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Content, mode, and self-reference

Abstract : In this paper I argue that the self-referential component which Searle rightly detects in the truth-conditions of perceptual judgments comes from the perceptual ‘mode' and is not an aspect of the ‘content' of the judgment, contrary to Searle's claim.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00089222
Contributor : François Recanati <>
Submitted on : Sunday, August 13, 2006 - 7:36:24 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 22, 2020 - 3:59:17 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, April 6, 2010 - 12:34:51 AM

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François Recanati. Content, mode, and self-reference. S. Tsohatzidis. John Searle's Philosophy of Language : Force, Meaning, and Thought., Cambridge University Press, 2006. ⟨ijn_00089222⟩

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