Can we believe what we do not understand?

Abstract : In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject Sperber's claim that quasi-belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief.
Liste complète des métadonnées
Contributeur : François Recanati <>
Soumis le : vendredi 8 novembre 2002 - 17:24:13
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:21:52


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000292, version 1



François Recanati. Can we believe what we do not understand?. Mind and Language, Wiley, 1997, 12 (1), pp.84-100. 〈ijn_00000292〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers