The norms of thought: are they social?

Abstract : A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of view according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein's rule following considerations, Davidson's triangulation argument, and Brandom's inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social. A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of view according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein's rule following considerations, Davidson's triangulation argument, and Brandom's inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Mind and Society, Springer Verlag, 2002, 2 (3), pp.129-148
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000250
Contributeur : Pascal Engel <>
Soumis le : vendredi 1 novembre 2002 - 16:24:30
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08

Fichiers

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : ijn_00000250, version 1

Collections

Citation

Pascal Engel. The norms of thought: are they social?. Mind and Society, Springer Verlag, 2002, 2 (3), pp.129-148. 〈ijn_00000250〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

159

Téléchargements de fichiers

37