Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation ?

Abstract : Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need not involve metarepresentation, nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Joëlle Proust <>
Submitted on : Friday, March 30, 2007 - 11:41:06 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, August 10, 2021 - 2:46:23 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, April 7, 2010 - 1:48:13 AM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00139315, version 1



Joëlle Proust. Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation ?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2003, 26 (3), pp.352-352. ⟨ijn_00139315⟩



Record views


Files downloads