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Can we believe what we do not understand?

Abstract : In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject Sperber's claim that quasi-belief is a credal attitude distinct from plain belief.
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Contributor : François Recanati <>
Submitted on : Friday, November 8, 2002 - 5:24:13 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 3, 2010 - 8:21:52 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000292, version 1



François Recanati. Can we believe what we do not understand?. Mind and Language, Wiley, 1997, 12 (1), pp.84-100. ⟨ijn_00000292⟩



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