Awareness of Agency : Three Levels of Analysis

Abstract : This paper discusses the content of agency awareness. It contrast three elements in content: what the goal is, how it is to be reached, and who is having the goal/performing the action ? Marc Jeannerod's claim that goal representations are self-other neutral is discussed. If goal representations are essentially sharable, then we do not understand other people by projecting a piece of internal knowledge on to them, as often assumed. The problem which our brain has to solve is the converse problem : determining who the agent is, once a goal is identified. This view has interesting consequences on the theory of mentalization. One can plausibly speculate that observing action, with an additional simulatory component for action memory, form major building blocks in understanding other minds. Metarepresenting, in this perspective, would depend on additional executive capacities for maintaining distinct the inferences from diverse simulated contexts of action.
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Contributeur : Joëlle Proust <>
Soumis le : vendredi 30 mars 2007 - 10:35:00
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
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  • HAL Id : ijn_00139276, version 1



Joëlle Proust. Awareness of Agency : Three Levels of Analysis. T. Metzinger. The Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Cambridge, MIT Press,, MIT Press, pp.307-324, 2000. 〈ijn_00139276〉



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