Framing Joint Action

Abstract : Many philosophers have offered accounts of shared actions aimed at capturing what makes joint actions intentionally joint. I first discuss two leading accounts of shared intentions, proposed by Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. I argue that Gilbert's account imposes more normativity on shared intentions than is strictly needed and that Bratman's account requires too much cognitive sophistication on the part of agents. I then turn to the team-agency theory developed by economists that I see as offering an alternative route to shared intention. I concentrate on Michael Bacharach's version of team-agency theory, according to which shared agency is a matter of team-reasoning, team-reasoning depends on group identification and group identification is the result of processes of self-framing. I argue that it can yield an account of shared intention that is less normatively loaded and less cognitively demanding.
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Article dans une revue
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011, 2 (2), pp.173-192
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Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : samedi 19 janvier 2013 - 19:51:44
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 20 avril 2013 - 03:54:26


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Elisabeth Pacherie. Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011, 2 (2), pp.173-192. 〈ijn_00778372〉



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