Some problems for Lowe's Four-Category Ontology

Abstract : In E.J. Lowe's ontology, (individual) objects are property-bearers which 1) have identity and 2) are countable. This makes it possible to become or cease to be an object, by beginning or ceasing to fulfil one of these conditions. But the possibility of switching fundamental ontological categories should be excluded. Furthermore, Lowe does not show that “quasi-individuals” (which are not countable) can exist. I argue against Lowe that kinds cannot be property-bearers in a more genuine sense than properties, that they are not absolutely countable, whether conceived according to science or common sense, and that they are dependent on individual objects.
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Analysis, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004, 64 (2), pp.146-151
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Contributeur : Max Kistler <>
Soumis le : mercredi 6 octobre 2004 - 15:27:15
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
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Max Kistler. Some problems for Lowe's Four-Category Ontology. Analysis, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004, 64 (2), pp.146-151. 〈ijn_00000538〉



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