Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It Is and Where It Comes From
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Immunity to error through misidentification: What it is and where it comes from

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I. The experiential basis of immunity

1.1 Error through misidentification: general and singular

There is error through misidentification in the following type of situation. A subject S judges that some object \( a \) is F, because S has grounds for believing that some object is F and wrongly believes that \( a \) is one such object — i.e., an object \( x \) such that S has grounds for believing that \( x \) is F. This covers two types of case, depending on the nature of the subject’s grounds for holding that some object is F.

In the standard type of case, the subject has singular grounds for believing that some object is F: there actually is an object \( x \) such that S has grounds for believing that \( x \) is F.

\[ ETM-S: \]
There is an object \( x \) such that S has grounds for believing that \( x \) is F, but S mistakenly identifies some other object \( y \) as satisfying (\( \lambda z \) (S has grounds for believing that \( z \) is F)).

For example, you see someone running and form the belief ‘He is in a hurry’. Wrongly believing that the person you see (and have grounds for taking to be in a hurry) is Tom, you form the judgment: ‘Tom is in a hurry’. Here there is an object \( x \) (namely the man you see running) such that you have grounds for believing that \( x \) is in a hurry, but you mistakenly identify some other object \( y \), namely Tom, as the object satisfying (\( \lambda z \) (S has grounds for believing that \( z \) is in a hurry)).

In the other type of case, the subject has grounds for believing that some object or other is F, but there is no object in particular such that the subject has grounds for believing that that object is F. The subject only has general grounds for holding that something is F. General though they are, such grounds may, in conjunction with other beliefs, themselves provide singular grounds, if they are taken to apply to some particular object. For example, I know that someone will win the lottery, and I know that the winner will go to Tahiti; so I have (general) grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti. This provides me with singular grounds for holding that you will go to Tahiti, if I happen to believe that you will be the winner. (There is no inconsistency in saying both that the subject only has general grounds, AND that these grounds in turn provide singular grounds; for the general grounds determine singular grounds only in conjunction with other beliefs. If we abstract from the collateral beliefs, the subject only has general grounds for holding that something is F; if we factor them in, the subject turns out to have singular grounds as well — provided he is right in believing his general grounds apply to a particular object.)
This opens the way to the second type of error through misidentification: the subject may misidentify some object \( a \) as being such that, given the subject’s general grounds for holding that some object is \( F \), these grounds apply to \( a \), i.e. provide grounds for holding that \( it \) is \( F \).

**ETM-G:**

\( S \) has grounds for believing that some object or other is \( F \), and mistakenly believes that these grounds apply to \( a \), i.e. provide grounds for holding that \( a \) is \( F \).

Again, I know that someone will win the lottery, and I know that the winner will go to Tahiti; so I have grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti. If I mistakenly believe that you are going to win the lottery, I will infer that you will go to Tahiti. That judgment suffers from ETM-G since my general grounds for believing that someone will go to Tahiti do not in fact apply to you (since you do not fulfil the critical condition: being the winner, contrary to what I assume).

The distinction between ETM-S and ETM-G resembles Pryor’s distinction between ‘de re misidentification’ and ‘which-object misidentification’ (Pryor 1998), but it differs from it, as shown by the fact that Pryor’s paradigmatic example of which-object misidentification is not an instance of ETM-G. In Pryor’s example, the subject \( S \) smells a skunky odor in the garden and thinks ‘There is a skunk in my garden’. Then he sees a small animal \( a \) in his garden and wrongly applies to it the property \((\lambda x) (x \text{ is a skunk in } S’s \text{ garden})\), i.e. the property he has grounds for taking to be instantiated. \( S \) makes a mistake, because \( a \) is a distinct animal from \( b \), the skunk whose characteristic odor \( S \) initially perceived. Here I would deny that \( S \) has only general grounds for holding that something is a skunk in \( S’s \) garden. \( S \) actually has singular grounds: there is an object, namely \( b \), such that \( S \) has grounds for holding that it is a skunk in \( S’s \) garden, and \( S’s \) mistake is an instance of singular ETM-S: he wrongly identifies \( a \) as the object satisfying \((\lambda z) (S \text{ has grounds for believing that } z \text{ is } F)\).

Pryor says that in this type of case there is which-object misidentification, rather than de re misidentification, because the subject’s mistake does not consist in moving from an initial, correct singular judgment ‘\( b \) is \( F \)’ to an incorrect singular judgment ‘\( a \) is \( F \)’ via a mistaken identity ‘\( a = b \)’, but rather from an initial, correct general judgment ‘Some \( x \) is \( F \)’ (‘There is a skunk in my garden’) to the incorrect ‘\( a \) is \( F \)’ (‘That animal is a skunk in my garden’) via the mistaken application to \( a \) of the predicate which the subject correctly judges to be instantiated. But however general the judgment the subject initially makes in this case, his grounds for making the judgement are undoubtedly singular: there is an \( x \) (namely the skunk \( b \) whose odor the subject smells) such that \( S \) has grounds for holding that \( x \) is a skunk in \( S’s \) garden. These grounds are eo ipso grounds for making the general judgment that some object \( x \) is a skunk in \( S’s \) garden, and it is that general judgment which the subject articulates in Pryor’s example. What matters to my classification, however, is not the nature of the initial judgment the subject actually makes but the nature of the grounds for making it; and in this case the grounds are undoubtedly singular.

I will return to Pryor’s example in the third part of this chapter. For the time being I assume the distinction between ETN-S and ETN-G, Pryor’s example being a special case of ETN-S (along with standard cases of ‘de re misidentification’). In what follows, I focus on ETN-S and leave ETN-G aside.

**1.2 (Immunity to) error through misidentification: primitive and derivative**

Let us look more closely at the running man example. Several judgments are involved. The initial judgment is the perceptual judgement that \( b \) (the man one sees, thought of
demonstratively as ‘that man’) is running. The final judgment is the judgment that Tom is in a hurry. In between, we find the identity : ‘That man = Tom’. But the identity in question can intervene either after the perceptual judgment that b is running, yielding the (mistaken) judgement that Tom is running and the subsequent judgment that Tom is in a hurry (pattern A), or after the inferential judgment that b is in a hurry, itself based upon the initial judgment that b is running (pattern B).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern A</th>
<th>Pattern B</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>That man is running</td>
<td>That man is running</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Than man = Tom</td>
<td>That man is in a hurry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tom is running</strong></td>
<td><strong>That man = Tom</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom is in a hurry</td>
<td><strong>Tom is in a hurry</strong></td>
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In both Pattern A and Pattern B, the final judgment that Tom is in a hurry suffers from error through misidentification. But in Pattern A the judgment that Tom is in a hurry *inherits* the misidentification error from the judgment that Tom is running, which already suffers from such an error. In Pattern B, the judgment that Tom is in a hurry suffers from misidentification in a *non-derivative* manner, just as the judgement that Tom is running does in Pattern A. I have used bold type to highlight the judgments that are subject to misidentification errors in a primary (non derivative) manner and directly rest upon an identity.

A singular judgment ‘a is F’ that is subject to (non-derivative) error through misidentification (e.g. ‘Tom is running’ in A or ‘Tom is in a hurry’ in B) is such that its immediate grounds involve several premisses, one of which is the identity ‘a = b’. The possible falsity of the identity entails the possibility of errors through misidentification. By ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (IEM), I mean a singular judgment’s immunity to such errors. So, a singular judgement ‘a is F’ has the property of IEM just in case its immediate grounds do not involve an identity ‘a = b’. In both Pattern A and Pattern B above, the judgment ‘That man is running’ is IEM. In B, the judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ is IEM too. This shows that, to be IEM, a judgment need not be directly based upon an experience. In A, the IEM judgment ‘That man is running’ is directly based upon a perceptual experience, but the judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ in B is not (it is inferential), yet it is IEM, insofar as it does not rest upon an identity.

Still, I want to tie immunity to error through misidentification to the property a singular judgment has whenever it is directly based upon an experience. We have just seen that an inferential judgment such as ‘That man is in a hurry’ can be IEM, but this should be qualified. That judgment is IEM only in a derivative sense, for it is based upon another judgment that is IEM too: the perceptual judgment ‘That man is running’. Not only is the judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ inferred from the perceptual judgment ‘That man is running’; the former *inherits its intentional object* from the latter. There is (as some people put it) ‘de jure coreference’ between the subject of the former and the subject of the latter. That means that the intentional object of the inferential judgment ‘That man is in a hurry’ is determined through the earlier, perceptual judgment ‘That man is running’: the subject *keeps thinking about the same man* (the man seen running) and infers that he is in a hurry. Now I take it that an IEM judgment which inherits its intentional object from another IEM judgment in this manner only has derivative immunity; the reason being that immunity has fundamentally to do with how one’s intentional object is determined. So a judgment displays primitive, rather than derivative, IEM just in case (i) it is IEM, and (ii) it does *not* inherit its intentional object (the object it is about) from another IEM judgment in its grounds, as ‘That

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1 On this issue, see e.g. Campbell 1994, 2002; Fine 2007; Pinillos forthcoming.
man is in a hurry’ does in Pattern B. Singular judgments which are directly based upon an experience display primitive immunity in that sense, I will argue.

Let us take stock. I have distinguished between derivative and non-derivative (primitive) forms of error through misidentification, and defined IEM in terms of the latter. An IEM judgment ‘a is F’ is such that its (immediate) grounds do not involve an identity ‘a = b’ whose possible falsity entails the possibility of misidentification errors. Now it turns out that immunity cases too have to be divided into primitive and derivative. Some judgments are IEM in a derivative manner: they inherit their intentional object (viz. a) from a judgment that is already IEM. Other judgments are IEM in a primitive, non derivative manner: their immediate grounds involve neither an identity ‘a = b’, nor another IEM judgment ‘a is G’ from which they inherit their intentional object. In both Pattern A and Pattern B, only ‘That man is running’ (the judgment that is directly based on the perceptual experience) displays primitive IEM. It is that notion of primitive IEM which I try to elucidate in the next section, by looking at the paradigmatic case: that of first-person judgments. I will return to the immunity of demonstrative judgments in the third part of this chapter.

1.3 Immunity and the first-personal character of experience

With first-person judgments we can replicate the three types of case we have introduced. Consider (1)-(2) below:

(1a) That man’s legs are crossed [said or thought while looking at someone in the mirror]
(1b) Oh, but that man is myself!
(1c) (So) my legs are crossed

(2a) I have a headache
(2b) (So) I will not be able to concentrate; I should stop working

The first-person judgment (1c) is made on the basis of the demonstrative judgment (1a) and the identity (1b); it is therefore subject to error through misidentification (the subject may be wrong in identifying himself with the person seen in the mirror). If (1c) was made directly on the basis of a proprioceptive experience (if the subject felt the position of his legs, ‘from inside’) it would be immune to error through misidentification (in a non-derivative manner): the subject could not be mistaken specifically concerning the person whose legs are crossed. In such a situation, it would make no sense for the subject to wonder: ‘Someone’s legs are crossed, but is it me?’ Likewise, judgement (2a) displays primitive immunity: it is directly based on the experience of headache, which it reports. In that situation the subject cannot wonder: ‘Someone has a headache, but is it me?’ (2b) also is IEM², but it is so only derivatively. It is based upon the prior judgment (2a) and inherits its intentional object from it.

There is primitive (non-derivative) IEM, I contend, whenever the first-person judgment is directly based upon an experience. Where does the immunity come from, in such a case? It comes from the fact that experiences are intrinsically first-personal. Of course, experiences need not represent the subject of experience; they need not be first-personal in that sense. Just as the content of our judgments, the content of one’s experiences may but need not be about the subject herself. The feature that makes an experience (as opposed to a judgment) intrinsically first-personal is not its content, I claim, but its mode.

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² It would make no sense for the subject to think: ‘Someone will not be able to concentrate, but is it me?’
What — following Searle (1983) — I call the ‘mode’ is what enables us to classify experiential states into types such as perceptions, memories, etc., quite independent of the content of the state (what is perceived, remembered, etc.). The mode $M$ of an experience determines that (if all goes well) a certain relation $R_M$ holds between the subject of the experience ($S$) and what the experience represents (its content $p$). The subject undergoing an experience $M(p)$ is therefore entitled to proceed as if he or she bore relation $R_M$ to $p$. For example, the subject undergoing a visual experience normally stands in an appropriate causal relation to the scene represented (she ‘sees’ the scene, i.e. stands in front of it and has her visual apparatus causally affected by it); in episodic memory, the subject’s relation to the scene represented is that of having perceived it in the past; in proprioception the subject’s relation to the bodily condition represented by the state is that of being in that condition. On the view I argued for in *Perspectival Thought*, the content of a proprioceptive state is a property (a bodily condition) which the subject is entitled to self-ascribe, just as the subject is entitled to self-ascribe the property of standing-in-front-of-and-being-causally-affected-by what his or her visual experience represents, or the property of having-perceived-in-the-past the scenes represented by his or her episodic memories. If the subject makes these self-ascriptions explicit, the resulting judgments are immune to error through misidentification; for even if the subject is mistaken in holding that she bears $R_M$ to $p$, still she is not entitled to conclude that anybody but her bears that relation to the content of the experience. The subject cannot think, on the basis of her episodic memories: ‘Someone experienced these scenes in the past, but was it I?’ Nor can she think, on the basis of her perceptual experience: ‘Someone is currently seeing these things, but is it I?’ Nor can she think, on the basis of her proprioceptive experience: ‘Someone’s legs are crossed, but are they mine?’

To sum up: An experience, whether visual, mnesic, or proprioceptive, concerns the subject who undergoes the experience. That is so even though the subject is not represented in the content of the experience. I have just said that the content of a proprioceptive experience is nothing but a bodily condition. What makes the bodily condition in question the subject’s bodily condition is the mode of the experience: no information can be gained on the proprioceptive mode concerning the position of other people’s limbs. The fact that the limbs whose position is represented are the subject’s limbs, rather than those of some other person, is therefore guaranteed by the proprioceptive mode. No such thing happens when the subject sees the position of her limbs in the mirror, as in (1); for the perceptual mode does not guarantee that the person whose limbs are seen is the subject. What it guarantees, however, is that the person who sees is the subject, i.e. the person undergoing the visual experience.

II. Immunity and the explicit/implicit distinction

2.1 *Implicit de se* thoughts

When the subject feels that her legs are crossed, from inside, only the position of the legs are represented, I said. The subject is not represented but is involved implicitly through the proprioceptive mode, whose informational deliverances can only concern the subject. Self-ascriptions of bodily properties based on proprioceptive experience are therefore immune to error through misidentification. In contrast, when the subject is represented in the content of her experience, as when she sees herself in the mirror, she is represented ‘as object’, from a third person point of view. The state is first-personal only derivatively, because the subject identifies the object represented as herself, the subject of experience. That gives rise to the possibility of errors, if the subject’s identification is mistaken. Still, in that situation, the subject is at the same time given ‘as subject’, through the experiential mode: she is the person
seeing the scene in the mirror, at the same time as she is the person seen. The subject is thus involved twice, as is apparent from the explicit judgment one can make on the basis of such a visual experience of oneself: ‘I see that my legs are crossed’. The initial occurrence of ‘I’ corresponds to a first-personal feature of the experience that is not reflected in its content (since the seeer is not part of what is seen). The second occurrence of the first person (‘my’) corresponds to an aspect of the content of the experience: the person whose legs are seen in the mirror to be crossed. Now the judgment is immune to error through misidentification with respect to the first occurrence of the first person, which is a use of ‘I’ as subject; but the same judgment is vulnerable to misidentification errors with respect to the second occurrence of the first person (‘my legs’): for the subject may be wrong in identifying herself as the person whose legs are seen. This strongly suggests that there is immunity to error through misidentification to the extent that the subject of experience is not represented in the content of the experiential state, but is involved implicitly through the mode.

In *Perspectival Thought*, on the basis of that observation, I distinguished between implicit and explicit *de se* thoughts, and I deemed immunity to error through misidentification a distinguishing property of implicit *de se* thoughts. Thoughts that are implicitly *de se* involve no reference to the self at the level of content: what makes them *de se* is simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. The subject serves as ‘circumstance of evaluation’ for the judgement, rather than being a constituent of content. Or, to put it in slightly different terms, in such cases the content of the thought is not a complete proposition ascribing a certain property to an object (viz., the subject himself/herself): the content is the property, but to think the thought — or to think it in the relevant mode — is, for the subject, to self-ascribe that property (Loar 1976 : 358; Lewis 1979; Chisholm 1979, 1981). In such cases the subject is given only ‘as subject’. It is not given as an object that one has to identify as oneself, but it is directly given as oneself, the subject of experience.

In the framework set up in *Perspectival Thought* a connection is drawn between three distinctions, corresponding to three basic questions:

(i) The subject/object distinction. Question: Is the subject given ‘as object’, as when she sees herself in the mirror, or is the subject only given ‘as subject’?
(ii) The implicit/explicit distinction. Question: Is the subject explicitly represented in the content of the thought, or is the content selfless, in which case the first-personal character of the thought comes from outside its content?
(iii) The distinction between first-person judgments that are immune to error through misidentification and those that are not. Question: Could it be that the subject is justified in holding that something is F, but mistaken in ascribing the property to herself?

The first distinction is Wittgenstein’s, and it is, indeed, closely related to the third distinction, also introduced by Wittgenstein, between first person judgments that are immune to error through misidentification and first person judgments that are not (Wittgenstein 1958). To be immune to error through misidentification, a first person judgment must be truly subjective. The subject must not be thought of as an object which one identifies as oneself; for if it is, the judgment rests on an identity (‘b = myself’) and is subject to identification errors.

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3 The terminology, of course, comes from Shoemaker (1968).
The second distinction is an application of Perry’s famous contrast between ‘concerning’ and ‘being about’ (Perry 1986; Recanati 2007). A judgment like ‘It is raining’ is said to concern the place where the subject is, even if that place is not explicitly represented. The content of the judgment is not a complete proposition, but (as Perry puts it) a ‘propositional function’, true of a place; when the judgment is made, it is applied to the place which the judgment concerns (the place of utterance, typically). ‘It is raining here’ has a different content: this time, the place the subject is in is explicitly represented in the content of the thought, which is fully propositional. The truth-conditions of the two thoughts are the same: both are true iff it is raining at the place where the subject is. But the place only comes into the picture as (parameter of the) circumstance of evaluation in the first type of case, without being represented in the content that is evaluated with respect to the place in question; while in the explicit case, the location is represented in the content. Note that, in this type of case, the situation of evaluation has to be ‘bigger’ than in the previous case; for the only reason why one makes the location explicit by feeding it into the content is that a potential contrast is drawn between the place in question (where it is raining) and some other places (Recanati 1997: 54-55). The situation of evaluation has to be big enough to include all the locations, between which a contrast is drawn (Recanati 2000: 65-66).

When no contrast is at issue, because only one place — the place we are in — is relevant and matters to our present purposes, it does not have to be represented explicitly in the content. The role of representational content is to keep track of whatever is susceptible to variation; what is invariant and fixed does not have to be represented. This principle applies to the cases we have discussed. A good example is the proprioceptive case: proprioception can only give us information about ourselves, so there is no need to represent the subject whose bodily condition is proprioceptively represented, since there are no relevant alternatives. Just as the content of ‘It is raining’ is a location-neutral content, true at some places and false at others, the content of a proprioceptive state is a person-neutral content, true at some persons and false at others. When the judgment is made, the relativized content is applied to the place, or the person, which the judgment concerns, and this is determined by factors external to content (the mode, in the proprioceptive case). Immunity to error through misidentification precisely arises from the fact that the subject which the judgment concerns is determined by the experiential mode in an invariant manner. Given the nature of the state, it can only concern the subject; there simply is no alternative, hence no possibility of error.

Was I right, in Perspectival Thought, to equate subjectivity to content-selflessness, and to treat immunity as the hallmark of implicit de se thoughts? Yes and no. I maintain what I said above, namely, that there is immunity to error through misidentification to the extent that the subject of experience is not represented in the content of the experiential state. So I maintain the gist of the theory, but would like to present a subtler and more exact picture of the relations between experience, first person judgment and immunity. The critical issue is this: is it possible for an explicit de se thought, that is, a thought in which the subject is explicitly represented, to be immune to error through misidentification? The framework set up in Perspectival Thought seems to rule out this possibility, but it is important, indeed essential, to make room for it. In other words, I wish to deny that only implicit de se thoughts display primitive immunity to error through misidentification (contrary to what I suggested in Perspectival Thought). Explicit de se thoughts can also be IEM in a non-derivative manner. Still, I will maintain, the experience on which such a judgment is based has to fit the above description, i.e., its content has to be selfless.

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4 Note that my interpretation of the distinction (actually the standard interpretation) is not exactly the same as Perry’s original proposal.

5 I am indebted to Daniel Morgan for pressing this point on me.
2.2 The immunity of explicit de se thoughts

Above I mentioned ‘the explicit judgment one can make on the basis of a visual experience of oneself’, and I said that such a judgment (‘I see that my legs are crossed’) is IEM with respect to the first occurrence of the first-person, though not with respect to the second. Does this not establish that explicit first-person judgments can be IEM? It does, and it is easy to come up with examples of explicit de se thoughts displaying IEM.

First, I mentioned that we make something explicit when a contrast between that thing and various alternatives is relevant. Thus I say ‘It is raining here’ (rather than merely: ‘It is raining’) only if I intend to contrast the present location, where it is raining, with other locations where it is not. Now a first-person judgment based on proprioceptive evidence and therefore immune to error through misidentification can be explicit precisely because such a contrast is relevant: ‘My legs are crossed (in contrast to my neighbour’s)’. This can be said, not because one sees one’s legs in the mirror, but because one feels one’s legs and knows, on the basis of pure proprioceptive evidence, that they are crossed. Here no identification mistake can arise: being proprioceptive, my evidence can only concern myself. Still, I intend to contrast the position of my legs (known in this immune manner) with the position of other people’s legs; and that contrast justifies making the subject explicit. It would be implausible to maintain that the content of such a (contrastive) judgment is ‘selfless’. Likewise, suppose I am asked: ‘How many people in this room are such that their legs are crossed?’ I can respond ‘Peter, Jim, and me’, even though I have third-person evidence based upon visual observation (subject to identification errors) in the case of Peter and Jim, and proprioceptive evidence (not subject to identification errors) in my own case. Who could deny that I explicitly refer to myself in the response, just as I explicitly refer to Peter and Jim?

Or consider ‘mixed’ inferences involving first person thoughts with different IEM-status, e.g. ‘I am standing, I was born in Paris, therefore someone who was born in Paris is standing’ (or ‘someone was born in Paris and is standing’). The first premiss is a first person judgment based on kinaesthetic evidence (hence immune to error through misidentification), but the second premiss is not IEM: ‘I was born in Paris’ is an ‘objective’ judgment about myself, based on evidence that is not experiential or intrinsically first-personal, and it is subject to misidentification errors. The inference seems to be an enthymeme with the following form:

\[ a \text{ is } \text{F} \]
\[ a \text{ is } \text{G} \]
\[ \exists x \ (x \text{ is } \text{F} & \ x \text{ is } \text{G}) \]

How shall we account for that inference if we do not treat the first judgment as having the ‘categoric’ structure ‘\( a \text{ is } \text{F} \)’, but as being subjectless (‘thetic’) and akin to ‘It is raining’?\(^6\)

Faced with such examples, we should give up the claim that only implicit de se thoughts are immune to error through misidentification, i.e., that the IEM character of a judgment is due to the selflessness of the content of that judgment. What needs to have selfless content is the experience on which a first-person judgment has to be based in order to display immunity; but the content of the judgment may be more complex and may explicitly

\(^6\) On the ‘thetic/categoric’ distinction, elaborated by Marty (after Brentano), see Kuroda 1972. Roughly, the content of a thetic judgment is ‘simple’ and corresponds to the content of a predicate, while the content of a categoric judgment is more complex since it contains something that corresponds to the subject of which something is predicated.
represent the subject of experience, without the judgment’s losing its immunity. Or so I will argue.

Consider the kinaesthetic experience of a subject who knows, from inside, that he is standing. I maintain that the content of that experience just is the property of standing, which is detected on what, in *Perspectival Thought*, I called the ‘internal mode’. I also maintain that the experience outputs a judgment (the primary judgment, that which is immediately based on the experience and/or constitutive of it’) with the same thetic content, namely a property which the subject self-ascribes. That judgment is what I call an implicit *de se* thought, a type of first-person thought which is IEM because the subject’s involvement is secured through the mode of the grounding experience. Now whenever something is contributed by the mode rather than part of content, it is possible to make it explicit by entertaining a more complex thought the content of which involves that very component. The transition from the simple to the more complex thought I call ‘Reflection’ (Recanati 1997, 2000) : it is non-inferential and requires no new evidence on the part of the subject. Thus a subject who, on the basis of perception, forms the thought ‘It is raining’ is automatically entitled to judge ‘It is raining here’, without any extra evidence being required on his or her part. (The subject only needs to have the conceptual resources required to entertain a thought explicitly about his or her current location.) That is so because perception is bound to concern the place where the perceiver is. ‘It is raining here’ simply makes explicit something that is already implicit in the experience which grounds the simpler judgment ‘It is raining’. Similarly, if, on the basis of his proprioceptive experience, the subject forms the explicit first person judgment that his own legs are crossed (in contrast to his neighbour’s), the content of that judgment differs from the simpler, selfless content of the experience (and of the primary judgment that goes with it), but nothing in addition to the experience in question is required to ground the more complex judgment : it simply makes explicit what was already conveyed by the mode of the grounding experience.

To sum up : Reflection is a transition which involves making explicit (in the content of the judgment) something that was not part of the content but was nevertheless implicitly contributed through the mode of the grounding experience. That element was already present in the semantics of the simple judgment through the situation of evaluation relevant to it (which situation is determined by the mode, according to *Perspectival Thought*). Thus the content of an implicit *de se* thought is ‘person-relative’ and is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject, just as the content of the perceptual judgment ‘It is raining’ is location-relative and evaluated with respect to the place of perception. Equivalently we can say, with Lewis, that the content of an implicit *de se* thought is a property which the thinker self-ascribes. Such a thought indeed involves a self-ascription, albeit an implicit one, and that self-ascription is immune to identification errors since it is driven by the mode and does not allow for alternatives. Reflection preserves immunity because no extra premiss — and in particular no identity premiss — comes into play in the transition from the experience and the primary judgment to the more explicit judgment. So a judgment is immune to error through misidentification if it is implicitly *de se*, that is, if the subject is not represented in the content of the judgment but his or her involvement is secured by the mode of the grounding experience ; yet an explicit *de se* thought may also be IEM if it has the same grounds as an implicit *de se* thought. In the above example, the kinaesthetic experience justifies both the implicit *de se* thought and the more reflective *de se* thought in which the subject’s involvement is made explicit.

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7 It does not matter for my purposes whether one construes the judgment in question as constitutive of the experience or as immediately based on it, and I will leave that issue open.
Above I characterized primitive IEM negatively: a judgment displays primitive IEM just in case (i) the judgment is IEM (i.e., its grounds do not include an identity ‘a = b’) and (ii) it does not inherit its intentional object from another IEM judgment. By this definition, explicit de se thoughts based upon a first-person experience are IEM just like the primary judgment immediately based upon (or constitutive of) the experience. The only difference between the implicit de se thought and its explicit counterpart is that the latter proceeds through Reflection and requires, on the part of the thinker, the conceptual ability to self-refer, i.e., the possession of a concept of “self”.

2.3 Reflection, immunity, and indexicality

One might think that an additional premiss is needed to go from the simple judgment ‘It is raining’ to the explicit ‘It is raining here’, namely a premiss to the effect that the simple judgment (because it is based on perception) concerns the place where the thinker is. That, however, would be a mistake. No such premiss is actually needed because the fact that the simple judgment ‘It is raining’ concerns the place where the subject is is constitutive of that judgment, on the view under discussion. A judgment is individuated both in terms of its content and in terms of the situation it concerns; this duality at the judgment level reflects the mode/content duality at the experiential level. So if the judgment concerned a different place (a place that had just been talked about, for example), it would be a different judgment, though one with the same content (in the narrow sense of ‘content’).8

An additional premiss would be needed only if the place which the judgment concerns was identified in a ‘detached’ manner as, say, the city of Cajarc, rather than indexically as the place where the subject is. There is indeed a clear difference between the transition from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ and the transition from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’. The former depends upon an auxiliary premiss to the effect that Cajarc is the place where the subject is located. Because of that additional premiss, it may be that the judgment ‘It is raining’ is correct and justified (if e.g. the subject sees and feels rain) even though the explicit judgment ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ is not: that will be the case if the subject is wrong to assume that he is in Cajarc. But the subject cannot simultaneously be right in making the perceptual judgment that it is raining and wrong in making the more complex judgment ‘It is raining here’.

To account for the difference between the two transitions — from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’, and from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’ — I suggest that we consider the latter as more complex than the former, and as presupposing it. Reflection is what takes us from ‘It is raining’ to ‘It is raining here’. As I pointed out, that transition is automatically justified and requires no additional premiss. In the explicit judgment ‘It is raining here’, the place is identified indexically via the contextual relation the subject bears to it (the relation of being in that place). To get to ‘It is raining in Cajarc’, the place in question must be identified in a detached manner, independently of that relation. Such an identification requires a supplementary premiss such as ‘here = Cajarc’. The pattern is:

(A) It is raining (primary judgment)
(B) It is raining here (from A, by Reflection)
(C) Here = Cajarc (additional premiss)

8 In the framework set up in Perspectival Thought, there are two levels of content, broadly understood. The content in the narrow sense (or lekton) is the (possibly relativized) content we evaluate at a circumstance, while the ‘Austinian proposition’ is constituted by the lekton together with the relevant situation of evaluation.
It is raining in Cajarc (from B and C, through substitution of identicals)

Since (C) may be mistaken, (D) is subject to misidentification errors, while (B) is not.

The same pattern applies in the first person case. When the subject knows, from inside, that he is standing, the content of his experiential state is the property of standing, which the subject implicitly self-ascribes (or evaluates with respect to himself) in virtue of the first-person quality of the experiential mode. Through Reflection the subject can make his own involvement explicit and represent himself as the bearer of the property: ‘I am standing’. That transition requires no additional premiss: nothing more than the original first-person experience is required to ground the explicit self-ascription, since a feature of that experience (the first person quality of the mode) justifies ascribing the detected property to the subject of experience. An additional premiss is required only if the subject identifies himself in a detached manner as, say, François Recanati. The same pattern recurs:

(A’) Standing (primary judgment, implicitly de se)
(B’) I am standing (from A’, by Reflection)
(C’) I am François Recanati (additional premiss)
(D’) F. Recanati is standing (from B’ and C’, through substitution of identicals)

The final judgment, (D’), is vulnerable to misidentification errors, for it rests on a prior judgment of identity, (C’), which may be mistaken. (Perhaps I am not François Recanati, contrary to what I believe.) But the self-ascription (B’), explicit though it is, is immune to errors through misidentification because its justificational basis is identical to that of the primary judgment. The judgment resulting from Reflection is justified just in case the primary judgment is justified, so no new possibility of error is generated by the transition from the primary judgment to the explicit self-ascription, when the latter involves an indexical mode of presentation such as ‘I’ or ‘here’. 9

Why does the output of Reflection have to involve indexical concepts such as those expressed by the words ‘here’, ‘I’ or ‘now’? Because such concepts are ways of thinking of objects through contextual relations the subject bears to them, and these relations to the objects of thought are implied by the experiential modes. In the explicit judgment ‘It is raining here’, the place is identified indexically via the contextual relation the subject bears to it: the relation of being in that place. Now the subject has to stand in that relation to a place in order to gain information perceptually from it (i.e. in order to know, through perception, what happens in that place). Similarly, in the explicit de se thought ‘I am standing’, the object to which the property of standing is ascribed is identified indexically via the relation of identity to the thinking subject; 10 and the subject can gain information about an object on the

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9 Of course, an explicit self-ascription such as ‘I am standing’ or ‘My legs are crossed’ can be subject to misidentification errors if it is based not on the subject’s kinaesthetic experience, as in (2’), but on a visual experience, as in (1c) above (section 2.1). The explicit self-ascription now depends upon an identity premiss, viz. (1b), which may be false.

10 That does not mean that the subject has to be able to think about the relation of identity between himself and the object of thought. Indexical concepts are best construed as mental files based upon contextual relations to the referent (Recanati 2010). To think of an object through contextual relations to that object just is to think of it by means of such a mental file. What makes it the case that the file is based upon a certain contextual relation to the referent is the fact that (i) it exists only as long as the contextual relation to the object endures, and (ii) the reference of the file is determined by the relation. But the contextual relation on which the file is based does not have to be represented by the owner of the file.
proprioceptive/kinaesthetic mode only if he or she stands in that relation (identity) to that object. So, to cut a long story short, the reason why the outputs of Reflection have to involve indexical concepts is that indexical concepts are those concepts which exploit the contextual relations to the environment on which experience implicitly depends.

III. The immunity of demonstrative judgments

3.1 A putative problem for my account

As we have seen, demonstrative judgements, like first-person judgments, can be immune to error through misidentification. The subject who sees a man running cannot reasonably wonder: ‘Someone is running, but is it that man’? Intuitively, the reason why the demonstrative judgment ‘That man is running’ is immune to error through misidentification is that the information that someone is running is acquired through looking at the man in question, in such a way that the (general) information that someone is running cannot be dissociated from the (singular) information that that man is running.11 If the singular information turns out to be illusory, one cannot retreat to the existential generalization ‘Someone is running’; once exposed as illusory, the experience no longer provides one with any grounds for holding that someone is running – it seemed that someone was running, namely that man, but that turned out to be illusory! As Evans used to put it, ‘there is no gap’ between the information that someone is running, and the information that that man is, and that is what gives rise to immunity (Evans 1982: 180, 182, 221).

It is unclear, however, that the immunity of demonstrative judgments can be handled in the way I have suggested for the first person case. According to my account, when a singular judgment ‘a is F’ is immune to error through misidentification, the object to which the property of being F is ascribed is not explicitly represented in the experience which grounds the ascription, but is determined by the experiential mode. Demonstrative judgments provide an apparent counter-example to that analysis, for they can be immune, yet there is hardly any doubt that the object to which the property is ascribed is represented in the content of the judgment.

Demonstrative judgments involve selectively attending to some object as opposed to others; they rest on discrimination (Strawson 1959: 18-19). As David Kaplan puts it, the use of a demonstrative must be accompanied by a ‘demonstration’, typically ‘a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing’ (Kaplan 1989: 490). Qua mode of presentation of the reference of the demonstrative, the standard form of the demonstration, he says, is

The individual that has appearance A from here now

‘where an appearance is something like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject’ (Kaplan 1989: 526). These characterizations, which I take to be phenomenologically correct, suggest that demonstrative thought is essentially contrastive: something is discriminated from other things (the rest of the ‘picture’) through an act of selective attention,

11 Campbell gives an example (the ‘transparent chair’ example) in which the property detected by looking at some object is not actually instantiated by that object but by another object (Campbell 1997: 69-70). Space prevents me from discussing that alleged counterexample to the claim that demonstrative judgments like ‘That man is running’ are IEM, and I will simply take it for granted that they are.
represented by the ‘pointing’ or the ‘little arrow’. Now this essentially contrastive character comports badly with the idea that the object to which the property is ascribed in a demonstrative judgment might remain implicit; for something remains implicit only when there is no need to make it explicit, because no alternative is salient enough. As I said above (§2.2), ‘we make something explicit when a contrast between that thing and various alternatives is relevant.’ Now the idea of contrast seems to be built into the very notion of a demonstrative thought. If that is right, then the immunity of demonstrative judgments such as ‘That man is running’ cannot be explained by appealing to the idea that the demonstrated object remains implicit.

The same point can be pressed by considering the example we discussed above:

(1a) That man’s legs are crossed [said or thought while looking at someone in the mirror]
(1b) Oh, but that man is myself!
(1c) (So) my legs are crossed

The conclusion (1c) is a first person judgment that is subject to misidentification errors, because it rests upon an identity, namely (1b). There is no doubt that, in (1c), the subject explicitly identifies himself as the person whose legs are crossed. The form of the reasoning is as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
    b & \text{ is } F \\
    a & = b \\
    a & \text{ is } F
\end{align*}
\]

But if a demonstrative judgment like (1a) has the categoric structure ‘\( b \text{ is } F \)’, does it not follow that the explanation of IEM I have offered is wrong? After all, (1a) is just as immune to error through misidentification as ‘That man is running’ in the earlier example. By looking at a man, the subject gains the information that someone is F (running, or such that his legs are crossed), and that information cannot be separated from the singular information that the man in question (‘that man’) is F. So (1a) is immune to error through misidentification, yet its structure is the standard categoric structure ‘\( b \text{ is } F \)’. It is not an implicit \textit{de re} thought in which only the property of being F is represented, the object to which the property is ascribed being determined in some other way.

3.2 \textit{Implicit de re thoughts}

What are we to think of these objections? The second one should not carry much weight, for I have \textit{already} conceded that a judgment may be explicitly about an object (hence of the ‘\( a \text{ is } F \)’ type) while still being immune to error through misidentification of the object in question. In the revised version of the theory, the immunity of a judgment does not entail that its object (the object with respect to which there can be no error through misidentification) remains implicit. What needs to have thetic (rather than categoric) content is not the immune judgment itself, but the experience on which it is based (and the primary judgment that goes with it, whatever its exact status). So we may grant (1a) the categoric structure ‘\( a \text{ is } F \)’, just as we treated explicit \textit{de se} thoughts as having such structure.

As for the first objection, we could also accept that, insofar as it rests on a contrast between the object that is judged to be F and other objects, a demonstrative judgment ‘That G is F’ is explicitly about the demonstrated object. Once again, that is compatible with the judgment’s being immune. Still, we can make sense of the idea that, underlying an explicit
demonstrative judgment like (1a), there is a more basic judgment that is implicitly *de re*, and whose content matches the content of the experience.

The evidence in favour of implicit *de re* judgments comes from Pryor’s discussion of ‘which object-misidentification’, a topic I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. Pryor gives the following example. I smell a skunky odor in my garden and think ‘There is a skunk in my garden’. That, Pryor says, is an existential judgment: I do not think of any animal in particular that it is a skunk in my garden. If now a small animal suddenly appears in full sight, I will presumably think of *it* — that animal — that it is a skunk (in my garden). That may be a mistake, though: there may be a real skunk, hidden in the bushes, responsible for the smell, while the animal I see is a different species altogether. Here, Pryor says, misidentification occurs, yet no identity ‘*a* = *b*’ is involved, for the mistake does not consist in moving from ‘*b* is *F*’ to ‘*a* is *F*’: rather, we move from a purely existential statement ‘Some *x* is *F*’ to a singular instance ‘*a* is *F*’.

It may be argued, following Coliva (2006), that there is an identity premiss in the skunk case, though one that involves a definite description: ‘That animal = the thing responsible for the smell.’ Still, there is a problem: an identity assumption ‘*a* = *b*’ can only take us from ‘*b* is *F*’ to ‘*a* is *F*’. It does not take us from ‘Some *x* is *F*’ to ‘*b* is *F*’ in the first place. Nor does the absence of any such assumption explain, without further background, why in some cases (as Pryor claims) the step from ‘Some *x* is *F*’ to ‘*b* is *F*’ is immune to the sort of error which the example illustrates. To address these worries, one might be tempted to flatly deny Pryor’s intuition that the judgment based on the smell experience is not about any particular object, but has existential force (‘There is a skunk in the garden’). The judgment, one might suggest, is *de re*, appearances notwithstanding: it is about the object one is smelling. The mistake consists in equating that object with the object one is seeing, and that is a standard case of *de re* misidentification.

I think this diagnostic is right, to a large extent; yet I also think Pryor’s intuition is essentially correct: the initial judgment (immediately based upon the smell experience) is not *de re* in the classical sense – it does not have the form ‘*a* is *F*’. Rather than putting it in existential form, as Pryor does, it would be more revealing perhaps to couch the content of the judgment in impersonal form: ‘It is skunky’, on the pattern of ‘It is raining’. Or, even better, we can think of it as simply the content of a predicate: ‘Skunk!’ , on the pattern of implicit *de se* thoughts. In this case too, arguably, it is the experiential mode which determines that with respect to which the predicate is to be evaluated.

In the case of a smell experience (in contrast to the case of proprioception), the properties that are detected on the olfactory mode are properties of the object or objects that one is smelling. Just as in the proprioception case, the experience, with its thetic content, can give rise to two judgments: one (the primary judgment) that has the same thetic content, and one that makes explicit the contribution of the mode. So, on the basis of your smell experience, you can judge ‘Skunk!’ / ‘It is skunky’, or more explicitly: ‘That [which I smell] is a skunk’. In the former case, no mistake can be made as to which object is a skunk since no object is identified: the content is simply the property of being a skunk, and the object this concerns is determined by the experiential mode, leaving the subject no choice. When we make explicit the contribution of the mode by entertaining a more complex content with categorial structure (‘That [which I smell] is a skunk’) immunity is retained: the epistemological situation does not change because no extra evidence is needed to make the more complex judgment. It is simply a matter of making explicit what was already implicit. Misidentification occurs only at a later stage, when we move from ‘That [which I smell] is a skunk’ to ‘That [which I see] is a skunk’ (using the identity ‘That [which I smell] = that [which I see]’). The pattern is by now familiar:
(A’’) Skunk! (primary judgment, implicitly de re)
(B’’) That [which I smell] is a skunk (from A’’, by Reflection)
(C’’) That [which I smell] = that [which I see] (additional premiss)
(D’’) That [which I see] is a skunk (from B’’ and C’’, through substitution of identicals)

On the view we arrive at, demonstrative thoughts themselves come in two varieties: implicit and explicit. The element of discrimination and contrast which is arguably characteristic of demonstrative thoughts only affects the content of explicit demonstrative thoughts. Implicit demonstrative judgments do rely upon an act of selective attention, but the content of such thoughts is restricted to the properties that are detected through the attentional act. The object those properties are ascribed to is determined not via the content of the thought but via the experiential mode: the object is whatever has grabbed the subject’s attention.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented a revision, and a defence, of the approach to immunity sketched in my book Perspectival Thought. The content of an experiential state is distinguished from its mode, and the mode is seen as contributing (or constraining) the situation with respect to which the content of the state is to be evaluated. Semantically, this gives us two levels of content (broadly speaking) for an experiential state and the primary judgment it gives rise to: the content in the narrow sense, or lekton, and the ‘Austinian proposition’ consisting of that content together with the relevant situation of evaluation. Whatever is part of the situation of evaluation as determined by the mode is fixed independently of the content of the judgment, and cannot be misrepresented since it is not represented at all. Immunity to error through misidentification follows.

The main revision to the original view is this. I acknowledge that immunity is not an exclusive property of those ascriptions that are implicitly conveyed by the judgments whose explicit content is ‘thetic’: a judgment may be immune to error through misidentification of its object even if the latter is explicitly represented, provided the explicit representation results from ‘Reflection’. Reflection makes the objects of thought explicit by deploying indexical concepts which refer to them through relations to these objects which are already implied by the mode of the grounding experience.

In the last part of the paper I have tackled the issue of immunity as applied to demonstrative judgments. Just as first person judgments, I argued, demonstrative judgments can be either explicit or implicit. An explicit demonstrative judgment deploys a demonstrative concept based upon the relation of attending to the referent; an implicit demonstrative judgment is based upon the same relation but represents only the observed features of the object attended to, not the object itself (indexically or otherwise). Again, immunity to error through misidentification follows from the unarticulated nature of the object in the implicit case, and is preserved when the object is made indexically explicit through Reflection.

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