Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

The content of intentions

Abstract : By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior intentions and intentions in action.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [79 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Saturday, March 12, 2005 - 2:29:34 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, September 20, 2010 - 1:53:07 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000258, version 2



Elisabeth Pacherie. The content of intentions. Mind & Language, 2000, 15 (4), pp.400-432. ⟨ijn_00000258v2⟩



Record views


Files downloads