Abstract : Over the past fifty years the philosophy of language and mind has been dominated by a nondescriptivist approach to content and reference. This book attempts to recast and systematize that approach by offering an indexical model in terms of mental files. According to Recanati, we refer through mental files, the function of which is to store information derived through certain types of contextual relation the subject bears to objects in his or her environment. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally, so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis-)information it contains. Mental files are the mental equivalent of singular terms, and the reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. On this approach, mental files, the vehicles of singular thought, do all the work of so-called 'modes of presentation' in Fregean and neo-Russellian theories.
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [250 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : François Recanati <>
Soumis le : dimanche 3 février 2013 - 09:28:33
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 4 mai 2013 - 02:40:08


  • HAL Id : ijn_00784032, version 1



François Recanati. MENTAL FILES. Oxford University Press, 2012. 〈ijn_00784032〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers