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Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefs: A reply to Campbell

Abstract : A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
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Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Sunday, April 6, 2003 - 11:04:52 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, September 17, 2020 - 12:28:50 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, April 3, 2010 - 8:24:20 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000346, version 1


Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie. Monothematic delusions, empiricism, and framework beliefs: A reply to Campbell. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. ⟨ijn_00000346v1⟩



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