The tuning fork model of human social cognition: a critique

Abstract : The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral premotor cortex of monkeys, involves the four following assumptions: (1) mirroring processes are processes of resonance or simulation. (2) They can be motor or non-motor. (3) Processes of motor mirroring (or action-mirroring), exemplified by the activity of MNs, constitute instances of third-person mindreading, whereby an observer represents the agent's intention. (4) Non-motor mirroring processes enable humans to represent others' emotions. After questioning all four assumptions, I point out that MNs in an observer's brain could not synchronically resonate with MNs in an agent's brain unless they discharged in a single brain in two distinct tasks at different times. Finally, I sketch a conceptualist alternative to the resonance model according to which a brain mechanism active in both the execution and the perception of e.g., the act of grasping is the neural basis of the concept of e.g., grasping.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2009, 18 (1), pp.229-243
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [66 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : Pierre Jacob <>
Soumis le : jeudi 22 novembre 2012 - 10:14:40
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 23 février 2013 - 03:42:51


  • HAL Id : ijn_00755869, version 1



Pierre Jacob. The tuning fork model of human social cognition: a critique. Consciousness and Cognition, Elsevier, 2009, 18 (1), pp.229-243. 〈ijn_00755869〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers