Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control

Abstract : In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements,thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.
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Social psychology, JSTOR, 2011, 42 (1), pp.67-73. 〈10.1027/1864-9335/a000044〉
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00778373
Contributeur : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Soumis le : samedi 19 janvier 2013 - 20:04:30
Dernière modification le : samedi 21 avril 2018 - 16:26:02
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Elisabeth Pacherie. Nonconceptual representations for action and the limits of intentional control. Social psychology, JSTOR, 2011, 42 (1), pp.67-73. 〈10.1027/1864-9335/a000044〉. 〈ijn_00778373〉

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