Conscious experience and concept forming abilities

Abstract : This paper examines Pierre Jacob's claim that in order to undergo states of consciousness a creature must have concept-forming abilities. I discuss the motivations behind this claim and its relations to two importants distinctions in Dretske's work: the distinction between analogical and digital coding of information and the distinction between sensory content and conceptual content. I argue that Jacob's claim is too strong and can be replaced by a weaker requirement.
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Journal articles
Acta Analytica, 2000, 26, pp. 45-52


http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000246
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Monday, October 28, 2002 - 5:00:47 PM
Last modification on : Monday, October 28, 2002 - 5:00:47 PM

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Elisabeth Pacherie. Conscious experience and concept forming abilities. Acta Analytica, 2000, 26, pp. 45-52. <ijn_00000246>

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