Do we know how we know our own minds yet?

Abstract : In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.


https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000352
Contributeur : Pierre Jacob <>
Soumis le : vendredi 6 juin 2003 - 15:03:40
Dernière modification le : mercredi 28 septembre 2016 - 14:03:05

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Pierre Jacob. Do we know how we know our own minds yet?. 2003. <ijn_00000352>

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