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Archive Electronique |
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| Acta Analytica 26 (2000) pp. 45-52 |
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| Conscious experience and concept forming abilities |
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| Elisabeth Pacherie1 |
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| (2000) |
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| This paper examines Pierre Jacob's claim that in order to undergo states of consciousness a creature must have concept-forming abilities. I discuss the motivations behind this claim and its relations to two importants distinctions in Dretske's work: the distinction between analogical and digital coding of information and the distinction between sensory content and conceptual content. I argue that Jacob's claim is too strong and can be replaced by a weaker requirement. |
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| 1 : | IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod |
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| Thématiques scientifiques | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de la perception Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit |
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| Perception – conscience – concepts – Jacob – Dretske |
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| ijn_00000246, version 1 | |
| http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000246 | |
| oai:jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr:ijn_00000246 | |
| Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie | |
| Soumis le : Lundi 28 Octobre 2002, 17:47:16 | |
| Dernière modification le : Lundi 28 Octobre 2002, 17:47:16 | |
