Conscious experience and concept forming abilities

Abstract : This paper examines Pierre Jacob's claim that in order to undergo states of consciousness a creature must have concept-forming abilities. I discuss the motivations behind this claim and its relations to two importants distinctions in Dretske's work: the distinction between analogical and digital coding of information and the distinction between sensory content and conceptual content. I argue that Jacob's claim is too strong and can be replaced by a weaker requirement.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Acta Analytica, 2000, 26, pp. 45-52
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Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : lundi 28 octobre 2002 - 17:47:16
Dernière modification le : mercredi 28 septembre 2016 - 14:03:12
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:18:24


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000246, version 1



Elisabeth Pacherie. Conscious experience and concept forming abilities. Acta Analytica, 2000, 26, pp. 45-52. <ijn_00000246>



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