



Open Quotation

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► **To cite this version:**

François Recanati. Open Quotation. Mind, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2001, 110 (439), pp.637-687. [ijn_00000157](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ijn_00000157)

HAL Id: [ijn_00000157](https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ijn_00000157)

https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000157

Submitted on 28 Sep 2002

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The issues addressed in philosophical papers on quotation generally concern only a particular type of quotation, which I call 'closed quotation'. The other main type, 'open quotation', is ignored, and this neglect leads to bad theorizing. Not only is a general theory of quotation out of reach: the specific phenomenon of closed quotation itself cannot be properly understood if it is not appropriately situated within the kind to which it belongs.

Once the distinction between open and closed quotation has been drawn and properly appreciated, it is tempting to consider that only closed quotation is relevant to semantics. Open quotation is more a matter of pragmatics: it is a matter of what people do with words, rather than a matter of content and truth-conditions. In this way one can provide the beginning of a justification for the neglect of open quotation in current semantic theorizing. There is some truth in this view, yet the phenomenon of 'mixed quotation', investigated at length in this paper, is interesting precisely because it shows that things are not so simple. Important issues concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics will thus be raised.

Introduction

Philosophical papers on quotation generally attempt to answer some of the following, basic questions:

— What is the reference of a quotation? Is it a linguistic expression as such, or a brute shape? Is it a type or a token? Is it possible to quote meanings or contents as well as forms of words?

— What does the referring in a quotation? Is it the quoted material itself which (self-) refers? Is it the complex expression, consisting of that material and the quotes, which refers to the quoted material? Or is it the quotation marks which do all the referring by themselves?

— Whatever plays the role of singular term, what sort of a singular term is it? Is it akin to a definite description, or to a genuine singular term? If the latter, should it be assimilated to a name, or to a demonstrative?

These, and other questions in the same vein, are interesting and worth answering (to the extent that their presuppositions are acceptable). But they concern only a particular type of quotation, which I call 'closed quotation'. The other main type, 'open quotation', is ignored, and this neglect leads to bad theorizing. Not only is a general theory of quotation out of reach: the specific phenomenon of closed quotation itself cannot be properly understood if it is not appropriately situated within the kind to which it belongs.

Most theorists are dimly aware that there are exotic varieties of quotation, not encompassed by their theories. 'Scare quoting' is an example. But they take this form of quotation to be fundamentally different from what they are trying to deal with; so different that it is misleading, they think, to call it by the same name. Thus it is a widespread practice among philosophers to deem 'quotation marks' ambiguous, and to attempt at disambiguation by using distinct symbols for (closed) quotation in the strict sense, and for 'scare quoting'. This suggests that the two forms do *not* really belong to the same kind. Let us call this suggestion the Homonymy Thesis. It is implicit in many philosophical discussions of quotation, but nowhere is an argument explicitly adduced in its favour. Nor is a systematic comparison between (closed) quotation and e.g. scare quoting anywhere undertaken — to my knowledge — in philosophical studies of quotation.

In recent years, undoubtedly, some progress has been made. This is mainly due to the influence of Davidson's iconoclastic views of the matter (Davidson 1979). In

their paper 'Varieties of Quotation' (1997) Cappelen and Lepore insist that any theory of quotation should account for the phenomenon of 'mixed quotation' illustrated by Davidson's famous example:

(1) Quine says that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature'

I will myself offer an analysis of mixed quotation in this paper. It is, I will argue, an instance of open quotation. For lack of the distinction between open and closed quotation, Davidson, Cappelen and Lepore, and other recent theorists who have attempted to deal with it have been unable to provide satisfactory accounts. But it was a good thing to broaden the scope of philosophical discussions of quotation by focussing on that phenomenon — the tip of an iceberg, in my view.

Once the distinction between open and closed quotation has been drawn and properly appreciated, it is tempting to consider that only closed quotation is relevant to semantics. Open quotation is more a matter of pragmatics: it is a matter of what people do with words, rather than a matter of content and truth-conditions. In this way one can provide the beginning of a justification for the neglect of open quotation in current semantic theorizing. There is some truth in this view, yet mixed quotation is interesting precisely because it shows that things are not so simple. Important issues concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics will thus be raised.

I. Quotations as pictures

§1.1 Displaying and demonstrating

In quotation, as several authors emphasized (Christensen 1967, Searle 1969, §4.1, Read forthcoming), the quoted material is *displayed* or *presented*. That means that a token is produced and the attention of the audience is drawn to that token. To be sure, whenever one says something, one produces (tokens of) words, with the intention that the

audience perceive them. Yet one does not normally intend the addressee to pay conscious attention to the words one utters. In linguistic communication, the words are automatically processed, and audience attention is drawn to what one says rather than to the means by which one says it. When words are mentioned, however, the *medium* itself is brought to the forefront of attention: the words are displayed, exhibited. This is a form of ostension, as Davidson and others pointed out, but it differs from ordinary ostension in one respect: the ostended token does not exist independently of the act of ostending it. When I point to a bird, the bird exists independent of my pointing, but when I mention a word, the ostended token is produced — it comes into being — through the very act of ostensive display.

At this point the question arises: what exactly is displayed? Tokens, or types? The proper answer to that question is: Both. Davidson says that the quotation marks "help refer to a shape [a type] by pointing out something that has it" [a token of the type] (Davidson 1979, p. 90). This could be understood in the light of Nunberg's distinction between index and referent (Nunberg 1993). Whenever one points to something, Nunberg says, a distinction should be drawn between that which is pointed to (the index), and that which is referred to through that pointing. Even if sometimes they happen to coincide, they do not always do so. Thus, handing my car key to an attendant at a parking lot, I may say 'This is parked out back': the index is the key, the referent is the car. Or I may point to a pair of shoes (index) and utter, 'Those are no longer in fashion'. In so doing I may well refer to *the shoes that are of that type* rather than to that particular pair of shoes. Similarly, one might argue, the quoter points to a token (index) and thereby designates a type (referent). For reasons that will become apparent, however, I do not want to bring the notion of reference into the picture at this stage. Rather, I suggest that we distinguish between the token which is *displayed* and what is (thereby) *demonstrated*. What the speaker ultimately calls attention to is not the

displayed token itself in all its singularity but certain properties of it, i.e. some type which it instantiates.¹

The claim that quotation is a matter of 'demonstrating' a type can be understood in two ways. What is common to both interpretations is the ostensive nature of quotation: the demonstrated type is exhibited by displaying a token of that type. Some interpret this in terms of reference. For Davidson, as we have seen, to demonstrate a type is to refer to it by displaying a token of it. In Part II, I will criticize Davidson's contention that the quotation marks have a referring function akin to that of a demonstrative. The other interpretation, which I adopt, is most prominent in the writings of the psychologist Herb Clark (Clark and Gerrig 1990, Clark 1996). In contrast to Davidson, Clark uses 'demonstrate' "in its everyday sense of 'illustrate by exemplification'" (Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 764 fn.). In that sense, Clark says, "you can demonstrate a tennis serve, a friend's limp, or the movement of a pendulum" (Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 764). To do so you must yourself produce an instance of the serve, the limp, or the movement. In quotation, what we demonstrate is a piece of verbal

¹ Cappelen and Lepore offer a different interpretation of Davidson's passage. Quotation marks, Davidson says, "help refer to a shape by pointing out something that has it... The singular term is the quotation marks, which may be read 'the expression a token of which is here' "(Davidson 1979, p. 90). Cappelen and Lepore take this at face value and conclude that quotation marks are "definite descriptions containing demonstratives": "the demonstrative picks out the token within the quotation marks and the definite description denotes an expression, i.e., a shape or a pattern, instantiated by the demonstrated token" (Cappelen and Lepore 1977, p. 439). Though possible, this interpretation of Davidson's passage is not mandatory. The putative equivalence between the quotation marks and the descriptive phrase 'the expression a token of which is here' can be construed more loosely, on the pattern of that between, say, the pronoun 'I' and the description 'the producer of this utterance'. Be that as it may, I am not concerned with Davidsonian exegesis in this paper. I mentioned Davidson's passage only because I think it points in the right direction.

behaviour — a way of speaking. We demonstrate it by producing an instance of that behaviour, that is, by speaking in the relevant way.²

The properties of the displayed token which the quoter calls attention to need not be purely linguistic properties — the sort of properties which are constitutive of linguistic types (word-types and sentence-types). As Clark points out, we do not merely demonstrate the words, but we also "depict all manner of speech characteristics — speed, gender, age, dialect, accent, drunkenness, lisping, anger, surprise, fear, stupidity, hesitancy, power" (Clark 1996, p. 175). Nor are the demonstrated properties confined to the realm of 'shapes'. Any aspect of speech can be demonstrated, meaning as well as form. Thus the sentence

(2) He said 'We're going to close early tonight'

can be used to report an utterance in Italian, provided the Italian sentence had a meaning sufficiently similar to that of the English sentence 'We're going to close early tonight' (Sperber and Wilson 1986, p. 228). What the demonstrator replicates here is only the meaning of the reported utterance, not the Italian wording (which the addressee would perhaps not understand).

As this example shows, not all the properties manifested by the displayed token are constitutive of the demonstrated type. Many properties of the displayed token are accidental or irrelevant and must be dismissed (Clark and Gerrig 1990, pp. 768-9 and

² According to Cappelen (personal communication), the everyday sense of 'demonstrate' only concerns events or actions: "You demonstrate how to do something, or how something happens or happened. You can't (in this sense) demonstrate an apple (though you can demonstrate how to eat an apple)." This may be right, but the restriction in question is irrelevant to my purposes. In what follows I will use 'demonstrate' in such a way that one *can* demonstrate even a type of thing. To demonstrate an apple, in the relevant sense, is to illustrate the 'apple' type by displaying a token of that type.

774 sq.). In (2) the property of being an English sentence is irrelevant to the demonstration; only the meaning of the sentence matters. (The demonstrated type, in that example, can be represented as the class of sentences which have the same meaning as the English sentence, whichever language they belong to.) On the other hand, there are properties which are constitutive of the demonstrated type but which are not actually 'manifested', in the sense that they cannot be read off the displayed token. One realizes that the displayed token has those properties only when one realizes that it is (intended as) a token of the relevant type.³ Identifying the demonstrated type is

³ This is the case in particular for some of the properties that are constitutive of linguistic types. In 'Types and tokens in linguistics', Sylvain Bromberger says that "there is a set of dimensions, representable as questions, in which each word type will find a location, and such that each word is fully individuated by the position it occupies in that space" (Bromberger 1989, p. 81). Examples of such questions are:

- How many syllables does the word contain?
- What is its underlying representation?
- What is its surface representation?
- What is the onset of its first syllable?
- What is its argument structure?

Similarly, "there is a set of questions to which each sentence type bears an answer, and whose answers fully individuate sentence types" (id.). For example:

- How many words does it contain?
- What is the matrix verb?
- What is the D-structure?
- What is the S-structure?
- Which phrase receives what thematic role from which predicate?

therefore like identifying the referent in an act of demonstrative reference: it is a full-fledged process of interpretation, possibly involving an assessment of the speaker's communicative intentions.

§1.2 The target of quotation

To analyse the interpretation process which underlies our ordinary understanding of quotations, we need more than two entities — the displayed token, and the properties of the displayed token to which the speaker intends to draw the hearer's attention. More often than not, the properties in question are demonstrated *because* they are properties of something which one attempts to depict through the demonstration. Let us call that thing the 'target'. In

(3) ... And then Greta Garbo said, 'I want to be alone!'

a token of the sentence 'I want to be alone' is displayed. It is intended to depict (mimick, simulate, provide an iconic representation of) the target of quotation: Garbo's utterance. The depiction is effected through properties shared by the displayed token and the target.⁴ The speaker therefore does three things at the same time: he *displays* a token, *demonstrates* certain properties of that token (a type), and thereby *depicts* the target.

When a token is displayed, certain questions are immediately answerable (by inspecting the token). Other can be answered only if the token is identified as a token of the relevant type. For example, in '*Put* is a three-letter word', the quoted word 'put' wears the number of its syllables on its sleeves, but a question concerning its argument structure can be answered only if the type of the displayed token is identified.

⁴ Once again, the properties in question need not be linguistic properties, and the demonstrated type need not be a linguistic type. As Clark points out, "many demonstrations combine sights and sounds, as when George demonstrates Greta

The target itself may be either a token or a type. When the target is a token, it is depicted by displaying another token of the same type. When the target is a type, it seems that we have only two entities: the displayed token and the type which it instantiates. But that need not be the case. The *demonstrated* type is such that the displayed token is (by definition) a token of that type. But one may attempt to depict a certain type (target) by displaying a token which is *not* of that type. Consider the following example of non-linguistic demonstration (Clark 1996, pp. 172-4). I can demonstrate to a friend how my sister Elizabeth drinks tea. To that effect I do something which resembles my sister's drinking tea: I hold an imaginary saucer in my hand, lift it to my lips in a certain way, etc. Through my demonstration, my friend "has a partial experience of what it would be like to see Elizabeth herself drinking tea" (Clark 1996, p. 174). Here the target of my demonstration undoubtedly is my sister's way of drinking tea. That is a *type* of action involving [a] a particular agent: my sister Elisabeth, [b] the two-place relation 'drinking', [c] a type of beverage (tea) filling the second argument role of the relation, [d] certain gestures, characteristic of Elizabeth when she drinks tea, etc. Particular *instances* of that action-type will involve specific (temporal and spatial) locations as well as particular instances of the type of beverage mentioned in [c]. Thus Elizabeth's drinking a certain cup of tea at a certain place at a certain time will count as an instance of the action-type 'Elizabeth drinking tea' (EDT, for short). Now when I demonstrate how Elizabeth drinks tea, I do not produce an instance of EDT: for the action I produce involves neither Elizabeth nor tea, since *I* am the agent and the cup I hold is imaginary. It follows that the action-type EDT cannot be the demonstrated type. The demonstrated type, rather, is HOW Elizabeth drinks tea: a certain pattern of bodily movements, which is instantiated not only by Elizabeth when she drinks tea but also by myself when I pretend to lift a saucer to my lips in a certain way. That action-type is superordinate to EDT in the sense that every instance of EDT is also an instance of that action-type. Let us call it H_{EDT} . The action which I produce,

Garbo's 'I want to be alone' in a Swedish accent while clutching his arms to his chest in a Garboesque pose" (Clark 1996, p. 175).

during the demonstration, is also an instance of H_{EDT} , hence H_{EDT} can count as the demonstrated type. But the target, what I intend to depict, is another, more specific type, namely EDT. And there are variants of the example in which the target of the demonstration will be even more specific: not a type, but a particular episode of tea-drinking behaviour on the part of Elizabeth.

I said above that there 'often' is a target which the demonstrator intends to depict. This implies that, in some cases at least, no such target can be found. The relevant examples are instances of *flat mention* like 'Cat is a three-letter word'. Here there is no target over and beyond the word-type 'cat' which is demonstrated by displaying a token of it. This is in contrast to (3), where the speaker's aim, in demonstrating the words 'I want to be alone', is to picture Garbo's utterance, to characterize it as an utterance of those very words.

Rather than say, as I have just done, that in such cases there is no target, I prefer to say that the target is the demonstrated type itself. The reason for speaking that way is that there is a striking similarity between the case in which the target is a type distinct from the demonstrated type, and the case in which it is the demonstrated type itself which the demonstrator wishes to depict. In the example I discussed above (my sister's drinking tea) the target of the demonstration was a type (EDT) distinct from the demonstrated type (H_{EDT}). But there is only a slight difference between, say, showing how Elisabeth drinks tea and showing how I drink tea (or showing how to drink tea); or between showing that with a real cup of tea in hand and showing it with an imaginary cup. If we want to capture that similarity we have to use a notion of 'target' which allows us to say that the target, in one case, is Elisabeth's way of drinking tea, and in the other case my own way. When, as in the latter case, the depicted type happens to be actually exemplified, that is, when the demonstrated type is the target, I will say that the target is *proximal*. We can even say that the demonstrated type always is the proximal target of the demonstration, while acknowledging that there may be other targets beyond the demonstrated type: *distal* targets, which may be either types or tokens. In

this framework, what characterizes instances of flat mention like '*Cat* has three letters' is the absence of a distal target, distinct from the demonstrated type.

§1.3 Iconicity and mimicry

At this point, a caveat is in order. The simple fact that (3) says something about a particular speech episode (Garbo's utterance *u*) is not sufficient to make that speech episode the target of the quotation occurring in (3). That the statement, as a whole, characterizes Garbo's utterance does not entail that *the quotation itself* is intended as a 'picture' of that utterance. To see that, consider the negation of (3):

(3*) Garbo did not say 'I want to be alone'

This statement too, on a certain interpretation, is about Garbo's utterance *u*: it characterizes it negatively as not being of the demonstrated type. But *the quotation itself* is not offered as a picture of *u*. It would be self-contradictory to picture Garbo's utterance as being of a certain type while, at the same time, saying that it is not of that type. It follows that the quotation in (3*) does not 'depict' *u*: (3*) characterizes Garbo's utterance, but Garbo's utterance is not the target of the quotation. (3*) must be classified as a case of flat mention, in which there is no distal target.⁵

The notion of a distal target, as I am using it, is inseparable from the *mimetic character* of the quotation — the fact that it presents itself as a picture or replica of, e.g., some utterance which the speaker is echoing. Not all quotations have this mimetic character. To be sure, quotations are demonstrations, and to demonstrate a piece of behaviour is to produce an instance of that behaviour, to replicate it, for illustrative purposes. It is therefore tempting to consider that to demonstrate something *is* to engage into imitation or mimicry. Tempting though it is, I think it is more illuminating to resist

⁵ I am indebted to Tim Williamson for drawing my attention to negative examples like (3*).

that equation and distinguish between two properties: the general property of iconicity, which all quotations possess, and the more specific property of mimesis (Cornulier 1978, pp. 81-82).

Peirce distinguished three categories of signs: symbols, which mean what they mean by convention; indices, which bear an 'existential relation' to what they mean (e.g. the relation of smoke to fire); and icons, which resemble what they mean. Even though, I claim, not all quotations are mimetic, I think all quotations are iconic. When the target of quotation is a particular speech episode which the quoter reports, quotation consists in producing something which resembles (is of the same type as) the target, hence it is obviously iconic in the most straightforward sense.⁶ When the target itself is a type, distinct from the demonstrated type, the displayed token is not 'of the same type as' the target, but it resembles, or is supposed to resemble, the tokens that are instances of the target: they fall under the same superordinate type, as we have seen. Finally, when there is no distal target, the displayed token stands for an abstract type, namely the class of tokens that are relevantly similar to that token. Resemblances are exploited here as much as in the previous cases. Still, I want to maintain that *there is no mimicry unless there is a distal target which the quotation presents itself as echoing*. This is a stipulation, but it is meant to help us capture the intuition that no mimicry takes place when we say something like 'Cat has three letters', while there is mimicry when, as in the example mentioned in footnote 4, "George demonstrates Greta Garbo's 'I want to be alone' in a Swedish accent while clutching his arms to his chest in a Garboesque pose" (Clark 1996, p. 175).

In this last example, the mimetic character of the quotation is fairly obvious. This is due not only to the speaker's gestures, but also to the discontinuity introduced by the change of tone and accent in speaking the quoted words. The same sort of effect can

⁶ To be sure, there is such a thing as misquotation. In misquotation, the attempt to provide something which resembles the target fails, but, I would argue, quotation retains its iconic character even in such cases. What matters is that, in all cases, quotation *aims at* producing something which resembles the target.

be achieved in written speech by typographical means (Cornulier 1978, pp. 79-80).

Consider, for example, the following variant of (3):

(3a) And then Garbo said:

— I want to be alone!

Here the typographical separation of the quotation from the prefatory words 'Garbo said' suggests that the speaker uttering 'I want to be alone' is mimicking Garbo, playing her part. Insofar as this is conveyed, there will be an inconsistency if the speaker denies, rather than asserts, that Garbo's utterance *u* was of the demonstrated type:

(3a*) ?And then Garbo did not say:

— I want to be alone!

The prefatory words now contradict something conveyed by the quotation, given its mimetic character. Just as the words 'Garbo said', in (3a), are to some extent superfluous and simply make more explicit what is already implicit in the quotation itself *qua* piece of mimicry, the words 'Garbo did not say', in (3a*), are incompatible with what the quotation itself suggests in virtue of its mimetic character.⁷

As Cornulier pointed out in the paper from which these observations are borrowed (Cornulier 1978, pp. 85-89), parenthetical clauses such as 'he said' can be used *only if* the quotation they are appended to is an autonomous piece of mimicry.

Thus in

⁷ (3a*) can be made acceptable by changing the interpretation. We can interpret the speaker as mimicking Garbo's *usual* utterance of 'I want to be alone' while saying that *this time* she did not say it. That is sufficient to remove the inconsistency; for what is inconsistent with the proposition expressed by (3a*) is not the mimetic character of the quotation, conveyed by the typographical layout, but, more specifically, the assumption that it is Garbo's utterance *u* which the speaker is mimicking.

Get out before I punch your nose, he said

the quotation is an autonomous piece of mimicry, whose relation to the depicted target is implicitly 'asserted' by the very fact of ostensibly producing a piece of mimicry. Since the depictive relation to the target is part of the meaning of the quotation *qua* piece of mimicry, it cannot be denied without inconsistency. Thus we cannot say

*Get out before I punch your nose, he did not say.

The fact that (3) *can* be negated without contradiction does not imply that the quotation there is an instance of flat mention. All that shows is that the mimetic character of the quotation is not 'marked' in the sentence itself (as it is when a parenthetical clause is used); for if it were, we could not negate (3) without contradiction. But it is quite possible to hold that the quotation has a mimetic character in (3) though not in (3*). The fact that the quotation is offered as a positive characterization of Garbo's utterance in (3), but as a negative characterization in (3*), is sufficient to justify construing the quotation differently in the two cases. Be that as it may, it is clear that mimesis is a graded property. A quotation may be obviously and heavily mimetic, as in Clark's example, or its mimetic character may be more superficial and due simply to the fact that it is offered as a positive characterization of some utterance presented as fitting the demonstrated type. Since there is a continuum, we may locate cases of flat mention, where there is no distal target hence no mimesis, at one end, and the most dramatic and picturesque cases of mimicry at the other end of the continuum. Examples like (3) will sit somewhere in between.

II. Quotations as singular terms

§2.1 *Open vs. closed quotation*

Suppose my friend Jean does something (say, bring us a bottle of wine) rather clumsily. I mock her by mimicking her clumsy behaviour. In so doing, do I refer to her behaviour? I am reluctant to say so. To be sure, I call the attention of my audience upon that behaviour and possibly convey something about it. There is no doubt that I thereby non-naturally mean something (Grice 1957). Yet the 'mode of meaning' at play here is utterly different from linguistic meaning. Not only are the means used to convey the message non-linguistic (I don't say anything — I do something); the conveyed message itself is not propositionally articulated in the way it is when linguistic communication takes place. It is even misleading to use the same term 'message' in both cases, given the heterogeneity of the respective modes of meaning.

What the communicator puts forward in the above example is something like a *picture*. Now pictures mean in a way quite different from the way in which utterances mean. Utterances say, pictures show. The difference between symbolic articulation and iconic display is notoriously hard to pin down, and I do not intend to contribute to that field of study here. But I want to restrict the notion of reference to the linguistic realm.⁸ Thus, I maintain, mimicking someone's behaviour is not *eo ipso* referring to that behaviour.

The same thing holds if the target of my demonstration is Jean's *verbal* behaviour. Suppose she said something silly, and I want to mock her by mimicking her silly talk. Adopting her gestures and manner of speech, I reproduce the sentence she's just uttered. Am I referring to her utterance? No more than I was referring to her behaviour in the previous example. I am picturing her speech and, through that picture, conveying something about it. I *show* how silly her speech was. That is not the same thing as *saying* that her speech was silly. No reference takes place because reference, as

⁸ This is a stipulation, not a substantive point. I want to confine 'refer' to cases of linguistic reference — reference by means of a singular term. No singular term, no reference (in that sense).

Austin put it, is an ancillary act (Austin 1975, p. 97), a component of the complex act of saying something about something — and nothing is said in this particular case.

Of course, reference can take place *in addition to* the demonstration. While picturing Jean's behaviour, I may say something about it. Or, immediately after the demonstration, I may utter: 'That was clumsy, wasn't it?' Here, undoubtedly, I refer to the demonstrated behaviour. The demonstration provides the 'mode of presentation' of the referent, hence determines the contextual 'sense' of the demonstrative. But it is the demonstrative, not the demonstration, which refers. The demonstration shows what the demonstrative refers to. Were it not for the demonstrative, which belongs to the linguistic realm, there would be no reference but a mere display.

The same thing holds, once again, for the special case in which the target of the demonstration is linguistic. If the French teacher says:

(4) 'Comment allez vous?' That is how you would translate 'How do you do' in French.

the French sentence 'Comment allez-vous?' is first demonstrated, then referred to by means of the demonstrative 'that'. This is exactly similar to the following utterance by the piano teacher:

(5) [The teacher plays a passage in a certain manner and says to the student:] That is what you've just done!

The piano teacher first demonstrates the student's mistaken manner of playing, then refers to it by means of the demonstrative. The demonstration itself does not refer. Similarly, the French teacher's utterance of 'Comment allez vous' counts as a demonstration of the French sentence, but does not refer to that sentence. It is the subsequent demonstrative which refers.

This is not to deny that, *in certain cases*, a demonstration may refer. Consider the following example (from Horn 1989, p. 564):

(6) Piano student plays passage in manner μ

Teacher: It's not [plays passage in manner μ] — it's [plays same passage in manner μ '].

Here the teacher's successive demonstrations are *linguistically recruited* and fill slots in the sentence frame 'It's not ___ — it's ___'. The demonstrations serve as singular terms. We find another, more familiar instance of that phenomenon in example (4). That example contains *two* linguistic demonstrations, i.e. two quotations: the teacher first demonstrates the French sentence 'Comment allez-vous', then its English counterpart 'How do you do'. But the second demonstration is linguistically recruited and fills a slot in the sentence frame 'That is how you would translate ___ in French': it plays the role of a singular term. Whenever a linguistic demonstration (a quotation) is recruited in this way and serves as a singular term, filling a slot in the sentence, I say that the quotation is *closed*. Thus the Garbo example which I mentioned earlier counts as an instance of closed quotation:

(3) ... And then Greta Garbo said, 'I want to be alone!'

That is so because the demonstration 'I want to be alone' fills a slot in the sentence frame 'And then Garbo said ___'.

A quotation which is not closed is (as one might expect) open.⁹ The contrast between open and closed quotation is illustrated by the following pair of sentences:

⁹ This should be qualified in view of the fact that a demonstration may be recruited not only as a singular term, but also as, say, a common noun. (I am grateful to Dick Carter for reminding me of this fact.) Such cases are left aside in this paper, but if they were taken into consideration one would have to characterize open quotation by the lack of any form of linguistic recruitment.

(7) Stop that John! "Nobody likes me", "I am miserable"... Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?

(8) John keeps crying and saying "Nobody likes me".

In (7) a token of 'Nobody likes me' and 'I am miserable' is displayed for demonstrative purposes, but it is not used as a singular term, in contrast to what happens in (8), where the quotation serves as a singular term to complete the sentence 'John keeps crying and saying ____'. (7), therefore, is an instance of open quotation, while (8) is an instance of closed quotation.

To sum up: Following Clark, I hold that quotations are linguistic demonstrations. What the 'quotation marks' conventionally indicate in writing is the fact that the enclosed material is displayed for demonstrative purposes rather than used in the normal way. But neither the displayed material nor the target of the demonstration (whether distal or proximal) is referred to, unless the quotation happens to be 'closed', that is, unless it acquires the grammatical function of a singular term within a sentence in which it fills a slot. When that is the case, the quotation transformed into a singular term acquires a referential value. Because the demonstration acquires a referential value in such cases, most theorists have jumped to the conclusion that quotations in general refer to what they depict. But that is not true. Only closed quotations refer. Open quotations merely depict.¹⁰

¹⁰ Even though open quotations typically exhibit a high degree of mimesis, and instances of flat mention are typically closed, one should not conflate the two distinctions (mimetic quotations vs flat mentions, on the one hand; open vs. closed quotations on the other hand). As the example mentioned in footnote 4 shows, closed quotations can be highly mimetic. Similarly, though less obviously, there are cases of flat mention that are open rather than closed (as in definitions such as: A 'fortnight' is a period of fourteen days).

In quotation, whether open or closed, two modes of meaning are simultaneously at play. The material which is displayed for demonstrative purposes has a certain linguistic meaning. The demonstration also has meaning: it pictures something. As I pointed out in §2.1, the two forms of meaning are utterly different — they belong to distinct realms.¹¹

In *closed* quotation, the situation is even more complicated. Instead of two levels of meaning (the linguistic meaning of the displayed token, and the pictorial meaning of the demonstration) there are three. The third level of meaning comes into play when the demonstration is linguistically recruited and assumes the role of a singular term within a sentence (the 'mentioning sentence', as I will henceforth call it). Like the displayed material, the sentence in which the demonstration fills the position of a noun-phrase has a linguistic meaning; and the demonstration itself, insofar as it is a constituent of that sentence, contributes to that meaning. *Qua* singular term, therefore, the demonstration acquires a linguistic meaning, distinct both from its level 2 pictorial

¹¹ I agree that "depiction seems to be very complex", as a referee for this journal wrote, but not (or not necessarily) that it is "certainly not simply a matter of resemblance". There is no reason why resemblance itself could not be something complex and subtle. The referee points out that "one might depict the fact that someone is speaking in his native language which is foreign to one by speaking one's own language with a foreign accent". But it is not obvious to me that something like resemblance in relevant respects is not operative in such a case. Nor am I convinced by Cappelen's objection that, since "there is no interesting sense in which written language pictures or resembles spoken language", one "cannot appeal to similarity to explain the connection" between displays of written tokens and spoken utterances serving as targets (personal communication). Resemblances seem to me to be involved in such cases. Be that as it may, as I said in §2.1, I intend to rely on our intuitive understanding of the contrast between saying and picturing, without providing an analysis of the contrast.

meaning and from the linguistic meaning of the displayed material. That linguistic meaning which the demonstration acquires at level 3 is a referential value: the demonstration *refers* to something which, at level 2, it depicts.

To sort things out I suggest that we distinguish the demonstration itself, which depicts without referring, and the demonstration-*qua*-syntactically-recruited, which refers. I will use the following notation: the Greek letter ' θ ' will stand for the displayed token; 'Dem' will stand for the demonstration accomplished by displaying that token; and '[Dem]_{NP}' will stand for the demonstration *qua* syntactically recruited. The meaning of both θ and [Dem]_{NP} is linguistic, while the meaning of Dem belongs to the pictorial variety.

To illustrate the three levels, let us consider example (3) once again:

(3) And then Garbo said 'I want to be alone'

The English sentence 'I want to be alone', which has a certain meaning (level 1), is displayed for demonstrative purposes. The demonstration itself carries meaning: it pictorially represents what Garbo said (level 2). As it is linguistically recruited and assumes the function of a singular term in the mentioning sentence, the demonstration acquires a level 3 meaning: *qua* singular term, the demonstration refers much as a name or a demonstrative would.

A fundamental property of closed quotation which must be mentioned at this point is the *semantic inertia* of the quoted material, manifested through several features. For example, it does not matter whether or not the quoted material makes sense on its own. In the metalinguistic frame 'John said " ___ "' I can insert a meaningless string without thereby rendering the sentence meaningless. The inserted material can even be ungrammatical — indeed, as (6) shows, it need not be linguistic material at all.¹²

¹² To use an example from Searle (1969, p. 76), an ornithologist may say, 'The sound made by the California Jay is...', and what completes the sentence is a sound, not a linguistic expression.

Another feature which provides evidence of the semantic inertia of quoted words is the irrelevance of the (intrinsic) grammatical function of the displayed material to the function of the quotation within the mentioning sentence. Thus even if what is displayed is itself a sentence, as in 'John said "It's late"', or an adjective, as in 'John said "bald"', the quotation functions as a singular term within the mentioning sentence.

Struck by that semantic inertia, many theorists have denied that the displayed words actually occur, *qua* words, in the quotation, or that they occur with their normal meanings. Some have treated quotations as *names* whose internal complexity carries no semantic significance. The words displayed within quotation marks "fulfil the same function as the letters and complexes of successive letters in single words", Tarski says, "hence they can possess no independent meaning" (Tarski 1933, p. 159). On this analysis, the meaning of the whole quotation does not depend upon the meanings of its parts, since those parts are only *fragments* of the name and "count for no more than serifs or syllables" (Quine 1951, p. 26). Others, more plausibly, have maintained that the displayed words occur in the quotation, while ascribing them a new, autonomous meaning in this context (Carnap 1937, p. 156). But if we look at *open* quotation, it is easy to convince ourselves that the displayed words not only occur but also carry their normal meanings. In (7) the sentence 'I am miserable' obviously keeps its normal meaning. The difference with an ordinary use of that sentence is simply that the quoter engages in a form of play-acting: the quoter simulates the person whose speech he is reporting, much as an actor simulates the character whose part he is playing.¹³ Or consider the following example:

¹³ This can serve as basis for a general account of quotation as simulation. See Wierzbicka 1974, Ducrot 1984, Clark and Gerrig 1990. Such an account goes a long way toward explaining why 'I', in examples like (7), does not refer to the person who quotes, but to the quoted person — and also why the propositional content of the sentence (even with respect to the pretend context) is not seriously asserted. According to Deirdre Wilson, however, an account in terms of pretense cannot handle cases of flat mention (Wilson 2000).

The story-teller cleared his throat and started talking. "Once upon a time, there was a beautiful princess named Arabella. She loved snakes and always had a couple of pythons around her..."

The discourse as a whole is, in part, about snakes and about a princess named Arabella. It is also, and primarily, about a story-teller telling a story. Indeed it is about a story-teller telling a story about snakes and a princess named Arabella. The meaning of the sentences within the quotation marks is obviously relevant to the meaning of the whole discourse, to which it undoubtedly contributes.

In the same way in which the quoted material is semantically active in the example of open quotation I have just given, it can be recognized as semantically active in a closed variant of that example:

The story-teller cleared his throat and said: "Once upon a time, there was a beautiful princess named Arabella, who loved snakes and always had a couple of pythons around her..."

That piece of text too is about a storyteller telling a story about Princess Arabella and her snakes. Clearly, the meaning of the quoted material is relevant to the meaning of the whole. Let us therefore stick to the view that there are three levels of meaning in a closed quotation, *including* the level 1 meaning of the displayed material. What the phenomenon of semantic inertia shows is only this: in closed quotation, the linguistic meaning of the displayed material (level 1) remains *segregated from* the linguistic meaning of the sentence in which the demonstration serves as a singular term (level 3). No integration of the former into the latter (no 'semantic composition') takes place. It is that insight which we must now try to spell out.

§2.3 *An improved Davidsonian analysis of closed quotation*

To account for the semantic segregation of the displayed material, Davidson famously suggested that that material is not part of the mentioning sentence at all: semantically it lies outside the mentioning sentence, which contains a demonstrative (the quotation marks) referring to the displayed material or some type which it instantiates (Davidson 1979). This approach to quotation was first mentioned (with approval) by Arthur Prior (1971, pp. 60-61):

Some... would say that the quotation-marks are *demonstratives* which point to their interior, so that ' "The cat sat on the mat" has nineteen letters' is rather like 'The cat sat on the mat. ← This has nineteen letters'. I incline to this view myself; and certainly if it is the correct view it is easy to classify the illusion involved in treating "'The cat sat on the mat" has nineteen letters' or "'The cat sat on the mat" was uttered by John' as compound sentences with 'The cat sat on the mat' as a component. This is simply the illusion of seeing two sentences as one, because they happen to stand in an interesting relation to one another.

On this view, there is semantic inertia only to the extent that, strictly speaking, the meaning of the quoted material is not a part of the meaning of the sentence in which the material is quoted. But the discourse contains more than that sentence: it also contains the quoted material. Hence the quoted material is semantically inert only in a *relative* sense. It remains, or can remain, semantically active at the separate level to which it belongs. In the above example (Arabella and her snake) the quoted material is semantically inert *in the sentence in which reference is made to that material* — it is not semantically part of that sentence, but must be seen as lying outside it. Yet it is semantically active in the discourse as a whole.

I wholeheartedly endorse the negative part of Davidson's analysis: in closed quotation, the displayed material is not semantically part of the mentioning sentence; it is displayed alongside the sentence and referred to by something (a singular term) *in* that sentence. According to me, however, the singular term in the mentioning sentence cannot be the pair of quotation marks.

If the quotation marks were a singular term, as Davidson claims, then, given the assumption that they "function in the same way and have the same semantic value whatever linguistic context they occur in" (Cappelen and Lepore 1997, p. 434), there would be a *dangling singular term* in all instances of open quotation — a singular term without a sentence frame in which to fit. Thus (7) would consist of four sentences ('Stop that, John', 'Nobody likes me', 'I am miserable', 'Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?') and two dangling singular terms (the quotation marks around 'Nobody likes me' and 'I am miserable'). To make sense of those singular terms, one could perhaps argue that (7) is actually elliptical for something like

(7*) Stop that John! *You say* "Nobody likes me", "I am miserable"... Don't you think you exaggerate a bit?

In (7*), indeed, there is a suitable frame, namely 'you say ___', where the alleged singular terms can fit. But I deny that (7) and (7*) are synonymous. Nor are there any grounds for postulating ellipsis here except the desire to save the theory in the face of obvious counterexamples.

An additional difficulty arises in examples of open quotation in which *there is* a genuine singular term over and above the demonstration. If Davidson were right about quotation marks, the sentence 'Comment allez vous' would be referred to *twice* in example (4), once by means of the quotation marks (a dangling singular term), another time by means of the demonstrative 'that'. Evidently, it makes more sense to say that the sentence is first displayed, then referred to.

The problem of the dangling singular term becomes particularly embarrassing in connection with the phenomenon of 'mixed quotation', to be considered at length below. Davidson claims that in (1)

(1) Quine says that quotation '... has a certain anomalous feature'

the words 'has a certain anomalous feature' are quoted at the same time as they are used. But if there were a singular term referring to those words in (1), the sentence would be as ungrammatical as

Quine says that quotation these words has a certain anomalous feature.

(See Davidson 1979, p. 81; Searle 1983, p. 185; Cappelen and Lepore 1997, pp. 437-8).

This shows that the quotations marks do not function as a singular term in (1).¹⁴

Still, we can retain the essentials of Davidson's theory, while rejecting his treatment of the quotations marks as a singular term. The quotation marks merely indicate that the quoted words are being demonstrated. It is, I suggest, the demonstration itself which assumes the function of singular term, in closed quotations.¹⁵ The musical example (6) provides evidence that even a nonlinguistic demonstration can play the role of a singular term. Thus we can agree that, in closed quotation,

- (i) the quoted material is displayed or presented for demonstrative purposes, as in open quotation;
- (ii) the demonstration assumes a grammatical function in the sentence: that of a singular term referring to the (proximal) target of the demonstration;
- (iii) the quoted material itself, distinct from the *presentation* of that material (the demonstration), is not semantically a part of the sentence in which it is presented.

¹⁴ To be sure, there is a closed variant of (1) in which the words *are* explicitly referred to, namely: "Quine says that quotation, in his words, has a certain anomalous feature". One may argue that (1) is to be understood on this pattern: the quotation marks in (1) function just as the description 'his words' in the above variant. I will discuss that view below (§3.1).

¹⁵ I owe this point to Benoît de Cornulier.

A sentence like 'Garbo said "I want to be alone"' can therefore be analysed, *à la* Davidson, as

Garbo said [Dem]_{NP}. I want to be alone.

where the second sentence corresponds to the displayed material, while the first sentence contains [Dem]_{NP}: the presentation of that material, serving as singular term.

Quotation marks, Davidson says, act as a *demonstrative* referring to some type which the displayed material instantiates. Should we accept this particular aspect of Davidson's analysis and construe [Dem]_{NP} as a demonstrative? Although I agree that a (nonstandard) form of ostension takes place when we quote, I think we must resist the suggestion. Demonstratives belong to a class of 'mixed signs' which Peirce analysed as *indexical symbols*. They are symbols, because they have a conventional meaning. At the same type, like natural signs, they are indices in that the sign (token) bears an 'existential relation' to its referent. Thus 'I' refers to its producer, and 'this' refers to some object its producer ostends while uttering it. (More precisely, an 'indexical symbol' is defined by the fact that the semantic convention governing the sign-type is the convention that *a token of that sign refers to the object, or an object, which bears a certain relation R to that token.*) Now [Dem]_{NP} is also a mixed sign, but of a different variety. It is a symbol because there is a semantic convention governing (closed) quotations; yet it is not a pure symbol because the convention explicitly appeals to a nonsymbolic (nonconventional) form of meaning, namely iconic meaning. The convention governing [Dem]_{NP} is this: [Dem]_{NP} refers to one of the things which Dem depicts, namely the proximal target of the demonstration. I conclude that [Dem]_{NP} is an *iconic symbol* and therefore does not belong to the same semantic class as demonstratives.

III. Mixed quotation

By 'mixed quotation' Cappelen and Lepore mean a mixture of *oratio obliqua* and *oratio recta*, characterized by the use of quotation marks in the sentential complement of an indirect-speech construction. They use Davidson's example (1), repeated below, as a paradigm.

(1) Quine says that quotation '... has a certain anomalous feature'

The first thing to notice is that the displayed material is not semantically inert here. The words 'has a certain anomalous feature' work as a *predicate* in (1) — they keep their normal semantic function within the mentioning sentence. This suggests that mixed quotation is not an instance of closed quotation. In closed quotation, the displayed material is segregated from the mentioning sentence. The mentioning sentence only contains the demonstration, recruited as a singular term.

Still, Davidson and his followers maintain that the quoted material is *referred to*. This raises the problem of the dangling singular term, as we have seen. After the words 'Quine says that quotation' we do not expect, and cannot accommodate, a singular term. What we expect is a predicate — and indeed we find one, since the displayed material plays its normal semantic role. The alleged singular term is an extra constituent which does not fit anywhere in the sentence. What can we do with it?

To accommodate the alleged singular term, we can say that the mixed-quoting sentence is *elliptical for* a longer sentence where it (the dangling singular term) can fit. The sentence in question must contain a metalinguistic predicate, since the alleged singular term refers to words: the singular term will thus be construed as providing one of the arguments of the elided predicate. Davidson himself suggests that (1) can be made more explicit as

Using those very words [or, as Davidson puts it: 'using words of which this is a token'], Quine says that quotation has a certain anomalous feature.

The demonstrative 'those very words' is a singular term referring to the words 'has a certain anomalous feature'. It plays the same role as (and is more or less synonymous with) the quotation marks around those words, in Davidson's analysis. If we replace it by the demonstration *qua* syntactically recruited, we shall analyse (1) as

Using [Dem]_{NP}, Quine says that quotation has a certain anomalous feature,

where the verb in boldface has been elided.

On this analysis, the speaker of (1) says two things at the same time: (i) that Quine says that quotation has a certain anomalous feature; and (ii) that Quine says so using the words 'has a certain anomalous feature'. In contrast to the first statement, the second one is elliptical: the speaker refers to Quine and to the words 'has a certain anomalous feature', but the metalinguistic predicate remains implicit. The displayed material has its normal semantic function in the explicit statement; the demonstration serves as singular term in the elliptical statement.

An alternative analysis in the same spirit dispenses with the postulation of an elided predicate, while maintaining that there are two overlapping statements, one superimposed on the other. The metalinguistic predicate, it can be argued, is already articulated in the sentence: it is the verb 'says'. In (1) 'says' takes *two distinct direct objects at the same time*: the 'that'-clause and the quotation each provides one. (1) is therefore to be analysed as

Quine says { that quotation has a certain anomalous feature
[Dem]_{NP}

where the singular term [Dem]_{NP} refers to the words 'has a certain anomalous feature' (Cappelen and Lepore 1997, p. 443 fn).

Both variants of the 'superimposition' analysis I find convoluted and gratuitous. The form of composition they appeal to is, to my knowledge, unheard of. The only motivation for offering baroque accounts like these is the desire to save a dogma: the view that quotations refer. When we realize that quotation can be open as well as closed, however, we no longer have to worry about the dangling singular term and how it fits in the sentence. There no longer is a dangling singular term, because there no longer is a singular term.

On the view I advocate, mixed quotation is correctly described as follows: The very words which are used to express the content of the reported attitude (or speech act) are at the same time displayed for demonstrative purposes, but they are not referred to by means of a singular term. The situation is similar to what we find in the following examples, where, in the course of reporting the ascriber's speech act, the speaker mimics him or her by phrasing and/or pronouncing the complement sentence in a certain way:

(9) To which Mr Bailey modestly replied that he hoped he knowed wot o'clock it wos in ginerel. (Dickens, *Martin Chuzzlewit*, cited in Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 791)

(10) Une vieille femme... vint au seuil et me demanda *qué que j'avouais*, d'une voix traînante et hargneuse. (Barbey d'Aurevilly, *L'Enfermée*)

At the same time as he reports the ascriber's talk, using indirect speech in the normal way, the speaker *shows* what that talk was like.¹⁶ The speaker might similarly gesture in a certain way to mimic the ascriber's own gestures. In such cases linguistic and

¹⁶ See Stainton 1999, pp. 273-4 for a similar analysis of mixed quotation. Stainton and I agree that "mixed quotation is equivalent to indirect quotation — give or take some mimicry" (Stainton 1999, p. 275).

iconic meaning run in parallel: something is said and, simultaneously, something is shown, concerning the same topic. Yet there is no conversion of the pictorial into the linguistic, no syntactic recruitment of the icon as a constituent in the sentence. In particular, the demonstration does not become a singular term in the sentence (as it does in closed quotation).

§3.2 *Mixed quotation as hybrid use*

When Davidson first introduced example (1), he presented it as a "mixed case of use and mention", that is, as a hybrid case in which the mentioned words are, at the same time, in active use (Davidson 1979, p. 81). Now there are many cases of that sort which do not involve *oratio obliqua* at all, for example

(11) John is very 'smart'

(12) The demonstration provides the 'mode of presentation' of the referent, hence determines the contextual 'sense' of the demonstrative. (From §2.1 above)

In such cases, typically, one uses words to say something while at the same time *echoing* some other person's use of the same words.¹⁷ Even though the words in quotation marks are used in part demonstratively, to depict someone's usage, they also do their normal semantic work in the sentence. That characterization does not take us very far because the quoted words generally do their normal semantic work (and, I would argue, are used to say something) in instances of open quotation, such as (7). But the characterization can be made more precise. What distinguishes hybrid cases like (11) and (12) from other examples of open quotation like (7) is the fact that in (7), the

¹⁷ Not all hybrid cases are echoic, though. The example I gave in footnote 10 (the definition: A 'fortnight' is a period of fourteen days) is hybrid since the word 'fortnight' is both mentioned and used, but it is not echoic because the demonstration lacks a distal target.

demonstrated words are uttered for the sole purpose of the demonstration: the speaker arguably says something by using them, but what is thereby said is said as part of the act of demonstration. When the speaker of (7) says 'I am miserable', his locutionary act is meant as a replica of the demonstrated speech and has no independent motivation. But when the speaker says (11), he performs an independent locutionary act, to which the demonstrated words themselves contribute. That act is not subservient to the act of demonstrative simulation which the speaker also performs: the latter runs in parallel to the act of saying that John is smart. It is in that sense that the quoted words can be said to be used simultaneously in saying something *and* performing a demonstration. (That the locutionary act is not subordinated to the demonstration is shown by the fact that the demonstration takes 'narrow scope', as it were; it is local and concerns only a limited portion of the sentence by means of which the locutionary act is performed.)

By drawing the hearer's attention to the words he or she uses, the speaker typically suggests that those words are to be ascribed to some other person (or group of persons). But the suggestion in question does not become part of the proposition expressed by the words. In (12) the expressions 'mode of presentation' and 'sense' are displayed, suggesting that they are used in an echoic manner. A normal analytic philosopher reading sentence (12) in this article immediately understands the author as echoing Frege, and as expecting him or her to take the displayed words in the sense they have in the Fregean literature. That metalinguistic indication may help determine *which* proposition is expressed, but it is not itself part of that proposition. The proposition expressed by (12) is simply the proposition that: the demonstration provides the mode of presentation of the referent, hence determines the contextual sense of the demonstrative. Similarly in (11): the speaker echoes a certain group of people by using the word 'smart' which (we may assume) belongs to their vocabulary. He ostensibly speaks like them, but he does not say that he speaks like them.

Mixed quotation is only a particular case of that phenomenon. The speaker uses certain words in expressing the content of the attitude or speech act he or she is reporting, while at the same time drawing the hearer's attention to them for

demonstrative purposes. On the most natural interpretation of the demonstration, the displayed words are ascribed to the very person whose attitude or speech act is reported.¹⁸ Yet the speaker does not *say that* the ascriber used these words. He merely *shows* (demonstrates) the words the ascriber used. This is like example (9): the readers understand Dickens as mimicking Bailey's manners of speech, but nowhere is it said that Bailey speaks in this way.

In this framework, it is simply not true that the proposition expressed by the complement sentence in (1) is 'about words', as Cappelen and Lepore claim (without argument). Cappelen and Lepore use this unsupported claim to undermine all the standard accounts of indirect speech, based on the following principle:

(A) A propositional attitude report is true just in case an agent stands in a certain relation, e.g. the saying relation, to the content of the complement clause.

(Cappelen and Lepore 1997, p. 435)

In (13), Cappelen and Lepore argue (1997, p. 433), the complement clause contains quotation marks and is therefore about words:

(13) Alice said that life is 'difficult to understand'

Yet Alice did not say anything about words, hence she does not stand in the saying relation to the proposition expressed by the complement clause in (13). This is supposed to show that the standard accounts of indirect speech based on principle (A) are all mistaken. On the present proposal, however, the proposition expressed by the complement sentence is the same with or without the quotation marks, and it is *not*

¹⁸ This is only the most natural interpretation, however. One can easily imagine a context in which a sentence exactly like (1) would be used with something other than the ascriber's utterance as target for the demonstration. See Recanati 2000, p. 214 for an example.

about words. The demonstration conveys an additional meaning, but that pictorial meaning runs in parallel to the proposition which is linguistically articulated: it is not a part of it. Mixed quotation therefore does not constitute a counterexample to Principle (A).¹⁹

§3.3 Quotation marks: what and how they mean

At this point Cappelen and Lepore can argue that, surely, the linguistic meaning of (13) is not the same as that of the sentence we get when we drop the quotation marks, viz. (14).

(14) Alice said that life is difficult to understand

The quotation marks are part of the language: They are linguistic symbols endowed with conventional significance. We cannot consider them as deprived of any linguistic meaning whatsoever and as operative only in the pictorial realm.

In reply, I should first point out that it is not obvious that the quotation marks are part of 'the language'. The quotation marks are a *punctuation sign*, and as such belong to the autonomous system of *written* language (Nunberg 1990). In spoken language, there are no quotation marks proper: the speaker simply draws the hearer's attention, by whatever means, to the words he utters. The display can be understood in various ways — not necessarily as a quotation. Consider for example the following utterance (where block letters indicate that the words are displayed in spoken speech):

(15) Tim said that John is HIGHLY dangerous

The display of 'highly' can be understood in various ways: as expressing emphasis (as when we say: he is VERY dangerous) or as indicating a demonstrative intention on the

¹⁹ See Stainton 1999, pp. 271-3 for similar remarks.

part of the speaker. (Quotation marks in written speech can bear only the second interpretation.) The claim that (13) has a linguistic meaning distinct from that of (14) is therefore correct only if (13) is taken as an instance of written language. In spoken language, arguably, (13) and (14) are the same sentence: the only difference between them is paralinguistic, like the difference between 'He is very dangerous' and 'He is VERY dangerous'. Since they are the same sentence, they can only have the same *linguistic* meaning.

That being said, let us assume that English contains quotation marks, as written English clearly does. Then, admittedly, (13) and (14) are not the same sentence: (13) contains a linguistic sign (the quotation marks) which (14) does not contain. As a result, (13) and (14) do not have the same linguistic meaning. What can we say about that difference?

I think the difference between (13) and (14) is similar to that between

(16) He is rich and stupid

and

(17) He is rich but stupid

Both utterances express the proposition that the person in question is both rich and stupid, but (17) conveys a further indication: that his stupidity is unexpected given his richness. This indication is conveyed in virtue of the *conditions of use* of the word 'but'. According to Oswald Ducrot and his school, 'but' is to be used to conjoin two statements P and Q only if there is an argumentative contrast of the following sort between them:

P supports a certain conclusion r;

Q supports not-r;

Q is stronger than P.

In virtue of those conditions of use, the speaker saying 'P but Q' indicates that there is a conclusion *r* such that the first conjunct supports it while the second conjunct provides a stronger argument in favour of its negation (see e.g. Anscombe and Ducrot 1977).

This indication comes in addition to the conjunctive proposition expressed by the utterance. The utterance therefore means two things:

- (i) that P & Q
- (ii) that there is a conclusion *r* such that the first conjunct supports it while the second conjunct provides a stronger argument in favor of its negation.

In a sense, then, the utterance expresses not one, but two propositions (Neale 1999; Bach 1999). In the case of (17) the two propositions are

- (i) He is both rich and stupid
- (ii) There is a conclusion *r* (e.g. 'John is intelligent') such that his being rich supports *r* to some degree, while his being stupid refutes *r*.

These two propositions are not on the same level, however. Only (i) is compositionally articulated. The complex metalinguistic proposition (ii) is expressed holistically, in virtue of a pragmatic mechanism. By using 'but', one implies that the conditions of use of that expression are satisfied, hence one implies (ii). That is a *pragmatic* implication, or 'implicature', to use Grice's cover term. Since the implicature arises rather directly from the conventions governing the use of a particular expression, Grice called it a *conventional* implicature, in order to distinguish it both from the compositionally articulated content of the utterance, and from the *conversational* implicatures which are not directly tied to the conventional significance of words.

Quotation marks too have conditions of use: one should use quotation marks only if one is using the quoted words demonstratively. Using quotation marks therefore indicates that one is demonstrating: that is the linguistic meaning of quotation marks, which differentiates (13) from (14). (13) therefore mean two things:

- (i) that Alice said that life is difficult to understand
- (ii) that the words 'difficult to understand' are being used demonstratively

While the proposition in (i) is compositionally articulated, the proposition (ii) is not. It is expressed holistically and has the status of a pragmatic implication. By using quotation marks, the speaker implies that the condition governing their use obtains. Since the condition in question is fixed by the conventions of the language, this sort of implicature deserves to be called a *conventional* implicature. Though conventional, it is not part of the (compositionally articulated) propositional content of the utterance. The propositional content of (13) is the same as that of (14), even if (13) and (14) do not have the same linguistic meaning.

IV. Interpreting quotations: the pragmatic view

§4.1 Three levels of meaning again (but not the same)

Quotation marks turn out to belong to the class of pragmatic indicators: expressions which have certain conditions of use, and whose use indicates that the conditions in question obtain (Recanati 1998, §4). For all such expressions, we can distinguish several layers of meaning.

(a) The meaning of a pragmatic indicator, *qua* expression type, is the convention governing its use. For example, the imperative mood is governed by the convention that it is to be used only if the speaker using it is performing a 'directive' illocutionary act. 'But' is governed by the convention that it is to be used in a conjunctive utterance only

if there is a certain conclusion r such that the first conjunct support r while the second conjunct provides a stronger argument in favour of its negation. In all cases of that sort the convention takes the form of a conditional, the right hand side of which is implicitly or explicitly 'token-reflexive'. The convention says that for every token x of the expression, x passes muster only if $f(x)$. ' $f(x)$ ' is a condition on the token — a constraint which the token must satisfy for the use to be legitimate.

(b) At the next level the meaning of the expression type is contextually *applied*. When a specific token τ of the expression is produced, it (the token) means that $f(\tau)$ in virtue of the mechanism described in the previous section. Thus an imperative utterance i means that i serves to perform a directive illocutionary act. An utterance u of 'He is rich but stupid' means that there is a conclusion r such that the first conjunct of u supports r while the second conjunct of u provides a stronger argument in favour of not- r . The applied meaning of the token is but an instantiation of the right hand side of the convention of use. As John Perry likes to point out, meaning at the second level is essentially reflexive (Perry forthcoming).

(c) Next, the applied meaning of the token is contextually *fleshed out*. For example, the hearer must identify a specific illocutionary act, within the directive class, as being that which the speaker intends to perform. Or, in the case of 'but', she must identify the conclusion r such that the first conjunct support r while the second conjunct supports not- r . Note that fleshing out is an obligatory step, similar to the obligatory identification of the reference in interpreting a directly referential expression. Just as you do not properly understand 'He is bald' unless you identify the referent of the pronoun, you don't understand 'Tim has measles but John's book is long' if you do not contextually identify the relevant r , in terms of which one can make sense of the suggested contrast between the two conjuncts.

Once the applied meaning of the token has been fleshed out, the interpreter can appreciate the utterance's illocutionary force (e.g. the fact that it is intended as a request) or its argumentative value (e.g. the fact that the whole utterance itself is offered as an argument in favour of not- r , since the second conjunct is argumentatively stronger

than the first one). These dimensions of meaning — illocutionary force and argumentative value — are distinct from and external to the utterance's propositional content, yet they have conventional indicators in the sentence. Similarly, I hold, the quotation marks are a pragmatic indicator which contributes to the meaning of the sentence, without contributing to its propositional content. Hence we should be able to distinguish the above levels of meaning in quotational utterances. Indeed we are: (a) The quotation marks have conditions of use: they are to be used only if the speaker is using the quoted words demonstratively. (b) In virtue of this conventional requirement, using the quotation marks in a particular utterance u indicates that the token θ within the quotation marks in u is displayed for demonstrative purposes. This indication (the applied meaning of the token) has the status of 'conventional implicature', as we saw in §3.3. It is directly generated by the convention regulating the use of the expression. But (c) it must be fleshed out in context. The interpreter must identify the (distal) target of the demonstration, if there is one, and he must identify the properties of the token which are 'depictive' and those which are merely accidental or 'supportive' (Clark and Gerrig 1990, p. 768). When the applied meaning of the quotation marks has been fleshed out in this way, the interpreter is able to appreciate the demonstration's pictorial value. The pictorial value thus determined is as external to the utterance's propositional content as its argumentative value or illocutionary force.

What is the relation between the three layers we have just distinguished — (a), (b), and (c) — and the three levels of meaning we talked about earlier in connection with closed quotation, namely levels 1, 2 and 3 below?

| | |
|---------|----------------------------------------------|
| Level 1 | Linguistic meaning of the displayed material |
| Level 2 | Pictorial meaning of the demonstration |
| Level 3 | Referential value of [Dem] _{NP} |

I take it that the new layers correspond to *steps in the generation of* the pictorial meaning of the demonstration. (a) is the linguistic meaning of the quotation marks. This

is distinct from, though on a par with, the meaning of the displayed material (level 1). When a sentence with quotation marks is issued, both the material within the quotation marks and the quotation marks themselves have a linguistic, conventional meaning which is contextually processed. By (b) applying and (c) fleshing out the meaning of the quotation marks, one determines the pictorial value of the demonstration (level 2): what it depicts and under which aspects. As for the third of the three levels talked about in §2.2, it is relevant only when the quotation is closed and serves as a singular term. The levels (a), (b) and (c), on the other hand, can be found in all instances of quotation, whether open or closed.

§4.2 Quotational point

Even in open quotation, the process of interpretation does not stop when the interpreter grasps the quotation's pictorial value. The interpreter may well grasp the latter — he may realize that the speaker is depicting so and so's speech in such and such respects — without getting the *point* of the demonstration. In closed quotation, the demonstration is used referringly. That much is quite straightforward. But in open quotation the demonstration may serve a number of purposes, which can only be determined on a pragmatic basis. In irony, one makes fun of the person one is mimicking. The speaker thereby dissociates herself from the target. She may do so jokingly or sarcastically, depending on whether her intention is to amuse or to harm. At the other end, the point of demonstrating can be to appeal to authority: to invest one's utterance with the authority of the person whose speech is demonstrated. Or the speaker can express condescending approval of that person. As Deirdre Wilson points out, "the attitudes conveyed by echoic utterances are very rich and varied: the speaker may indicate that she agrees or disagrees with the original, is puzzled, angry, amused, intrigued, sceptical, etc., or any combination of these" (Wilson 2000, p. 432).²⁰

²⁰ All these attitudes can also be conveyed in closed quotation: the referring function of the quotation does not prevent it from also serving a number of other purposes. This is

Note that the speaker's aim in depicting the target need not be unique or well-delineated. In (12), for example, the point of the demonstration is multiple: the speaker's aim is (i) to make sure that the readers will take the speaker's words 'sense' and 'mode of presentation' in the proper technical sense he intends them to have in this context, and thereby to help them grasp the propositional content of the utterance; (ii) to appeal to Fregean authority; (iii) to suggest a 'context' (in the sense of Sperber and Wilson 1986), namely the body of Fregean theses about sense, in which to draw relevant consequences from the proposition expressed by the utterance. Or consider the following, rather typical example of 'scare quoting':

(18) Iouri Skouratov, general prosecutor, was suspended in March by Boris Eltsin. His successor, Iouri Tchaïka, was 'promoted' minister of Justice in August.

The quotation marks around 'promoted' convey many things to the interpreter: (i) that this term was officially used, or at least, that Iouri Tchaïka's change of affectation was *presented as* a promotion, (ii) that the speaker (the newspaper columnist) does not fully endorse that description, (iii) that the reason why he does not is that it was not a real promotion, but rather a way of getting rid of Iouri Tchaïka by 'kicking him upstairs'... There are no clear limits to what can be contextually suggested in this manner. This is all in addition to what the utterance directly expresses, where 'what the utterance directly expresses' includes not only its compositionally articulated content but also the pictorial meaning of the demonstration.

What about mixed quotation? Consider example (1). Knowing the conventional meaning of quotation marks, the hearer can retrieve the conventional implicature that the speaker (Davidson) uses the words 'has an anomalous feature' demonstratively. Fleshing out the implicature he identifies the distal target (Quine's utterance, which Davidson is reporting) and sorts out the depictive and other properties of the signal.

especially manifest when the quotation, though closed, exhibits a high degree of mimesis.

Finally he makes sense of the demonstration by recognizing Davidson's intention to let him know that Quine used those very words. The last mentioned aspect of the interpretation is clearly pragmatic, like the interpretation of the speaker's intent in (18). It is a matter of *identifying the point of the demonstration*. If this is right, then the ascription of the quoted words to the person whose speech or thought is reported is not even a conventional implicature. It belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation, where one tries to *make sense of the speaker's act of demonstration in the broader context in which it takes place*. This is not 'interpretation' in the narrowly linguistic sense.

§4.3 Putative counterexamples to the pragmatic view

From what has been said so far the following picture emerges. Since [Dem]_{NP} contributes to the truth-conditions of the mentioning sentence, closed quotation undoubtedly is a *semantic* phenomenon. In contrast, open quotation is pragmatic: It is a matter of what people do with words, rather than a matter of content and truth-conditions. This applies, in particular, to mixed quotation, which I construed as an instance of open quotation. In mixed quotation, the displayed material is used echoically, and this adds a layer of pictorial meaning to the utterance's linguistic content; but the content in question is unaffected by the demonstration. Or so I claimed.

As far as mixed quotation is concerned, this view seems unacceptable. It can hardly be disputed that there is a *truth-conditional difference* between (1) and (1*).

(1) Quine says that quotation '*... has a certain anomalous feature*'

(1*) Quine says that quotation has a certain anomalous feature

(1) does, but (1*) does not, entail that Quine used the words '*... has a certain anomalous feature*'. If Quine did not use those very words, (1) will not possibly count as a true

statement. Not so with (1*). (1*) does not give us any clue as to the words which Quine used.

A somewhat different counterexample is

(19) Paul says he's due to present his work in the 'paper session'

where the speaker is understood as mimicking Paul's deviant use of the phrase 'paper session'. What Paul meant when he said what (19) reports was that he was due to present his work in the *poster* session. The speaker ironically echoes Paul's mistaken use. What are the truth-conditions of (19)? Are they the same as those of

(19*) Paul says he's due to present his work in the paper session

I do not think so. It seems to me that (19) ascribes to Paul reference to *the poster session* under the wrong name. But in (19*) no reference to the poster session is ascribed to Paul.

Perhaps a similar example with a proper name will elicit clearer intuitions. Suppose it is mutually known to the speaker and his addressee that James misidentified a certain old man (Tim McPherson) as the famous philosopher Quine. The speaker can then ironically use the name 'Quine' in quotes to refer to McPherson. Thus he can say:

(20) Look who is coming! 'Quine' wants to speak to us

Or he can say:

(21) James says that 'Quine' wants to speak to us

In (20) the speaker refers to McPherson under the name which James mistakenly gives him. Similarly in (21): the speaker refers to McPherson (under the name which James

mistakenly gives him) and says that James says that *he* (McPherson) wants to speak to us. Now consider (21*):

(21*) James says that Quine wants to speak to us

This does not say anything about McPherson! Hence there is an obvious truth-conditional difference between (21) and (21*). One statement is about McPherson, the other is about Quine. I think we find the same sort of difference between (19) and (19*).

Another potential counterexample, due to Cappelen and Lepore, is

(22) Nicola believes that his father is a 'philtosopher'

where Nicola is a five-year-old boy. (22) cannot have the same truth-conditions as

(22*) Nicola believes that his father is a philtosopher

for the simple reason that (22*) is meaningless: the sentence contains a non-word, hence it does not express a complete proposition. But (22) arguably does.

In all these pairs — (1)-(1*), (19)-(19*), (21)-(21*), (22)-(22*) — there is a truth-conditional difference between the two members of the pair. This shows that mixed quotation affects truth-conditions. Does it follow that I was wrong when I classified mixed quotation as an instance of open quotation? No, for the problem is more general. The problem is that sometimes open quotation seems to affect truth-conditions. Mixed quotation is a case in point, but there are others. Thus in (20) the name 'Quine' is demonstrated, at the same time as it is used to refer to McPherson. That is a hybrid case, but not an instance of mixed quotation (since there is no *oratio obliqua*). Yet the demonstration appears to affect the truth-conditions of the utterance,

as it does in instances of mixed quotation such as (21). (20) does not have the same truth-conditions as (20*):

(20*) Look who is coming! Quine wants to speak to us.

In contrast to (20*), which says something about Quine, (20) says something about McPherson.

In the last section of this paper I will deal with those counterexamples to the view that open quotation (including mixed quotation) is a pragmatic phenomenon. I will argue as follows. The counterexamples do not show that the view itself is untenable, but only that *standard assumptions concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics must be questioned*. For instance, it is standardly assumed that there is a single notion of literal content which is both the *intuitive* truth-conditional content of the utterance and its *linguistically articulated* content (what the autonomous mechanism of 'semantic composition' delivers). Yet recent research shows that the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance results in part from 'pragmatic intrusions' of various sorts — pragmatic intrusions which, by interfering with the process of semantic composition, enrich or modify what would otherwise be the truth-conditional content of the utterance. If I am right, mixed quotation provides a striking illustration of that phenomenon.

V. In defense of the pragmatic view

§5.1 *Cumulative hybrids and pragmatic enrichment*

We have just seen that in some instances, removing the quotation marks in hybrid cases of open quotation somehow affects the content of the utterance. Thus there is an intuitive difference in truth-conditions between the two members of each of the above

pairs (1)-(1*), (19)-(19*), (20)-(20*), (21)-(21*), and (22)-(22*). How can this fact be reconciled with the pragmatic view?

Before we answer that question, we must draw a distinction between two sorts of case. Consider the pair (1)-(1*) once again:

- (1) Quine says that quotation '... has a certain anomalous feature'
- (1*) Quine says that quotation has a certain anomalous feature

As in all the counterexamples mentioned in §4.3, the first member of the pair entails something which the second member does not entail. In this particular case, however, that is the *only* semantic difference between the two statements. The quotation adds something to the content of the utterance, *but it does not subtract anything from it*. As a result, (1) entails (1*). That is far from trivial for, in the other counterexamples, the first member of the pair does not entail the second member. (20) does not entail (20*), nor does (21) entail (21*).

- (20) [Look who is coming!] 'Quine' wants to speak to us.
- (20*) [Look who is coming!] Quine wants to speak to us.

- (21) James says that 'Quine' wants to speak to us
- (21*) James says that Quine wants to speak to us

The difference between the two sorts of case can be spelled out as follows. While in (1) the content of (1*) is enriched through the demonstration, in the other examples it seems that the content of the utterance is transformed instead of being merely enriched. In the first type of case I say that the hybrid is 'cumulative' for the demonstration contributes something *in addition to* the normal content of the utterance, which is preserved (though possibly enriched). The cumulative nature of the hybrid is established by the fact that the sentence containing it entails the sentence obtained by

removing the quotation marks. In the second type of case (to be dealt with in §5.2-3), the hybrid is 'non-cumulative': the demonstration results in the fact that the utterance *no longer expresses its normal content*, not even as part of a richer content.

The simple hybrids I mentioned in §3.2 were clearly cumulative. Thus (11) entails (11*):

(11) John is very 'smart'

(11*) John is very smart

The difference between the cumulative hybrid in (11) and the non-cumulative hybrid in (20) is similar to the difference between (1) and (21). To be sure, (1) and (21) are instances of mixed quotation, while (11) and (20) are not. But that is irrelevant. The cumulative/non-cumulative distinction is a distinction between two sorts of hybrid use. Since mixed quotation is a variety of hybrid use (involving *oratio obliqua*), it is not surprising that the distinction between the two forms applies to mixed quotation as well as to simpler cases like (11) and (20) (Table 1).

| | <i>Cumulative</i> | <i>Non-cumulative</i> |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Simple hybrid</i> | (11) John is very 'smart' | (20) 'Quine' wants to speak to us |
| <i>Mixed quotation</i> | (1) Quine says that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature' | (21) Jame says that 'Quine' wants to speak to us |

Table 1

Despite the fact that both (1) and (11) are cumulative hybrids, in which the normal content of the utterance is preserved, only in (1) is there enrichment of that

content *in the truth-conditional sense*. In (11), the demonstration 'enriches' the content of the utterance in the sense that it adds to it a layer of pictorial meaning, as we have seen; but the truth-conditions of the utterance are unaffected. From a truth-conditional point of view, there is no difference between (11) and (11*). But there is a truth-conditional difference between (1) and (1*): (1) entails something which (1*) does not entail. How can we account for that fact?

When, as in this case, the hybrid is cumulative, there is an easy explanation for the demonstration's impact upon the truth-conditions of the utterance. We can invoke the notion of *pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content*.²¹

When a speaker asserts something, there often are aspects of what he asserts that are not explicitly stated but are provided by the context. This is different from indexicality insofar as the contextually provided constituents remain entirely 'unarticulated'. A good example is

(23) He took out his key and opened the door

in which it is naturally understood that the door mentioned in the second conjunct was opened *with the key* mentioned in the first conjunct. That is a pragmatic suggestion conveyed by the utterance, rather than an aspect of its compositionally articulated content. *Qua* pragmatic suggestion it can be cancelled, as in

(24) He took out his key and opened the door, but he used my key instead of his because he realized his was broken

Despite its pragmatic nature, the suggestion conveyed by (23) — to the effect that the door was opened with the key — does not remain external to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. This is in contrast to standard 'conversational implicatures', which remain intuitively distinct from what is asserted. Thus in

²¹ For an overview of this research area, see Recanati 1993, Chapters 13-14.

(25) [- Would you like some brandy?]

- I don't drink alcohol

the answer implicates that the speaker does not want the brandy she is kindly offered; but the implicature remains distinct from, and external to, what is asserted. By 'what is asserted' here I mean something corresponding to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. Intuitively, the speaker who makes the answer in (25) asserts that she does not drink alcohol and 'implies' that she does not want any brandy. In (23), however, the fact that the door was opened with the key is not intuitively taken to be 'implied' as opposed to asserted. It takes some reflection to realize that that fact was not explicitly articulated in the sentence. From a psychological point of view, the pragmatic suggestion is incorporated into what is asserted: A single mental representation is constructed using both linguistic and contextual clues, rather than two distinct representations as in the case of the answer in (25). In such cases, I say that the truth-conditional content of the utterance is *pragmatically enriched*.²²

²² Another example of the same phenomenon is 'They got married and had many children'. The intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance of this sentence differ from those of 'They had many children and got married'; but that difference can be traced to pragmatic factors, as Grice pointed out: the order in which the events are described is implicitly taken to reflect the temporal order in which they took place. Grice calls this a 'conversational implicature', but it is best treated as an instance of pragmatic enrichment; for the temporal suggestion affects the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance, instead of merely superimposing an extra layer of meaning over and above the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. Similar remarks apply to a host of other examples discussed in the pragmatic literature. For instance, Kent Bach imagines a child crying because of a minor cut and her mother uttering 'You're not going to die' in response. What is meant is: 'You're not going to die from that cut', but literally the utterance expresses the proposition that the kid will not die *tout court*. The extra

Now remember what I said about (1). According to my analysis (§4.1-2), the hearer grasps the pictorial meaning of the quotation when she understands the speaker as depicting Quine's own use of the demonstrated words. But that is not sufficient: the hearer must also identify the point of the demonstration, that is, she must recognize the speaker's intention to let her know that Quine used those very words in the speech episode which the utterance reports. This last aspect of the interpretation of the utterance, relating to the point of the demonstration, is utterly pragmatic, yet it affects the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance (what is asserted). The hearer understands that Quine expressed the reported proposition and did so *using the demonstrated words*, much as in (23) the hearer understands that the individual referred to took out his key and opened the door *with it*. In both cases what the hearer understands as being asserted contains more than what is linguistically articulated, as a result of pragmatic enrichment.

In (11), the pragmatic meaning of the demonstration does *not* affect what is understood as asserted, but only what is implied (in the intuitive sense). (11) therefore is more like (25) than like (23). The conditions under which pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content may or may not take place is a difficult matter which cannot be dealt with in this article. But what is important is the fact that sometimes there is pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content. Since that is so we need to distinguish between the compositionally articulated content of the utterance (c-content), and its intuitive truth-conditional content (i-content). Whenever pragmatic enrichment takes place, as in (23), the i-content contains more than the c-content.

As soon as one draws the independently needed distinction between the two notions of content — the i-content and the c-content — the problem raised for the pragmatic view by the truth-conditional difference between (1) and (1*) vanishes.

element contextually provided (the implicit reference to the cut) does not correspond to anything in the sentence itself, hence it does not constitute a component of the compositionally articulated content of the utterance, yet it is part of its intuitive truth-conditional content.

When I say that open quotation in general, and mixed quotation in particular, is pragmatic and does not affect the content of the utterance, I mean that it does not affect its c-content. That is consistent with the fact that it can affect its i-content. Indeed, I hold that i-content in general is quite systematically affected by pragmatic intrusions of various sorts. So I am not worried by the counterexamples involving cumulative hybrids. Since they can be handled in terms of pragmatic enrichment, they are not counterexamples to my view. They raise difficulties only for someone who holds both the pragmatic view (argued for in this paper) *and* the traditional view which equates the i-content and the c-content.

§5.2 Language-shifts in non-cumulative hybrids

When the hybrid is non-cumulative, we cannot invoke the notion of pragmatic enrichment of truth-conditional content to dispose of the counterexamples. The hallmark of the process of content enrichment is the fact that the enriched content (the output of the process) entails the original content (the input to the process). Thus we have seen that (1) entails (1*). But in the non-cumulative counterexamples, repeated below, the first member of the pair does not entail the second member. Instead of being preserved and merely enriched, the original content is transformed.

(19) Paul says he's due to present his work in the 'paper session'

(19*) Paul says he's due to present his work in the paper session

(21) James says that 'Quine' wants to speak to us

(21*) James says that Quine wants to speak to us

(22) Nicola believes that his father is a 'philtosopher'

(22*) Nicola believes that his father is a philtosopher

Here is what I take the intuitive content of the first member of each pair to be. (19) expresses the proposition that Paul says he's due to present his work in what *he* calls the 'paper session', namely the poster session; (21) expresses the proposition that James says that the individual *he* calls 'Quine', namely McPherson, wants to speak to us; (22) expresses the proposition that the five-year old Nicola believes his father has the property *he* (Nicola) associates with the word 'philtosopher', whatever that property may be. In each case the expression within the quotation marks is not used with its standard meaning, but with the meaning it has *for the person whose use is being echoically simulated*. The reason why the first member of the pair does not entail the second member can be traced to the fact that the meaning of the quoted expression does not stay invariant. Instead of superimposing an extra layer of meaning upon an otherwise invariant content, the demonstration changes the meaning of the expression in quotes and thereby affects its contribution to content.

Those cases can be described in terms of a *language-shift*. In (19) the speaker does not use the word 'paper' in its normal sense, that is, in the sense it has in academic English (where it means *article*), but in the sense it has in Paul's idiolect (where it means what 'poster' means in academic English). The same thing holds for the proper name 'Quine' in (21): that name normally refers to Quine, but in (21) it is used in the sense it has in James' idiolect, where it refers to Tim McPherson. In (22) the speaker uses a word from Nicola's idiolect. That word does not exist in English, even though it is etymologically derived from the English word 'philosopher'.²³

²³ While in (19) and (21) we know what the relevant words mean in the relevant idiolects, in (22) it's hard to say exactly what the sense of 'philtosopher' in Nicola's idiolect is. This case is actually quite complex (and interesting), for both Nicola's own use and the speaker's echoic use can be said to be 'deferential' in their own ways (Recanati 2000, Part VI). Nicola defers to mature speakers of English in his use of what he takes to be an English word, while the speaker of (22) defers to Nicola's own use which he mimicks. Be that as it may, it is out of question to undertake the analysis of such a complex example here.

As Bar-Hillel pointed out half a century ago,

Any token has to be understood to belong to a certain language. When somebody hears somebody else utter a sound which sounds to him like the English 'nine', he might sometimes have good reasons to believe that this sound does not refer to the number nine, and this in the case that he will have good reasons to assume that this sound belongs to the German language, in which case it refers to the same as the English 'no'. In this sense, no linguistic expression is completely independent of the pragmatic context. (Bar-Hillel 1954, p. 80)²⁴

In some cases the interpreter may have reasons to believe that a particular portion of a given utterance belongs to a different 'language' than the rest of the utterance. I put 'language' in quotation marks here because I am using the word in a fairly inclusive sense. The shift at issue may be from English to (say) French, as in "He says I am completely *toqué*"; but it may also be from a dialect of English to another, or from a 'level of language' to another... Thus I would count examples (9) and (10) from §3.1 as instances of sentence-internal language-shift:

(9) To which Mr Bailey modestly replied that he hoped he knowed wot o'clock it wos in gineral.

(10) Une vieille femme... vint au seuil et me demanda *qué que j'voulais*, d'une voix traînante et hargneuse.

I take it that (19), (21) and (22) can be analysed in more or less the same terms. The expression in quotes is understood as belonging to someone's idiolect (Paul's, James', or Nicola's), in contrast to the rest of the sentence. As a result that expression is given a special meaning, which determines a special content.

²⁴ See Kaplan 1978, pp. 228-9 and Recanati 1979, p. 165 for similar remarks and examples.

Let us take stock. In non-cumulative instances of mixed quotation as elsewhere, the quotation marks indicate that the words inside the quotes are used demonstratively. As the indication is fleshed out, the hearer understands that the speaker uses the words in the (deviant) sense they have for such and such person. This affects the content of the utterance, by determining the language which is relevant to the interpretation of the expression in quotes. Here, in contrast to what happens in cumulative cases, the c-content of the utterance is affected. For the process of semantic composition which outputs the c-content takes the meaning of the constituent words as input, and the meaning of the constituent words itself depends upon the language(s) to which the words in question are taken to belong.

Even though it affects the c-content of the utterance, the demonstration does so only indirectly, through the determination of the input to the semantic process which outputs the c-content. That process of input-determination is, by definition, pre-semantic. As Kaplan (1989, p. 559) writes: "Given an utterance, semantics cannot tell us what expression was uttered or what language it was uttered in. This is a presemantic task." Language-selection is like sense-selection in that respect. When an ambiguous sentence is uttered, semantics by itself cannot tell us in which sense it must be taken. Both disambiguation and language-determination are pragmatic processes which must take place *before* the semantic process of content-determination can even start. It is only at that pre-semantic level that the demonstration has an impact upon the utterance's c-content, in the non-cumulative counterexamples. Here again, the analogy with disambiguation is useful. As Kaplan points out, if a haberdasher says 'I am out of checks' to a banker, "whether the utterance takes place in the store or at the bank will help the banker to determine what the haberdasher has said" (Kaplan 1978, p. 229); yet the location of the utterance makes no direct contribution to its content, which it affects indirectly. The same thing can be said about the role of the demonstration in the non-cumulative counterexamples. It affects the truth-conditions of the utterance indirectly, by signalling a sentence-internal language-shift. The shift in question significantly affects the c-content of the utterance, but the demonstration itself makes no direct

contribution to that content. The only direct contribution the demonstration makes to the meaning of the utterance in the non-cumulative counterexamples is the pictorial meaning of the quotation. That, as we have seen, remains external to the c-content.

I conclude that the non-cumulative counterexamples no more threaten the pragmatic view than the cumulative counterexamples do. The cumulative counterexamples are characterized by the operation of a pragmatic process of content-enrichment which affects the i-content of the utterance but leaves its c-content untouched. Non-cumulative counterexamples are harder to dispose of since the c-content of the utterance is also affected. But we have just seen that it is affected only indirectly, at a pre-semantic level. This raises no problem for the pragmatic view.²⁵

§5.3 *Context-shifting*

There are non-cumulative hybrids that cannot be handled in terms of language-shift. In Recanati (1987, p. 63) I gave the following example. Suppose it is mutual knowledge between John and myself that Peter wrongly believes that Mary is my sister. Spotting Mary at a distance, John says to me

(26) Look! 'Your sister' is coming over.

By using the incorrect description 'your sister' to refer to Mary, John ironically echoes Peter's mistake. That this is a non-cumulative hybrid is shown by the fact that (26) does not entail

²⁵ Note that the pragmatic process of content-enrichment also takes place in non-cumulative instances of mixed quotation. What singles out non-cumulative instances of mixed quotation is the fact that a *further* process of language-shift (or, as we shall see, context-shift) takes place, which affects the c-content. It is because of that further process, also triggered by the demonstration, that the first member of the pair does not entail the second member.

(27) Your sister is coming over.

(26) means that *the person whom Peter describes as my sister* is coming over. That does not entail that my actual sister (Jane, say) is coming over.

Even though the hybrid is non-cumulative, it cannot be handled in terms of language-shift. For the phrase 'your sister' is used with its normal meaning in (26); it is the standard English phrase 'your sister', with its standard semantics. The difference between (26) and (27) concerns the circumstance with respect to which the extension of the description is determined. The description 'your sister', as uttered by John, denotes Jane, my actual sister, *in the actual world*; but in Peter's 'belief-world' (that is, in the set of worlds compatible with what Peter believes), or rather in what the speaker takes to be Peter's belief-world, the description denotes Mary. What is special with (26) is the fact that the relevant circumstance of evaluation for the description is Peter's alleged belief-world rather than the actual world.

The content of an utterance is traditionally equated with the conditions that must hold in a circumstance of evaluation for the utterance to be true in or at that circumstance. When a sentence is uttered in a context *k*, the relevant circumstance of evaluation normally is the 'circumstance of the context' (Kaplan 1989). A context comprises a specific situation of utterance (involving a speaker, a hearer, a time and a place of utterance, plus various other factors) together with a complete possible world to which that situation belongs. When a sentence is uttered, the specific situation serves to anchor the indexicals and provide semantic values for them, thus determining a truth-evaluable content for the utterance; that content is then evaluated in the possible world of the context, thus determining a truth-value. The same thing holds for sub-sentential constituents such as the description 'your sister': it is first interpreted with respect to the situation of utterance (in order to fix the value of the indexical 'your') then evaluated in the circumstance of the context so as to determine the extension of the description in that circumstance. What is special in the case of (26) is, again, the fact that the

circumstance of evaluation for the description is not the actual world (in which the utterance takes place) but Peter's alleged belief-world.

This case can be described as follows. The speaker temporarily pretends that he is Peter: he uses the description 'your sister' to refer to Mary, the way Peter himself would. In other words, even though (26) is uttered in a context k , the speaker pretends, at a certain point, that the context is different from what it actually is. That is an instance of *context-shift*. Since the speaker temporarily pretends that the context is different from what it actually is, the relevant circumstance of evaluation is temporarily shifted: the world of the context no longer is the actual world — it is Peter's alleged belief-world.

The analysis I have just given must be readily qualified. Even though, in a sense, the speaker pretends that he is Peter, still the context-shift is highly selective — it affects *only* the circumstance of evaluation. In reply to (26), I may say

(28) You're right; 'my sister' is indeed coming

Here I myself 'pretend that I am Peter' in the sense that I mimick him by my improper use of the description; but the first person in my utterance still refers to myself — it does *not* refer to Peter.

To capture the selectivity of context-shifting, we must represent a context as consisting of a number of parameters which can be shifted independently (Lewis 1980). For the purpose of this paper, I will represent a context as consisting of three main items: (i) a language; (ii) a set of parameters corresponding to the situation of utterance (speaker, hearer, time, place, etc.); (iii) a possible world or more generally a circumstance of evaluation. A context k is therefore analysed as a triple $\langle L, s, c \rangle$ where L is a language, s is a situation of utterance comprising a number of parameters, and c a circumstance of evaluation.

An utterance is normally interpreted with respect to the context k in which it takes place. When an utterance is made, it is made at a certain location, by a certain

speaker, in a certain language, and in a certain possible world. But sometimes the utterance is interpreted with respect to a context *k'* distinct from the context in which it is actually made.²⁶ This is typically the case in *oratio recta*. When we quote an utterance, the sentence within quotation marks is interpreted with respect to the context of the reported speech episode rather than with respect to the actual context in which the quotation is made. In "Jean said 'I am getting bald'", 'I' does not refer to the speaker who quotes, but (if it refers at all) to the quoted person, namely Jean herself. That is because a context-shift takes place, which affects the *situation* component of the context. In (26), it is the *world* of the context which shifts from the actual world to Peter's alleged belief-world. In the non-cumulative examples dealt with in the previous section, it is the *language* that shifts. The speaker speaks a certain language which is constitutive of the context in which the utterance takes place; yet a portion of the utterance is interpreted with respect to a distinct context in which another language is used.

Using the notion of context-shift, we can account for an intriguing example of mixed quotation mentioned by Cappelen and Lepore (1997, p. 429):

(29) Mr Greenspan said he agreed with Labor Secretary R.B. Reich "on quite a lot of things". Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved "quite a surprise to both of us".

The word 'us' here refers to Mr Greenspan and Mr Reich. It does not refer to a group including the speaker of (29). As a result, the hybrid is non-cumulative. (29) does not entail (30):

(30) Mr Greenspan said he agreed with Labor Secretary R.B. Reich on quite a lot of things. Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved quite a surprise to both of us.

²⁶ See e.g. Predelli 1998, and my book *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta* (Recanati 2000).

That is so because (30) entails that, according to Greenspan, the agreement reached by Greenspan and Reich has proved a surprise *to the speaker* (i.e. to the person who reports Greenspan's utterance). That entailment is absent from (29), since 'us' in (29) is quoted and interpreted with respect to the shifted context of the reported speech episode. In that context, the speaker is Mr Greenspan himself (rather than the person who reports his utterance), so 'us' refers to a group including Greenspan rather than to a group including the reporter.²⁷

In that example, as in (26), no language-shift takes place. The words within quotation marks are used with the normal meanings they have in standard English. It is the situational component of the context which shifts, rather than the language component or the circumstance component. Whichever component is involved, however, it is the pre-semantic process of context-selection which is affected by the quotation.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued (following Clark) that quotation is a form of demonstration involving linguistic material. *Qua* demonstration, it has pictorial rather than linguistic meaning. This makes quotation, at bottom, a *paralinguistic* phenomenon, like gesturing or intonation. Such phenomena play a central role in discourse, so to say that quotation is, at bottom, paralinguistic in no way underplays its role or importance in linguistic practice.²⁸

²⁷ The Greenspan example comes from the *New York Times*. In the same newspaper I found another example, where the context-shift affects the reference of the first-person pronoun:

'Levi Foster, in fact, is the great-great-grandfather of Gov. Mike Foster of Louisiana, who said recently on a radio program that it would be "news to me" if anyone in his family had owned slaves.'

²⁸ Not only do such phenomena play a central role in language use, they interact with the linguistic system itself in so many ways, that the latter cannot be properly described

Even though, *qua* demonstrations, quotations have pictorial rather than linguistic meaning, they do affect linguistic meaning in several ways. I have described the impact of quotation on linguistic meaning at four levels. First, the quotation marks themselves have linguistic meaning — they conventionally indicate the fact that the speaker is demonstrating the enclosed words. That indication, like the meaning of pragmatic indicators in general, is 'use-conditional' rather than 'truth-conditional' (Recanati 1998); in more traditional terms, it has the status of a 'conventional implicature'. Second, the demonstration can pre-semantically affect the truth-conditional content of an utterance by shifting the context in which it, or part of it, is interpreted. Third, what the demonstration conveys in virtue of its pictorial meaning can be incorporated into the utterance's truth-conditional content — or at least, into the content of the speaker's assertion — through the process of pragmatic enrichment. (That is only to be expected, since both the pictorial meaning of the demonstration and the linguistic meaning of the sentence contribute to determining the non-natural meaning of the utterance, by manifesting the speaker's communicative intentions.)

The three contributions to linguistic meaning I have just described are somewhat peripheral. They are not direct contributions to the literal (compositional) truth-conditions of the utterance — to what I referred to above as the 'c-content'. But quotations can also, and often do, contribute directly to truth-conditional content. That happens whenever a quotation is *closed*, that is, linguistically recruited as a singular term in the mentioning sentence. Because it functions as a regular singular term, both syntactically and semantically, closed quotation undoubtedly is a genuine linguistic phenomenon.

Closed quotation as I have described it is only a special case; and my aim was precisely to show that it is only a special case. That special case is what is usually called 'quotation' in the philosophical literature. *Open* quotation has been ignored so far by philosophers. One might think that one can afford to ignore it, precisely because it is

without taking them into consideration. For example, the notion of a nonlinguistic 'pointing' can hardly be dispensed with in theorizing about demonstratives.

not directly relevant to the syntactico-semantic study of language, which is the central concern of formally-minded philosophers. But that is not right. By ignoring open quotation, philosophers have been led to commit mistakes and overgeneralizations.

Quotation, philosophers have said, is a device for talking about words; it's a *referential* device. But quotation marks are used also for doing other things, like distancing oneself from a word or expression which one is using. According to the standard philosophical view, there is not much in common between the two uses, hence quotation marks display a form of ambiguity which is to be dispelled for the sake of clarity. Thus philosophers often attempt to use different sorts of quotation marks according to the purpose at hand.²⁹

My objection to this approach is twofold. First, I think we miss a generalization if we posit an ambiguity. Closed quotation is only a special case of a more general phenomenon, and scare quoting is another, even more special case. (It's a special case of open quotation.) Second and more important, the standard approach is methodologically confused. The distancing effect characteristic of scare quoting is the *point* of the demonstration in an important group of cases. But there are other cases which are quite similar on syntactico-semantic grounds — they are also cases of open quotation — but where the point of the demonstration is not to distance oneself from the displayed words. In particular, there are instances of quotation, like (32) below, whose main point is to ascribe the displayed words to someone whose speech the speaker is reporting, *but which ought to be classified as open rather than closed on syntactico-semantic grounds*, even though it is closed quotation that one typically uses in direct speech report. This shows that one should carefully distinguish two issues: a basic syntactico-semantic issue (Is the quotation open or closed, that is, is it, or is it not, linguistically recruited as a singular term?), and a pragmatic issue (What is the point of the demonstration?). Those issues are hopelessly confused in the standard approach.

²⁹ Davison recognizes that this is an "absurd and unworkable formula" (1979, p. 81), but for the wrong reason. See footnote 30 below.

Using the simple-minded distinction between 'genuine' quotation (where one talks about words, and the quotation functions as a singular term) and scare quoting (where one achieves a distancing effect, with no referential intent), one cannot account for examples like the following:

(31) A 'fortnight' is a period of fourteen days

(32) To begin with, I endorse Evans's (1982, ch. 11) distinction between *producers* and *consumers* in a proper-name-using practice. Consider 'an ordinary proper-name-using practice, in which the name "NN" is used to refer to the person x'. The *producers* are the members of the 'core group of speakers who have been introduced to the practice via their acquaintance with x', that is, on the basis of learning 'a truth which they could then express as "This is NN", where "This" makes a demonstrative reference to x', in the context of a certain capacity to recognize persons, or at least that particular person, over time. (p. 376). [From B. Brewer, *Perception and Reason*, Clarendon Press 1999, p. 41]

In (32) the point of the three successive demonstrations is clearly to ascribe to Evans the particular words that are enclosed within quotation marks. The page in Evans's book where those passages occur is even indicated. Those quotations are therefore (pragmatically) similar to those that occur in direct speech reports such as 'Page 321, Evans says "___"'. (Cappelen and Lepore classify such cases as cases of 'direct quotation', where we quote someone by mentioning the words he or she used.) In (31), we give the meaning of the word 'fortnight'. This is (pragmatically) similar to what Cappelen and Lepore call 'pure quotation', where we ascribe properties to words (as when we say: '*Fortnight* is an unfamiliar word'). Despite the pragmatic similarities with instances of either pure or direct quotation, however, the quotations in (31) and (32) are open rather than closed. The quotations are not linguistically recruited as singular

terms. In contrast, both in 'Page 321, Evans says "___"', and in '*Fortnight* is an unfamiliar word', the quotation is closed.

For lack of the distinction between open and closed quotation, philosophers like Davidson or Cappelen and Lepore, confronted with examples similar to (32), have been misled by the pragmatic similarities into thinking that such cases are cases of genuine quotation in their sense.³⁰ This naturally led to the mistaken assumption that there must be a singular term referring to the displayed words somewhere in the sentence.

What I have just said may sound unfair to Davidson and Cappelen and Lepore, since they do not discuss examples like (31) or (32). But I take it that (34) and (35) below present the same characteristic features as (33), which is extracted from (32):

(33) I endorse Evans's distinction between *producers* and *consumers* in a proper-name-using practice. The *producers* are the members of the 'core group of speakers who have been introduced to the practice via their acquaintance with x'.

(34) According to Evans, the *producers* are the members of the 'core group of speakers who have been introduced to the practice via their acquaintance with x'.

(35) Evans says that the *producers* are the members of the 'core group of speakers who have been introduced to the practice via their acquaintance with x'.

It follows from what Davidson and Cappelen and Lepore say about mixed quotation that in (35) the words 'core group of speakers who have been introduced to the practice via their acquaintance with x' are referred to by means of a singular term occurring in

³⁰ The pragmatic similarities between cases of closed quotation (where the words are referred to) and cases of open quotation where the point of the demonstration is to convey something about the words is what seems to have convinced Davidson that the simple-minded distinction between genuine cases of quotation in which we mention words and cases in which we merely scare-quote them is unworkable.

(35). By parity, the same thing should be said about (33) and (34). In all such cases, by ignoring open quotation, one is led to posit a singular term where there is none.

My own analysis of closed quotation is very similar to Davidson's, except that for me, what plays the role of singular term is the demonstration itself, not the quotation marks. What I object to is the tendency, implicit in Davidson and quite explicit in Cappelen and Lepore, to extend that analysis to cases of open quotation, like (35). In (35), the speaker displays certain of the words he is using with the overt intention that the hearer understand these words as being quoted verbatim from Evans's book. That intention underlying the speaker's demonstration is easily recognizable, hence the speaker succeeds in communicating to the hearer that the words within quotation marks come from Evans's book. Yet that aspect of what the utterance communicates is not part of its *c*-content. The ascription of the quoted words to the reportee is part of the content of the *assertion* which the speaker makes, but that part of the content of the assertion is not compositionally determined by the words which the speaker uses. Far from explicitly talking about the quoted words and ascribing them to the reportee, the speaker does not even refer to them; he displays them, and his intention to ascribe them to the reportee is recognized merely by grasping the point of the demonstration.

To Rob Stainton, who similarly advocated a pragmatic approach to mixed quotation,³¹ Cappelen and Lepore replied that such a view "underplay[s] important linguistic aspects of the practice of indirect reporting" (Cappelen and Lepore 1999, p. 282). But it does not, or need not. One need not deny that part of what one standardly asserts by uttering a mixed-quoting sentence is that the reportee used the quoted words; the only thing one has to deny is that this aspect of the intuitive truth-conditional content of the utterance is compositionally determined by the uttered words. One

³¹ "In mixed quotation, one 'shows' the linguistic tools which were used by the reported speaker; and those 'watching the show' acquire beliefs about the form of speech employed. But, to paraphrase Davidson's thoughts on metaphor, it's an error to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a mixed quotation provokes, and to read these contents into the mixed quotation itself." (Stainton 1999, p. 273)

simply has to apply to mixed quotation the strategy which is commonly accepted for sentences like (23) or (36), cited earlier:

(23) He took out his key and opened the door

(36) Peter and Mary got married and had many children

In (36), the temporal suggestion that Peter and Mary had children after getting married (rather than the other way round) is not compositionally determined by the uttered words; it is not part of the utterance's c-content. Yet one need not deny that this pragmatic suggestion is part and parcel of what is asserted by uttering (36) in an appropriate context. The same thing can be said about the suggestion, in (23), that the door was opened with the key mentioned in the first conjunct. The fact that those suggestions are intuitively part and parcel of the truth-conditions of the utterance is no objection to a pragmatic treatment, once it is accepted that the intuitive truth-conditions of an utterance are shaped, to a large extent, by pragmatic factors.³² *

³² At this point a defender of the standard account may reply that in (23) or (36), the pragmatic character of the suggestion can be established using the cancellability test. One can devise contexts in which (23) or (36) do not convey the relevant suggestions. But the same thing can be done with examples like (35). One has only to imagine a context in which the target of the demonstration is distinct from the reported utterance. (See footnote 18 above.)

* This paper has benefitted from discussions with Herman Cappelen, Dick Carter, Benoît de Cornulier, David Kaplan, Philippe Schlenker, Barry Smith, Dan Sperber, Tim Williamson, and Deirdre Wilson (and probably a few others who will, I hope, forgive me for not mentioning them). Written comments by Herman Cappelen, Rob Stainton, and two referees for this journal were most helpful. Thanks are also due to Robyn Carston, to the students who attended my graduate seminar on Quotation at CREA in the academic year 1999-2000, and to the participants in various seminars or conferences in which I presented successive versions of this paper.

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