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Declarative vs. procedural rules for religious controversy

Is Leibniz's rational approach to heresy an example of procedural rationality?

Frédéric Nef

I propose to employ the conceptual contrast between procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge instead of the contrast stressed by Marcelo Dascal (2001, 2005) between soft and hard rationality in Leibniz's thought. I propose to examine the interplay between declarative and procedural knowledge in Leibniz's religious thought, and in particular Leibniz's approach to heresy. If there is a domain where soft rationality is dominant, it seems that it would be such a field, governed by theological disputes apparently deprived of hard rationality. I will show that the opposite is true: even in that sort of sub-domain, the two types of rationality are present. I shall define the leibnizian concept of heresy and give some criteria and examples of its use in Leibniz's writings. I shall consider in some detail his response to the leibnizian response to the classical question: "Is heresy a crime?"¹ I shall analyze the strong connection between religious controversy in general and the philosophical treatment of heresies and show that the contrast between declarative and procedural approaches to heresy illuminates some underestimated aspects of Leibniz's religious thinking.

Supprimé :

1. Reason, rationality, rationalism: A reminder

Reason is neither a faculty, nor an ideal, as a Kantian interpretation would falsely suggest. Reason is a concatenation of truths of two types: eternal truths (either dogmatic or mathematical ones) and positive truths (laws of nature). The mind can be helped by natural light in arts and sciences and by the light of faith (*lumière de la foi*) in religion. Hence "natural light of reason" and "God's divine revelation" are complementary:

Almost every thing we have said is manifest through the natural light of reason, but what is the secret economy of divine council in order to restore man to his first condition can be known only through God's divine revelation?²

It is thus necessary that sane reason, as a natural interpreter of God, be capable of judging the authority of those who claim to interpret the divine will before admitting them [to controversy], but once these [new] interpreters have demonstrated the legitimacy of their faith, reason must submit itself to the deference of faith.³

Is this a form of relativism, of double truth? Leibniz's answer is the following: There is only one reason and not several ones – there is no 'fragmentation of reason' in the various domains of rationality; reason does not change according to the field to which it is applied: Reason is naked and pure (*la raison pure et nue*, T, Discours Préliminaire, § 1) and is distinguished from experience, unable by itself to unify the multiplicity of prismatic subfields. Faith in that respect is comparable to experience and miracles are similar to natural events in physical experience. But this experience specific to faith is transmitted by tradition, which has authority regarding controversies. Accordingly, there is then one reason and several fields of experience and so, regarding metaphysical principles and pure mathematics, pure reason is eventually independent from experience. Miracles are hard facts, even if they constitute an exception to the laws of nature, and faith is hard reason, when it is justified by reasoning. Therefore there is a hard theological rationality based partly on hard facts, even when they violate natural laws.

1.1 Faith

Leibniz distinguished first *fides* and *assensus* and, second, simple faith without reflection (*assensus rationibus destitutus*; ST 52)⁴ and faith with reflection, justified by reasoning. He admits the existence of practical faith (*Fides sive assensus practicus*; ST 54). Christian faith has a public character: "I do not accept Christian faith on the basis of a private reason, but on the basis of the testimony of catholic church, about miracles and martyrs, and of the perpetual tradition and scriptures kept inside the church" (A VI 4 C 2323; GR 27-30).⁵

Faith is both free and non-voluntary, since Leibniz refuses to admit an obligation to believe.⁶ Faith is a type of belief, but moreover, it is a combination of theories and practices: religious beliefs supervene on rites. There is no real independency of religious beliefs, even if opinions determine conversely correctness or incorrectness of rites. Dogmas considered as beliefs can be either rational or irrational. Rational dogmas are either natural, like the belief in a divine providence, or revealed, like belief (or faith) in Jesus-Christ's resurrection. Irrational dogmas can be either voluntary, like multifarious heresies, or involuntary, like the errors of the pagans. True religion, revealed religion grounded on natural religion, is a set of practices or rites, completely distinct from false devotion (think about Molière's *Tartuffe ou l'Imposteur*, 1664). Faith supervenes on sincere dedication and we are right to maintain that Leibniz would have endorsed the contemporary anthropological thesis, according to which belief is supervenient on action.

1.2 Why think that there is soft rationality?

As elsewhere, Leibniz makes use of the presumptive argument (anybody is presumed innocent, until proven guilty) in theology. Presumption governs practice, and that makes possible confusion between the pragmatic use of argument and the pragmatic nature of reason. Theology is a species of 'universal jurisprudence' (Grua 1949; see also Riley 1996). Practical theology is almost equivalent to universal jurisprudence (Adams 1989: 195). The domain of practical theology is large, but not identical with the whole of theology. Jurisprudence is based on the logic of probability, but this latter is not soft rationality. For all these reasons, we may doubt that theology, as a whole, should be identified with a sort of soft rationality.

Moreover, jurisprudence and law are precisely defined and distinguished concerning man and relative to God: we have to distinguish right (*jus*) and quasi-right (*quasi jus*): our right to expect something from God. Quasi right is twofold: *ex congruo* and *ex condigno*. *Ex*

congruo is distributive justice and through quasi right *ex condigno* our merits are rewarded. *Ex condigno* is commutative; through quasi right *ex condigno*, the commutation between sins and redemption is realized and achieved.

There is, therefore, one single rationality, one single reason, but several kinds of rationalism. If we draw a distinction between the connection of truths grounded on essences (reason), the universal and unique disposition of the human mind to use reason (rationality), and the application of rationality to a domain (types of rationalism), we can conclude that Leibniz's rationalism is both logical (Couturat-Russell), jurisprudential (Grua), and theological (Baruzi). Each domain is an entrance into the system.

1.3 *Je viens à la métaphysique*

It could be objected that there is at least a fourth entrance into the system, perhaps the main one: metaphysics. But from the point of view of discussing Leibniz's rationalism, metaphysics is identical to logic: true metaphysics, in so far as it is distinct from verbal metaphysics, is not different from logic (*ars inveniendi*); moreover, metaphysics is identical to natural theology, in virtue of the convertibility between truth and goodness.

2. Declarative vs. procedural: Definition

Let us define in an informal way (by an enumerative definition, not a stipulative one) what is declarative and what is procedural. To give the internal structure of a database, to axiomatize a body of knowledge, is declarative. 'To know that p', 'to infer q from p', 'to expand if p, then q to: if p, r...then q' are typical expressions or moves of declarative thinking. On the contrary, to know how to do something is relative to procedural strategies in various domains (war, cooking, cycling, etc.). To refute p, to give an argument in favor of p, to decide who is right and who is wrong, are highly representative of procedural thinking. Declarative knowledge is mainly logical, metaphysical and geometrical; usually based on deduction, it corresponds to a dogmatic style. Procedural thinking is mainly juridical, theological. The disputational structure of argumentation is symptomatic of procedural thinking.⁷ Leibniz applies his formalist and anti-intuitionist theoretical principles in all fields of his philosophy: "I hold that in order to reason with evidence everywhere, one must keep some constant formality. There will be less eloquence and more certainty".⁸

3. The problem of heresy

Heresy is a dogmatic error *inside Christian theology* defined by the Church in Leibniz's sense. ~~(including the Roman Church and the Ausburg Confession)~~. Leibniz does not index new heresies; he accepts the list established by the Councils' records and decrees and considers, for example, Marcionism as a heresy (A VI 4 2533). Leibniz endorsed Johachim of Fiora's condemnation by Petrus Lombardus who declared him a heretic (A VI 4 2578). The history of heresies (*haeresi historia*) is a part of theology (GP I 72) and Leibniz accepted the distinction between *haeretica*, *schismatica*, *fanatica* (Letter to Thomasius; GP I 23). These few examples show that Leibniz took the heuristic power of this apologetic concept very seriously.

Heresy is relative to *vraie religion* (Moses, Jesus-Christ, Mohammed), whereas in false religion there are no heresies (cf. Zoroaster, Brama) (D I 678ff.). Thus, some religious doctrines are false but nonetheless not heretic. For example, the Stoic doctrine of the world's soul is a bad doctrine⁹ – but not a heresy. More generally, naturalism, of which Stoicism is a kind, is not a heresy (GP VII 333-334). It is a philosophical error but not a heretical doctrine.

Leibniz's use of the concept of heresy exhibits the same duality of conservative and innovative strategies as elsewhere in his system. Thus, heresy is defined as a will to reform radically the Church¹⁰ and, at the same time, a traditional heresy can be mentioned in order to show that a philosophical doctrine is mistaken.¹¹ Leibniz adds a new category: half-heretics. A half heretic is something more than a schismatic (potentially heretic). We face, therefore, a sort of continuum: schismatic, half heretic, material heretic (i.e. involuntary heretic), formal heretic (i.e. voluntary heretic). In this way, Leibniz considers the French clergy as half heretic and sees a connection between this fact and some epistemological doctrines of the Cartesians considering antiquity as a source of certitude, but not Scholastic and casuistic:

These are the nice principles of some Sorbonnists or other figures of France's clergy, which are considered half-heretic among us. For, in this way the door is open for anyone who dares to oppose what is done in the Church and who despises its judgments [...]. This is why he will accuse [...] the Scholastics of sophistry [c. Descartes, Arnauld] and the Casuists of license [cf. Pascal]. So that it is not he that holds these people to be heretics – they do all that is needed for that. And if the Pope dared to excommunicate them at our time, and if they got some secular support, they would remain within the schism, as Luther and Zwingli: unless they would abandon the bad principle that reduces infallibility to antiquity [cf. Pascal, *Préface au Traité du Vide*], and separates it from the modern practice.¹²

Leibniz usually takes for granted the distinction between material and formal heresy. Concerning material heresy, he was accused of being too indulgent when he did not refuse salvation to material heretics. Leibniz's solution to the classical problem of the legal nature of heresy derives from this distinction between material and formal heretics (see GR 210-212).

3.1 Heresies are also philosophical errors: Five examples.

Mohammedanism (or 'destin à la turque') is an involuntary irrational dogma of absolute divine omnipotence negating human freedom (opposed to the belief in divine providence), supervening on laziness and arrogance. Manichaeism or Gnosticism is a voluntary irrational dogma supervening either on libertinage or the free spirit adepts or ingratitude (the goodness of creation is ignored). We can note that intellectual vices (heresies) supervene on moral vices: non-observance, effrontery, dissoluteness, oblivion. Three other heresies exhibit deeper conceptual confusions. Arians believe the son of God is only the first creature (*Ariani vero Filium Dei volunt esse primam creaturam*; ST 34; A VI 4 2367). In that case, the cult of Jesus-Christ is unreasonable, as there is confusion between creature and creator. Photinians believe Jesus-Christ is only a man (*Photiniani autem ex simplici homine faciunt Filium Dei*; *ibid*). In that case, the cult of Jesus-Christ is pagan. Socinians believe no cult of Jesus-Christ is necessary. Socinianism is very close to Mohammedanism. The last one is the more consistent (*rectiusque ex ipsorum hypothesibus*; *ibid.*), but unreasonable: logical consistency is only a condition for reasonability. Heresy is both contrary to reason and to virtue.

3.2 Are heresies crimes?

Leibniz uses the distinction between material and formal heresy. The first is caused by accidental ignorance, the second by malicious disobedience. Only the second has to be punished. But the punishment must be used only for curing the depraved will and not as a commutative retaliation. Leibniz insists that if nobody can be a saint and formally a heretic at the same time, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of a partial material heresy in a saint if, for example, an opinion became unorthodox after his death.

As "the intellect corrects the will, and the will corrects the intellect",¹³ it is not enough to inflict a punishment on the heretic; it is also necessary to demonstrate to him the falsity of his heresy. But we know that true demonstrations are not frequent and that the risk of

propagation of formal heresies through passive infection, as in infection in an epidemic, is enormous.¹⁴ Leibniz thinks that, in such a case, the punishment of the charismatic leaders must be more severe, because unreflectively joining formal heresy is, in a certain way, close to material heresy (a point on which Leibniz was vehemently criticized by institutional theologians). In the controversy with Pélisson, Leibniz remarked in 1690 that the Catholic theologians affirm that the criteria of salvation for material heretics are “the internal marks of a movement of the Holy Ghost”.¹⁵ Leibniz answers that these motives cannot be explained, that we can only have probability (*vraisemblance*) with such ‘marks’, and that a man cannot be excommunicated if there is only a probability that his will is wrong. On this point, too, Leibniz was judged too liberal. The main point is that Leibniz affirms that the real criterion is obedience and that opinions are not voluntary: if the material heretic is *disposed* to change his opinion, when his superiors say he is wrong, it is enough.¹⁶

3.3 Procedural aspects of the fight against heresies

Leibniz condemns heretics because they attempt to destroy charity in the Church and among men. But if we use force (Inquisition) or treachery (like some Jesuits used or use to do), we will cause a rebellion of heretics and the situation will be worse, because the loss of charity among men will be greater (religious wars, revolts of fanatics and enthusiasts); heretics will look for supreme sacrifice, which they will falsely and outrageously call ‘martyrdom’ (*martyrium*) and in that case, they will be close to winning (think of terrorists’ strategies).

What is, then, the winning strategy for the wise men? Leibniz thinks that a balance between toleration and force must be firmly kept, and that the rules of weighing pros and cons are not known in that case, even if we know, for example, that in general anathemas, intimidation and excommunication are useless (Cf. Pichler 1870). If there is no unique winning strategy against heresies, philosophy could be used in order to prevent the formation of such heresies (a prophylactic use of reason, opposed to a curative one, which is in the power of the Church). In that respect, the fight against philosophical misconceptions cannot be separated from the general fight against heresy: “[... I would have the courage to assure that no solid objection against the atheists, the Socinians, the naturalists and the Skeptics will ever be raised without the constitution of this philosophy”,¹⁷ i.e., a philosophy opposed to the Cartesian conception of matter.

We have insisted on the fact that Leibniz wanted to keep a balance between opinions, and that heresies can be considered as exaggerations of opinions. Does Leibniz consider heresy as simplification? The use of the expression ‘exaggeratedly wrong dogma’ (*dogme outré*) in Leibniz’s writings seems to imply the opposite.¹⁸ Leibniz characterized heresy as ‘un dogme outré’ several times in the *Théodicée*. But Leibniz in fact does not adopt this view and his characterization has to do with the procedural approach to religious controversies. ‘Outré’ does not mean ‘false’, but denotes a bad move in a discussion.

According to Leibniz, Descartes’ doctrine of the essence of body is potentially schismatic. The *Systema Theologicum* is almost silent on heresies, as it is an irenic writing, but Leibniz denounces the metaphysical origin of a potential theological schism concerning the rationalization of the Eucharist dogma. The Cartesian metaphysical error is to consider that the essence of bodies is only extension. This erroneous philosophical opinion has theological consequences. To begin with, there would not be, in that case, substantial change in the Eucharist, and this is potentially unorthodox.¹⁹ Next, as Cartesians cannot believe something metaphysically impossible (i.e., implying a logical contradiction), they cannot believe in transubstantiation.

3.4 The cannibal case

Concerning *resurrection*, Leibniz examines a *casus*: when a cannibal is resurrected, what will remain of his body, as parts of it will have joined the owners of their original wholes? Solution: we must know that not everything which has belonged to a body is necessary to the essence of this body.²⁰ The justification of this solution is the following: there is in each body a 'flower of substance' (alchemical vocabulary?) and the cannibal will return the flowers of substance belonging to eaten persons, while keeping his own substantial flower. The cannibal can return flowers of substance without losing his own.

4. Law and Theology: Universal law is the same for God and man

Law, according to Leibniz, is a set of presumptions (*vérité par provision* and not conjecture), probabilities and prejudices, founded on particular reasons. Theology is a set of demonstrations, revelations and testimonies of tradition, grounded on general reasons. Therefore, we could say that theology is harder than law (if we maintain this way of speaking). We prefer to affirm that there is a declarative element in theology, exactly as there is a procedural element in law. When Leibniz gives a theory of legal conditions, he is working on the declarative side of law: its conditional structure.

In the context of the criticism of Antitrinitarianism, Leibniz makes use of a general strategy: to demonstrate the non-repugnancy of mysteries and dogma (the Trinity, the Eucharist) with metaphysical and logical necessity (Letter to Loeffler; D I 17-21). This method is presumptive and therefore close to jurisprudence. But there is a difference between explaining the mysteries of religion and explaining civil laws: the first is not necessary, whereas the second is. In order to terminate a social conflict, it is necessary to explain the *laws*, but when we arbitrate a religious controversy on dogmatic matters, the explanation of the *Mysteries* is not necessary.²¹

More universal is religion, closer it is with natural law; a universal religion is therefore identical to natural law:

And although divine Reason surpasses infinitely our [reason], one can say without impiety that we share reason with God, and that it constitutes the links not only of all society and of friendship among men, but also of God with man. [...] Reason is the principle of a universal and perfect religion, which one can justly call the Law of nature. [...] *the Law of nature is the Catholic religion* (Leibniz's underlining).²²

Among the main heresies and schisms fought by Leibniz, we find as particularly representative of Leibniz's natural theology: (i) Socinian heresy, (ii) Calvinist predestinationism, and (iii) Antitrinitarian heresies. Leibniz defends the dogma of incarnation, the harmony between human freedom and divine omnipotence and defends, as do Whitehead and Peirce, the relational nature of God. In those cases, heresy or schism *look* simpler than the true doctrine of the universal Church, but Leibniz shows that these deviations are more complex from the point of view of Reason, in so far as they lead to very intricate antinomies.

5. Procedural vs. declarative method in theological controversies: Leibniz vs. Bayle in the *Théodicée*, Discours Préliminaire

Leibniz characterizes Bayle as a partisan of declarative, or mathematical method in philosophical and religious controversies. He translates Bayle's assertions in procedural guise. We could put the two ways of rational discussion in front of each other and give a procedural translation of declarative language (T, Discours préliminaire, §§75-82). Leibniz insisted that

he had commented extensively to Bayle in § 75-76 of this 'preliminary discourse':

I was especially at pains to analyze this long passage where M. Bayle has put down his strongest and most skillfully reasoned statements in support of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how this excellent man has been misled (§77).

Unfortunately, the meaning of the text is a bit masked, because Leibniz put his comments in brackets and it is necessary to reconstruct the dispute by pulling apart Bayle's bold assertions and Leibniz's incidental objections.

According to Bayle, religious controversies have to conform themselves to the rules of deductive method:

Every philosophical dispute assumes that the disputant parties agree on certain definitions [...] and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, and the signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything lies in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or immediately to the principles one is agreed upon (§ 75).

Definitions and syllogisms characterize the Aristotelian demonstrative method expressed in the *Second Analytics*. It is well known that Leibniz himself prized very much the deductive method he defended against the Cartesians, but he refused to apply it mechanically to disputes or controversies. However, it is not a decisive reason for contrasting soft (disputational) and hard (deductive) rationality. I think that the procedural vs. declarative contrast is more relevant here, because there is no value judgment in this distinction, whereas the opposition between soft and hard could turn curiously negative towards what is called 'soft'. Leibniz thus objects: "This would be desirable, but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point, if the necessity arises which is done by means of the syllogisms of him who makes objections" (id.).

Bayle firmly relies on some rules of the deductive Aristotelian-Euclidean method, whereas Leibniz considers the dispute game as a succession of moves, in which some of these rules could be applied. For example, he puts 'advanced by the opponent' in brackets after Bayle's rule. Whereas Bayle thinks in an absolute way, Leibniz thinks in a contextualist one. He refused, as always, to separate methodology and real controversy.

Bayle gives some precisions: "whether the premises of a proof are true [...] whether the conclusion is properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether some aphorism of the chapter *de oppositis* or *de sophisticis elenchis*, etc., has not been violated" (id.). But Leibniz judges these precisions pedantic and useless: "It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny some premise or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained some ambiguous term" (id.). Bayle considers that a player won the game when he fulfilled these conditions: "One comes off victorious either by showing that the subject of dispute has no connection with the principles which had been agreed upon [...]" (id.). Here Bayle judges that to win is to be consistent with principles agreed upon explicitly before the dispute. He sees no real difference between a demonstration and a dispute, which both consist in deriving consequences from postulates. Leibniz translates this declarative description into a procedural description: "that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing, and then the defendant wins the case" (id.). However, the translation aforementioned goes both ways. When Bayle completes the sentence with a procedural equivalent: "or by reducing the defender to absurdity" (id.), Leibniz translates it in demonstrative mode: "when all the premises and all the conclusions are well proved" (id.).

Concerning 'the aim of the dispute', Bayle and Leibniz deeply disagree. Bayle believes that there is one single aim of the dispute (i.e., the victory of one of the participants): "The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence" (T 116). Leibniz, however, sees very well that the aims of opponent and defendant are not the same: "It is the aim of the opponent, for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot here be the aim of the defendant, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that one cannot demonstrate it" (*ibid.*). Bayle and Leibniz, accordingly, do not evaluate 'victory' in the same manner. Bayle affirms that victory belongs to the one who has clear ideas:

This leads to the opinion that during the course of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or with the opponent, to whether there is more or less clarity in the propositions of the one than in the propositions of the other (T 117; GP VI 94).

Very impressively, Leibniz opposes to this Cartesian internalist epistemology a social-externalist conception of the dispute:

That is speaking as if the defender and the opponent were equally unprotected; but the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defense works, and it is for the attacker to destroy them. The defender has no need here of self-evidence, and he seeks it not: but it is for the opponent to find it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order that the defender may be no longer protected (T 117; GP VI 94).

Bayle attributes the victory in the dispute to the one who proves that his opponent has fallen into obscurity: "Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are such that one comprehends nothing in them, [...] and who confesses that they are incomprehensible" (§ 76). However, this criterion of victory seems subjective to Leibniz: "It is a very equivocal sign of victory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend anything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided" (*id.*). Even if he recognizes the importance of rules concerning conceptual distinctions, "[t]he order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to answer them by denying or making a distinction" (*id.*). Leibniz thus reveals a contradiction in Bayle's thought between criteria of clarity and the very nature of theological disputes:

It is permitted to him who maintains the truth of a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if this confession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no need of objection. It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible, but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing at all therein. It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called *Scindapsus* or *Blityri* (Clem. Alex., *Stromateis*, 8), that is, words devoid of meaning (*id.*).

In the passage above, Leibniz is, therefore, making a very useful distinction between two types of incomprehensibility.²³ The first is simply identified as void of content (*blitiri*); the second is the mark of mystery. As theological disputes are concerned with mysteries, criteria of comprehensibility cannot be applied without qualification. A little later (§ 78) Leibniz contrasts between Bayle's method of evidence and the lack of evidence proper to mysteries:

M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we need an answer as clearly evident as the objection' [...] I have already shown that it is obtained when one denies the premises, but that for the rest it is not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always to advance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning the Mystery itself is not evident.

There is a last difference between the two religious thinkers: Bayle has an offensive vision of dispute, Leibniz a defensive one. Bayle says:

He [the defeated, i.e., the defendant] is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding victory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has covered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his antagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an army which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the victor only under cover of night (id.).

Whereas Leibniz explains:

Matching allegory with allegory, I will say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by his entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it is permitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blame for that (id.).

We must conclude that Leibniz was aware of the distinction between procedural and declarative uses of rationality; the terms of this opposition cannot be identified with a distinction between different fields of rationality, and neither are some parts of Leibniz's thought harder or softer than others – a distinction Dascal stresses when he correctly says that soft rationality is pervasive in most parts of Leibniz's writings. In nearly every field and subfield, Leibniz was familiar with the interplay between those two varieties of reason. In that sense, Leibniz's rationalism is both procedural and declarative and his model of the judge of controversies as a wise man, inspired by charity and prudence, could still be a model for our times.

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¹ The key text is: “Sur Thomasius. *Utrum haeresis sit crimen?*” (GR 210-212).

² “Et quidem quae hactenus diximus [God does not want the death of the sinner, because he is perfectly good] fere omni ipso ex rationis lumine manifesta sunt; et quae fuerit in restitendis hominibus divini consilii arcana oeconomia a solo DEO relevante dici potuit” (ST 16; A VI 4 2361).

³ “Proinde necesse est rectam rationem tanquam interpretem DEI naturalem judicare posse de auctoritate aliorum DEI interpretum, antequam admittantur, ubi vero illi semel personae suae legitimae fidem, ut ita dicam fecerunt, jam ratio ipsa obsequium fidi subire debet” (ST 20-22; A VI 4 2362).

⁴ “[...] consistat in eo mentis statu quo fit ut qui eum habent perinde affecti atque ad agendum patiendumque compositi sunt ac illi qui rationum sibi sunt conscii, imo ad aliquando efficacius”.

⁵ “Tametsi fides Christiana non ratione privata, sed testimonio Ecclesiae Catholicae scriptisque in ecclesia conservatis [...]”; “holicae a miraculis et martyriis accepto, et traditione perpetua Specimen demonstrationum catholicarum seu apologia fidei ex ratione”.

⁶ Demonstration: “DEFINITIONES 1) Obligatio: necessitas imposita sub poenae justae metu; 2) credere est conscius esse rationum nobis persuadentium; 3) in potestate sunt, quae fiunt si velis; 4) metus est voluntas evitandi; 5) conscientia est nostrarum actionum memoria. EXPERIMENTUM: Non est in potestate nostra, nunc meminisse alicujus rei praeteritae aut non meminisse. PROPOSITIONES: I. Conscientia non est in potestate; II. Credere aliquid aut non credere non est in potestate; III. Eorum quae non sunt in potestate nulla obligatio est; IV. Nulla est obligatio credendi (*De obligatione credendi*, GR 181-182). cf. [chap. 6, p. 000-000](#)

⁷ Some examples in the field of religious controversy may be given. Declarative: Averroës (*Decisive Discourse*, first level), Bayle (in *Théodicée*), Luther (*The Bondage of the Will*). Procedural: Averroës (*Decisive Discourse*, second level), Leibniz (in *Théodicée*), Erasmus (*De Libero Arbitrio*).

⁸ “Je soutiens qu’à fin de raisonner avec évidence *par tout* [my emphasis], il faut garder quelque formalité constante. Il y aura moins d’éloquence et plus de certitude” (GP IV 292-293).

⁹ “Cette mauvaise doctrine est fort ancienne et fort capable d’éblouir le vulgaire” (T 55; GP VI 54).

¹⁰ “ce sont des visionnaires...ils ne sont guère meilleurs que les hérétiques, puisqu’ils ont la présomption de réformer la Ste Eglise” (A VI 4 2223).

¹¹ “M. de Soissons remarque que de faire *consister la nature de l’homme en ce qu’il pense est une des hérésies des trois premiers siècles*” (A VI 4 2117). This passage is excerpted by Leibiz from a review of Huet’s *Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae* (Paris in 1689; French translation in C. Poulouin (ed.), *Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du cartésianisme*, 1996).

¹² “Ce sont là les beaux principes de quelques Sorbonistes ou autres supposts du clergé de France, qui passe pour *demi-hérétique* parmi nous. Car ainsi la porte est ouverte au premier venu qui ose s’opposer à ce qui se fait dans l’Eglise et qui méprise ses jugements [...]. C’est pourquoi il accusera [...] les Scholastiques de sophistique [cf. Descartes, Arnauld] et les casuistes de licence [cf. Pascal]. De sorte qu’il ne tient pas à ces gens-là d’être *hérétiques*, ils font tout ce qu’il faut pour cela. Et si le pape les osoit excommunier dans le temps où nous sommes et s’ils trouvoient quelque appuy seculier, ils demeureroient dans le *schisme* comme Luther et Zwingli; à moins que de renoncer à ce mauvais principe qui réduit l’*infaillibilité* à l’*antiquité* [cf. Pascal, *Préface au traité du Vide*] et qui les sépare de la pratique moderne” (*Dialogue entre Poliandre et Theophile*; A VI 4 2225; my additions and italics).

¹³ “*Intellectus emendat voluntatem, et voluntas emendat intellectum*” (ST 211).

¹⁴ “Schisma inter maxima est orbis et Ecclesia mala, et qui ejus autor est summo se scelere obligat; qui vero in schismate haeret culpa sua gravissime peccat” (*Positiones*; A VI 4 2353).

¹⁵ “*les marques intérieures d’un mouvement du St Esprit*”.

¹⁶ *Lettres de Leibniz et Péllisson*, IV, Second mémoire (D I 702-707; DA: Chapter 33B).

¹⁷ “[...] illud confirmare ausim, Atheis, Socinianis, Naturalistis, Scepticis nunquam nisi constitutam hac philosophia solide occursum iri” (Letter to Thomasius, 30 April 1669; GP I 26; BO 115).

¹⁸ See Newman’s (1878) notion of the historical development of dogmas.

¹⁹ “Aversio a Catholicae Ecclesiae dogmatibus nascitur” (ST 200).

²⁰ “[...] verum sciendum est non illud ad essentiam unius cujusque corporis pertinere quod ei unquam unitum fuit” (ST 300).

²¹ *Remarques sur le livre d’un antitrinitaire anglais* (D I 24-26).

²² “Et quoique la Raison divine surpasse infiniment la nôtre, on peut dire sans impiété que nous avons la raison commune avec Dieu et qu’elle fait non seulement les liens de toute la société et amitié des hommes [*philanthropia*], mais encore de Dieu et de l’homme [*theophilia*]. La Raison est le principe d’une religion universelle et parfaite qu’on peut appeler avec justesse la loi de la nature. *La loi de la nature est la religion catholique*” (*Parallèle entre la Raison originale ou de la Nature, le Paganisme ou la corruption de la Loi de la Nature, la Loi de Moïse ou le Paganisme réformé et le Christianisme ou la Loi de la Nature rétablie*; BA: 352, 354, 355).

²³ For a detailed analysis of Leibniz’s handling the problem of the incomprehensibility of the mysteries of faith, with special attention to the passages here discussed, see Dascal (1987: Chapter 6).