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Qui a peur des qualia corporels?

Abstract : Qualia, conceived as intrinsic properties of experiences, are not always welcomed by materialists, who prefer to see them as intentional properties presented in our experience. I ask whether this form of reductionism applies to the qualia of bodily awareness. According to the standard materialist theory, the intentional object of pain experience, for instance, is a bodily damage. This theory, though, is unable to account for the phenomenal difference between feeling pain "inside" and perceiving it "outside" (seeing oneself or another in pain). I sketch another reductionist analysis which is compatible with materialism, and according to which the intentional object of bodily awareness, unlike that of external perception, constitutively depends on the subject's experience.
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Contributor : Jérôme Dokic <>
Submitted on : Thursday, September 5, 2002 - 6:18:25 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 3, 2010 - 8:11:46 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000138, version 1



Jérôme Dokic. Qui a peur des qualia corporels?. Philosophiques, Editions Bellarmin, 2000, 27 (1), pp.77-98. ⟨ijn_00000138⟩



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