Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Too much ado about belief

Abstract : Three commitments guide Dennett's approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls 'heterophenomenology.' Third, a 'doxological' commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject's beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/ appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett's third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett's doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [27 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Friday, January 18, 2013 - 2:34:53 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, April 19, 2013 - 4:03:22 AM




Jérôme Dokic, Elisabeth Pacherie. Too much ado about belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Springer Verlag, 2007, 6, pp.185-200. ⟨10.1007/s11097-006-9036-9⟩. ⟨ijn_00777972⟩



Record views


Files downloads