Externalism revisited: is there such a thing as narrow content?

Abstract : First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" (in a belief-ascription) is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that the truth-conditions of belief-ascriptions include aspects of the believer's (social) environment does not entail that those environmental aspects are thereby parts of the contents of the person's thoughts.
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Article dans une revue
Philosophical Studies, Springer Verlag, 1990, 60, pp.143-176
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Pierre Jacob. Externalism revisited: is there such a thing as narrow content?. Philosophical Studies, Springer Verlag, 1990, 60, pp.143-176. 〈ijn_00353270〉

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