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| Do we know how we know our own minds yet? |
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| Pierre Jacob1 |
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| (2003) |
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| In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer. |
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| 1 : | IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod |
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| Thématiques scientifiques | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de la perception Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie/Philosophie de l'esprit |
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| Self-knowledge – content externalism – displaced perception |
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| ijn_00000352, version 1 | |
| http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000352 | |
| oai:jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr:ijn_00000352 | |
| Contributeur : Pierre Jacob | |
| Soumis le : Vendredi 6 Juin 2003, 15:03:40 | |
| Dernière modification le : Vendredi 6 Juin 2003, 15:03:40 | |
