Response to Phil Gerrans

Abstract : Phil Gerrans comments on Proust's paper entitled "Thinking of oneself as the same" raise two points; one has to do with the value of sceptical arguments about self-knowledge, the other with what a self can know of him/herself. These two comments are discussed. It is shown first that metacognition operates on content as well as on vehicles, which leaves every replica with her own numerical identity. Second, the homuncular fallacy is discussed as part of a response to the second point.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.513-514
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [3 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : Joëlle Proust <>
Soumis le : lundi 7 juin 2004 - 19:40:46
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:37:12


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000505, version 1



Joëlle Proust. Response to Phil Gerrans. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2003, 12 (4), pp.513-514. 〈ijn_00000505〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers