The Myth of the Conceptual Given

Abstract : Conceptualism conceives of perceptual experience as a source of reasons. This claim can be read in two ways: in a strong reading, perceptual experience is taken to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to justify doxastic states. In a weak reading, it is assumed to provide only the materials to form reasons, which are conceived as “hybrid entities” made from perceptual contents plus doxastic force. The paper shows that whereas the strong version is in error, the weak version is committed to a dualistic understanding of perception-judgment transitions. This result leads to three further conclusions: (1) conceptualism cannot rule out the existence of nonconceptual content, (2) it is a version of the Myth of the Given, and (3) pace conceptualists, only beliefs can justify other beliefs.
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Contributeur : Santiago Echeverri <>
Soumis le : mardi 2 février 2010 - 16:54:38
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 18 juin 2010 - 18:26:39


  • HAL Id : ijn_00452614, version 1



Santiago Echeverri. The Myth of the Conceptual Given. 2010. 〈ijn_00452614〉



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