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Do we know how we know our own minds yet?

Abstract : In traditional epistemology, psychological self-knowledge is taken to be the paradigm of privleged a priori knowledge. According to an influential incompatibilist line of thought, traditional epistemic features attributed to psychological self-knowledge are supposed to be inconsistent with content externalism. In this paper, I examine one prominent compatibilist response by an advocate of content externalism, i.e., Fred Dretske's answer tot he incompatibilist argument, based on the model of displaced perceptual knowledge. I discuss the costs and benefits of his answer.
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Contributor : Pierre Jacob <>
Submitted on : Friday, June 6, 2003 - 3:03:40 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 31, 2020 - 11:46:08 AM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000352, version 1



Pierre Jacob. Do we know how we know our own minds yet?. 2003. ⟨ijn_00000352⟩



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