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Do we know how we know our own minds yet?
Pierre Jacob1
(2003)

In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
1 :  IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de la perception

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit
Self-knowledge – content externalism – displaced perception

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