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In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions

Abstract : In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.
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Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 15, 2009 - 5:24:22 PM
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  • HAL Id : ijn_00353586, version 1



Elisabeth Pacherie, Tim Bayne. In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind & Language, 2005, 20 (2), pp.163-188. ⟨ijn_00353586⟩



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