Reliability, Margin for Error and Self-Knowledge

Abstract : Margin for error principles play a central role in the epistemology of Timothy Williamson, both in his account of vague knowledge (Williamson 1992, 1994), and in his attack against the luminosity of knowledge (Williamson 2000). The present paper pursues two objectives: the first is an attempt to refine and systematize the modal analysis of the reliability of knowledge given by Williamson, and to delimit the scope of margin for error principles. The second is a criticism of Williamson's thesis that knowledge is not luminous, elaborating on previous work by Dokic & Egre (2004), based on the intuition that knowledge is modular and that a representation of this modularity is needed at the logical level in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusions which result rom Williamson's assumptions.
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Soumis le : vendredi 3 février 2006 - 17:23:10
Dernière modification le : mercredi 28 septembre 2016 - 14:02:48
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 17 septembre 2012 - 11:41:00



  • HAL Id : ijn_00000667, version 1



Paul Egré. Reliability, Margin for Error and Self-Knowledge. Duncan H. Pritchard & Vincent Hendricks. New Waves in Epistemology, Ashgate Publishing, 2006. <ijn_00000667>



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