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Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite

Abstract : Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or 'lite' notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach's approach to team-agency theory in terms of framing, group identification and team reasoning. I argue that the account of shared intentions this approach yields is less cognitively and conceptually demanding than other accounts and is thus applicable to the intentional joint actions performed by young children. I also argue that it has limitations of its own and that considering what these limitations are may help us understand why we sometimes need to take other routes to shared intentions.
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Contributor : Elisabeth Pacherie <>
Submitted on : Friday, October 11, 2013 - 12:11:39 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 9:58:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, January 12, 2014 - 4:31:57 AM




Elisabeth Pacherie. Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite. Synthese, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2013, 190 (10), pp.1817-1839. ⟨10.1007/s11229-013-0263-7⟩. ⟨ijn_00872152⟩



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