Moderate Relativism

Abstract : In modal logic, propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition may be true relative to a world w, and false relative to another world w'. Relativism is the view that the relativization idea extends beyond possible worlds and modalities. Thus, in tense logic, propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the proposition that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time t, and false relative to another time t'. In this paper I discuss, and attempt to rebut, two classical objections to Relativism. The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. I distinguish two possible relativist responses to that objection, one of which corresponds to the view I actually defend : Moderate Relativism. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who argued that the objects of belief cannot be relativistic. I show that that objection can be met within the Moderate Relativist framework. In the last section, I deal with special forms of disagreement that have loomed large in recent discussions of Relativism.
Type de document :
Chapitre d'ouvrage
M. Kölbel & M. Garcia-Carpintero. Relativizing Utterance Truth, 2006
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00089223
Contributeur : François Recanati <>
Soumis le : dimanche 13 août 2006 - 19:47:50
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mardi 6 avril 2010 - 00:34:56

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  • HAL Id : ijn_00089223, version 1

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François Recanati. Moderate Relativism. M. Kölbel & M. Garcia-Carpintero. Relativizing Utterance Truth, 2006. 〈ijn_00089223〉

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