Is collective intentionality really primitive?

Abstract : This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00353603
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Thursday, January 15, 2009 - 5:57:02 PM
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Elisabeth Pacherie. Is collective intentionality really primitive?. M. Beaney, C. Penco & M. Vignolo. Mental processes: representing and inferring, Cambridge Scholars Press, pp.153-175, 2007. ⟨ijn_00353603⟩

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