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The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth

Abstract : In this paper, I argue against the view there are contingent a priori truths, and against the related view that there are contingent logical truths. I will suggest that in general, predicates ›a priori‹ and ›contingent‹ are implicitly relativized to circumstances, and argue that apriority entails necessity, whenever the two are relativized to the same circumstance. I will then criticize the idea, inspired by David Kaplan's framework, of contingent contents »knowable under a priori characters.« I will also argue, against Kaplan, that sentences of the form »The actual F is F« do not deserve the status of logical truths, since what they express is neither necessary nor a priori (pace Kaplan).
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Contributor : Isidora Stojanovic <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 20, 2009 - 1:19:27 PM
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Isidora Stojanovic. The Vicious Triangle of A Priori Truth, Contingent Truth, and Logical Truth. Nikola Kompa, Christian Nimtz and Christian Suhm. The A Priori and its Justification in Philosophy, Kompa, N., Nimtz C., Suhm, C.; Mentis Verlag, pp.69-82, 2009. ⟨ijn_00354590⟩



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