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Embodiment, ownership and disownership

Abstract : There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.
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Contributor : Frédérique de Vignemont <>
Submitted on : Sunday, October 17, 2010 - 5:40:58 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, January 18, 2011 - 2:32:24 AM


  • HAL Id : ijn_00526983, version 1



Frédérique de Vignemont. Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2010, pp.1-12. ⟨ijn_00526983⟩



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