Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions

Abstract : A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framework propositions. We argue that neither Campbell's attack on empiricism nor his rationalist alternative to empiricism is successful.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 11 (1), pp.1-11
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [36 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000346
Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : samedi 12 mars 2005 - 14:21:24
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 20 septembre 2010 - 13:52:20

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : ijn_00000346, version 2

Collections

Citation

Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie. Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 11 (1), pp.1-11. 〈ijn_00000346v2〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

306

Téléchargements de fichiers

1031