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Externalism revisited: is there such a thing as narrow content?

Abstract : First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" (in a belief-ascription) is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that the truth-conditions of belief-ascriptions include aspects of the believer's (social) environment does not entail that those environmental aspects are thereby parts of the contents of the person's thoughts.
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Contributor : Pierre Jacob <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 15, 2009 - 11:28:10 AM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
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  • HAL Id : ijn_00353270, version 1



Pierre Jacob. Externalism revisited: is there such a thing as narrow content?. Philosophical Studies, Springer Verlag, 1990, 60, pp.143-176. ⟨ijn_00353270⟩



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