Thinking of oneself as the same

Abstract : What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own internal states). This view is compatible with the hypothesis that the self is a dynamic representation emerging out of a higher level control system, - valuation control - whose articulation with control of plans and perceptual/motor control is discussed in the context of normal and pertrubed agency .
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Article dans une revue
Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.495-509
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Contributeur : Joëlle Proust <>
Soumis le : lundi 7 juin 2004 - 19:28:02
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
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Joëlle Proust. Thinking of oneself as the same. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.495-509. 〈ijn_00000504〉



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