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Mereological essentialism, composition, and stuff: a reply to Kristie Miller

Abstract : In ‘Essential stuff' (2008) and ‘Stuff' (2009), Kristie Miller argues that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are incompatible: - (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists. - Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there exists a portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). She does this by considering competing hypotheses about stuff, trying to prove inconsistency in all cases and with all corresponding understandings of mereological essentialism and stuff composition. I explain why, from an endurantist standpoint, her argument does not go through.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00420383
Contributor : David Nicolas <>
Submitted on : Monday, September 28, 2009 - 5:55:34 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 14, 2020 - 4:10:18 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 30, 2011 - 11:50:50 AM

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David Nicolas. Mereological essentialism, composition, and stuff: a reply to Kristie Miller. Erkenntnis, Springer Verlag, 2009, 71 (3), pp.425-429. ⟨10.1007/s10670-009-9185-7⟩. ⟨ijn_00420383⟩

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