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Archive Electronique |
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Archive Electronique |
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| Detailed view |
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| Voluntary action, Oxford University Press (Ed.) (2003) 202-219 |
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| Attached file list to this document: | |||||
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| How voluntary are minimal actions ? |
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| Joëlle Proust1 |
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| (2003) |
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| This book chapter aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional causation, may still qualify such a behavior as voluntary. |
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| 1: | IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod |
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| Subject category | : | Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/Philosophy of Mind Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/Philosophy of Action |
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| intention – awareness of agency – will – irreflexive action – second-order desire |
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| ijn_00139209, version 1 | |
| http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00139209/en/ | |
| oai:jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr:ijn_00139209_v1 | |
| From: Joëlle Proust | |
| Submitted on: Thursday, 29 March 2007 18:26:21 | |
| Updated on: Thursday, 29 March 2007 18:30:03 | |
