Abstract : Holophobia can be defined as the "neurotic" fear that semantic holism, if not instantly extirpated by the most radical means, might be a deadly threat to intentional realism. I contend that Fodor exaggerates the threat that meaning holism poses to intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content in terms of conceptual roles. He particular, he overestimates the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of reach.I argue that all that is needed to defeat the more radical varieties of meaning holism is a weaker distinction than the full-blown and allegedly inexistent analytic/synthetic distinction - namely, a distinction between what is treated as if it were analytic by a cognitive system and what is treated as if it were synthetic.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Acta Analytica, 1994, 12, pp. 105-112
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Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : samedi 26 octobre 2002 - 14:23:36
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Elisabeth Pacherie. Holophobia. Acta Analytica, 1994, 12, pp. 105-112. 〈ijn_00000232〉



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