Thinking of oneself as the same

Abstract : What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own internal states). This view is compatible with the hypothesis that the self is a dynamic representation emerging out of a higher level control system, - valuation control - whose articulation with control of plans and perceptual/motor control is discussed in the context of normal and pertrubed agency .
Document type :
Journal articles
Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.495-509
Contributor : Joëlle Proust <>
Submitted on : Monday, June 7, 2004 - 7:28:02 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 2, 2015 - 11:06:22 AM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Saturday, April 3, 2010 - 7:07:15 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000504, version 1



Joëlle Proust. Thinking of oneself as the same. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.495-509. <ijn_00000504>




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