The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Abstract : Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of mirror neurons first discovered in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys seems to provide an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospect of a motor theory of human social cognition. In humans, however, social cognition encompasses the ability to mindread. Many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we argue that motor simulation is neither sufficient nor necessary for third-person mindreading.
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Contributeur : Pierre Jacob <>
Soumis le : mardi 1 février 2005 - 18:27:23
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 3 avril 2010 - 20:42:27


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000573, version 1



Pierre Jacob, Marc Jeannerod. The motor theory of social cognition: a critique. 2005. 〈ijn_00000573〉



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