Sacred bounds on the rational resolution of violent political conflict

Abstract : We report a series of experiments carried out with Palestinian and Israeli participants showing that violent opposition to compromise over issues considered sacred is (i) increased by offering material incentives to compromise but (ii) decreased when the adversary makes symbolic compromises over their own sacred values. These results demonstrate some of the unique properties of reasoning and decision-making over sacred values. We show that the use of material incentives to promote the peaceful resolution of political and cultural conflicts may backfire when adversaries treat contested issues as sacred values.
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Soumis le : jeudi 22 juillet 2010 - 19:59:39
Dernière modification le : lundi 29 janvier 2018 - 17:22:54
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Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, Khalil Shikaki. Sacred bounds on the rational resolution of violent political conflict. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , National Academy of Sciences, 2007, 104, pp.7357-7360. 〈ijn_00505179〉



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