Framing Effects as Violations of Extensionality

Abstract : Framing effects occur when different descriptions of the same decision problem give rise to divergent decisions. They can be seen as a violation of the decisiontheoretic version of the principle of extensionality (PE). The PE in logic means that two logically equivalent sentences can be substituted salva veritate. We explore what this notion of extensionality becomes in decision contexts. Violations of extensionality may have rational grounds. Based on some ideas proposed by the psychologist Craig McKenzie and colleagues, we contend that framing effects are justified when the selection of one particular frame conveys choice relevant information. We first discuss this idea from a philosophical point of view, and proceed next to formalize it first in the context of the Bolker–Jeffrey decision theory. Finally, we extend the previous analysis to non-expected utility theories using the Biseparable Preference model introduced by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and therefore show that the analysis is independent of the assumptions of Bayesian decision theory.
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Article dans une revue
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2009, 67 (4), pp.385-404
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Contributeur : Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde <>
Soumis le : lundi 16 novembre 2009 - 19:02:27
Dernière modification le : mercredi 5 septembre 2018 - 17:04:03
Document(s) archivé(s) le : jeudi 17 juin 2010 - 20:36:10


  • HAL Id : ijn_00432662, version 1



Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Raphaël Giraud. Framing Effects as Violations of Extensionality. Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2009, 67 (4), pp.385-404. 〈ijn_00432662〉



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