Believing, Accepting, and Holding True

Abstract : Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other writers argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees- holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief.
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Article dans une revue
Philosophical Explorations, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 1998, 1 (2)
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Contributeur : Pascal Engel <>
Soumis le : dimanche 20 octobre 2002 - 14:37:49
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08



  • HAL Id : ijn_00000220, version 1



Pascal Engel. Believing, Accepting, and Holding True. Philosophical Explorations, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 1998, 1 (2). 〈ijn_00000220〉



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