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Acta Analytica 26 (2000) pp. 45-52
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Conscious experience and concept forming abilities
Elisabeth Pacherie1
(2000)

This paper examines Pierre Jacob's claim that in order to undergo states of consciousness a creature must have concept-forming abilities. I discuss the motivations behind this claim and its relations to two importants distinctions in Dretske's work: the distinction between analogical and digital coding of information and the distinction between sensory content and conceptual content. I argue that Jacob's claim is too strong and can be replaced by a weaker requirement.
1 :  IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de la perception

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit
Perception – conscience – concepts – Jacob – Dretske

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