The content of intentions

Abstract : By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.
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Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : samedi 12 mars 2005 - 14:29:34
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 20 septembre 2010 - 13:53:07


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000258, version 2



Elisabeth Pacherie. The content of intentions. Mind & Language, 2000, 15 (4), pp.400-432. 〈ijn_00000258v2〉



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