Concepts are Not a Natural Kind

Edouard Machery
Abstract : Machery Edouard (2004) Concepts are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science. Full text available as: Adobe PDF Abstract: In cognitive psychology, concepts are those data structures that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings' higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning...). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the Natural Kind Assumption. This article challenges the Natural Kind Assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate to carve human beings'
Liste complète des métadonnées
Contributeur : Nicolas Bullot <>
Soumis le : samedi 18 septembre 2004 - 22:54:20
Dernière modification le : lundi 15 juin 2015 - 15:07:41
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:39:08


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000535, version 1



Edouard Machery. Concepts are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press, 2004. 〈ijn_00000535〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers