to consider a philosophical argument whose conclusion is panpsychism. But I think the exercise is worthwhile, provided we spell out all the consequences of forcing.
keyword : qualia physicalism
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Book sections
Amita Chatterjee. Towards a Science of Consciousness, 2002


http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000057
Contributor : Roberto Casati <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, June 25, 2002 - 1:00:24 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 25, 2002 - 1:00:24 PM

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Roberto Casati. Qualia Domesticated. Amita Chatterjee. Towards a Science of Consciousness, 2002. <ijn_00000057>

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