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Archive Electronique |
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| Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 3 (2004) 97-114 |
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| The co-consciousness hypothesis |
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| Frédérique De Vignemont1 |
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| (2004) |
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| Self-knowledge seems to be radically different from the knowledge of other people. However, rather than focusing on the gap between self and others, we should emphasize their commonality. Indeed, different “mirror matching mechanisms” have been found in monkeys as well as in humans showing that one uses the same representations for oneself and for the others. But do these shared representations allow one to report the mental states of others as if they were one's own? I intend in this essay to address the epistemic problem of other minds by developing Ayer's notion of co-consciousness. |
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| 1: | IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod |
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| Subject category | : | Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy/Philosophy of Mind Cognitive Science/Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Science/Naïve psychology and simulation |
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| Ayer – co-consciousness – empathy – mirror neurons – theory of mind |
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| ijn_00169608, version 1 | |
| http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00169608 | |
| oai:jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr:ijn_00169608 | |
| From: Frédérique De Vignemont | |
| Submitted on: Tuesday, 4 September 2007 14:34:46 | |
| Updated on: Tuesday, 4 September 2007 14:34:46 | |
