Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions

Abstract : A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [36 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Saturday, March 12, 2005 - 2:21:24 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, September 20, 2010 - 1:52:20 PM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000346, version 2



Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie. Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 11 (1), pp.1-11. ⟨ijn_00000346v2⟩



Record views


Files downloads