Too much ado about belief

Abstract : Three commitments guide Dennett's approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls 'heterophenomenology.' Third, a 'doxological' commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject's beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/ appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett's third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett's doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming
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Article dans une revue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Springer Verlag, 2007, 6, pp.185-200. 〈10.1007/s11097-006-9036-9〉
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Soumis le : vendredi 18 janvier 2013 - 14:34:53
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
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Jérôme Dokic, Elisabeth Pacherie. Too much ado about belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Springer Verlag, 2007, 6, pp.185-200. 〈10.1007/s11097-006-9036-9〉. 〈ijn_00777972〉

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