McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism

Abstract : In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell's view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: (1) the identity conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; (2) it could be plausible only from an externalist point of view that is in tension with the view of normativity that motivates conceptualism; (3) the identity conception of truth is incompatible with McDowell's recent version of conceptualism in terms of ‘non-propositional intuitive contents'.
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Article dans une revue
European Journal of Philosophy, Wiley, 2011, 19 (1), pp.1-30. 〈10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00383.x〉
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Contributeur : Santiago Echeverri <>
Soumis le : mardi 2 février 2010 - 15:39:05
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Santiago Echeverri. McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy, Wiley, 2011, 19 (1), pp.1-30. 〈10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00383.x〉. 〈ijn_00452517〉



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