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L-worlds. The curious preference for low quality and its norms

Abstract : We investigate a phenomenon which we have experienced as common when dealing with an assortment of Italian public and private institutions: people promise to exchange high quality goods and services (H), but then something goes wrong and the quality delivered is lower than promised (L). While this is perceived as ‘cheating' by outsiders, insiders seem not only to adapt but to rely on this outcome. They do not resent low quality exchanges, in fact they seem to resent high quality ones, and are inclined to ostracise and avoid dealing with agents who deliver high quality. This equilibrium violates the standard preference ranking associated to the prisoner's dilemma and similar games, whereby self-interested rational agents prefer to dish out low quality in exchange for high quality. While equally ‘lazy', agents in our L-worlds are nonetheless oddly ‘pro-social': to the advantage of maximizing their raw self-interest, they prefer to receive low quality provided that they too can in exchange deliver low quality without embarrassment. They develop a set of oblique social norms to sustain their preferred equilibrium when threatened by intrusions of high quality. We argue that cooperation is not always for the better: high quality collective outcomes are not only endangered by self-interested individual defectors, but by ‘cartels' of mutually satisfied mediocrities.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00436655
Contributor : Gloria Origgi <>
Submitted on : Friday, November 27, 2009 - 1:06:14 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, September 22, 2020 - 3:58:22 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 17, 2010 - 6:37:04 PM

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Diego Gambetta, Gloria Origgi. L-worlds. The curious preference for low quality and its norms. Oxford Series of Working Papers in Linguistics, 2009, pp.1, 23. ⟨ijn_00436655⟩

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