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The scope and limits of Chomsky's naturalism

Abstract : While Chomsky subscribes to methodological naturalism, he rejects both metaphysical naturalism and an externalist conception of meaning. This chapter explores some of Chomsky's grounds for rejecting both metaphysical naturalism and meaning externalism, in particular his peculiar attitude towards ontological physicalism and his arguments for an internalist approach to meaning.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00755897
Contributor : Pierre Jacob <>
Submitted on : Thursday, November 22, 2012 - 10:39:02 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 31, 2020 - 11:46:08 AM
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Pierre Jacob. The scope and limits of Chomsky's naturalism. Jean Bricmont & Julie Franck. Chomsky's Notebook, Columbia University Press, pp.211-234, 2010, 10. ⟨ijn_00755897⟩

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