State consciousness revisited

Abstract : I try to reconcile Dretske's representational theory of conscious mental states with Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of conscious mental states by arguing that Rosenthal's HOT can make room for the notion of a state of consciousness whereby an invidual may be conscious of an object or property without thereby being conscious of being in such a state.
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Article dans une revue
Consciousness and Intentionality. Models and Modalities of Attribution, Kluwer Academic Press, 1998, pp.9-32
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000164
Contributeur : Pierre Jacob <>
Soumis le : mardi 1 octobre 2002 - 15:54:26
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08

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Pierre Jacob. State consciousness revisited. Consciousness and Intentionality. Models and Modalities of Attribution, Kluwer Academic Press, 1998, pp.9-32. 〈ijn_00000164〉

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