Uncertainty and the suppression of inferences

Abstract : The explanation of the suppression of Modus Ponens inferences within the framework of linguistic pragmatics and of plausible reasoning (i. e. , deduction from uncertain premises) is defended. First, this approach is expounded, and then it is shown that the results of the first experiment of Byrne, Espino and Santamaría (1999) support the uncertainty explanation but fail to support their counterexample explanation. Second, two experiments are presented. In the first one, aimed to refute one objection regarding the conclusions observed, the additional conditional premise (if N, C) was replaced with a statement of uncertainty (it is not certain that N); the answers produced by the participants remained qualitatively and quantitatively similar in both conditions. In the second experiment, a fine-grained analysis of the responses and justifications to an evaluation task was performed. The results of both experiments strongly supported the uncertainty explanation.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Thinking and Reasoning, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2005, 11 (1), pp.5-33
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Contributeur : Guy Politzer <>
Soumis le : samedi 30 juillet 2005 - 02:48:02
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 14 septembre 2012 - 16:48:34


  • HAL Id : ijn_00000616, version 1



Guy Politzer. Uncertainty and the suppression of inferences. Thinking and Reasoning, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2005, 11 (1), pp.5-33. 〈ijn_00000616〉



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