Qui a peur des qualia corporels?

Abstract : Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside" (seeing oneself or another in pain). I sketch another reductionist analysis which is compatible with materialism, and according to which the intentional object of bodily awareness, unlike that of external perception, constitutively depends on the subject's experience.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Philosophiques, Editions Bellarmin, 2000, 27 (1), pp.77-98
Liste complète des métadonnées

Contributeur : Jérôme Dokic <>
Soumis le : jeudi 5 septembre 2002 - 18:18:25
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:11:46


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000138, version 1



Jérôme Dokic. Qui a peur des qualia corporels?. Philosophiques, Editions Bellarmin, 2000, 27 (1), pp.77-98. 〈ijn_00000138〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers