Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Framing Joint Action

Abstract : Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert's account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman's account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach's version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [1 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00778372
Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Saturday, January 19, 2013 - 7:51:44 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 31, 2020 - 11:46:08 AM
Document(s) archivé(s) le : Saturday, April 20, 2013 - 3:54:26 AM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : ijn_00778372, version 1

Collections

Citation

Elisabeth Pacherie. Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011, 2 (2), pp.173-192. ⟨ijn_00778372⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

717

Files downloads

1102